On 8/2/2011 2:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, "Stephen P. King"<[email protected]> wrote:
The point is that there is a point where the best possible
model or
computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The
fact that
it is impossible to create a model of a weather system that can
predict
*all* of its future behavior does not equal to a proof that one
cannot
create an approximately accurate model of a weather system. One
has to
trade off accuracy for feasibility.
I agree that's true, and by that definition, we can certainly make
cybernetic systems which can approximate the appearance of
consciousness in the eyes of most human clients of those systems for
the scope of their intended purpose. To get beyond that level of
accuracy, you may need to get down to the cellular, genetic, or
molecular level, in which case it's not really worth the trouble
of re-
inventing life just to get a friendlier sounding voicemail.
Craig
So now you agree that a simulation of a brain at the molecular
level would suffice to produce consciousness (although of course it
would be much more efficient to actually use molecules instead of
computationally simulating them). This would be a good reason to
say 'no' to the doctor, since even though you could simulate the
molecules and their interactions, quantum randomness would prevent
you from controlling their interactions with the molecules in the
rest of your brain. Bruno's argument would still go through, but
the 'doctor' might have to replace not only your brain but a big
chunk of the universe with which it interacts. However, most
people who have read Tegmark's paper understand that the brain must
be essentially classical as a computer and so a simulation, even
one of molecules, could be quasi-classical, i.e. local.
Brent
Hi Brent,
I wonder if you would make a friendly wager with me about the
veracity of Tegmark's claims about the brain being "essentially
classical"? I bet $1 US (payable via Paypal) that he is dead wrong
*and* that the proof that the brain actively involves quantum
phenomena that are discounted by Tegmark will emerge within two
years. We already have evidence that the photosynthesis process in
plants involves quantum coherence, there is an experiment being
designed now to test the coherence in the retina of the human eye.
http://www.ghuth.com/2010/02/03/another-finding-of-quantum-coherence-in-a-photosynthetic-biological-system/
http://www.ghuth.com/2011/04/24/quantum-coherence-and-the-retina/
Those are not really to the point. Of course the brain involves
quantum processes and some of these involve coherence for short
times. But Tegmark argues that the times are too short to be
relevant to neural signaling and information processing. There's an
implicit assumption that neural activity is responsible for thought -
that the 'doctor' could substitute at the neuron level. I think this
is right and it is supported by evolutionary considerations. We
wouldn't want an intelligent Mars Rover to make decisions based on
quantum randomness except in rare circumstance (like Buridan's ass)
and it wouldn't be evolutionarily advantageous for an organism on
Earth. I'm glad to accept your bet; except that I'm not sure how to
resolve it. It don't think finding something like the energy
transfer involving coherence in photosynthesis or photon detection is
relevant.
No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other
things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated into a whole.
What integrated whole do you refer to? Our memory of a life? How does
it account for it?
This leads to a situation that Daniel C. Dennett calls the "Cartesian
Theater". Dennett's proof that it cannot exist because it generates
infinite regress of homunculi inside humonculi is flawed because such
infinities can only occur if each of the humonculi has access to
sufficient computational resources to generate the rest of them. When
we understand that computations require the utilization of resources
and do not occur 'for free' we see that the entire case against
situations that imply the possibility of infinite regress fails.
I don't understand that. Are you agreeing with Dennett that an infinite
regress cannot occur or are you arguing that the need to pay for
resources makes them possible?
Quantum phenomena is NOT all about randomness. Frankly I would
really like to understand how that rubbish of an idea still is held
in seriously thinking people! There is not randomness in QM, there in
only the physical inability to predict exactly when some quantum event
will occur in advance. It is because QM system cannot be copied that
makes it impossible to predict their behavior in advance, not because
of some inherent randomness!
Sounds like a distinction without a difference. It's still a good
reason for evolution to favor a quasi-classical brain.
Take the infamous radioactive atom in the Schrodinger Cat box. Is its
decay strictly a "random" phenomena? Not really! QM says not one word
about randomness,
See Born's projection postulate.
it only allows us to calculate the half-life of said atom and that
calculation is as good as is possible given the fact that we cannot
generate a simulation of that atom and its environment and all of the
interactions thereof in a way that we can get predictions about its
behavior in advance.
As to your post here. Craig's point is that the simulated brain,
even if simulated down to the molecular level, will only be a
simulation and 'think simulate thoughts'. If said simulated brain
has a consiousness it will be its own, not that some other brain.
Craig's position seems to be more a blur than a point. He has said
that only biological neurons can instantiate consciousness and only a
conscious being can act like a conscious being. That would imply
that a being with an artificial, e.g. silicon chip based, brain
cannot act like a conscious being.
You care completely failing to understand that Craig is not stuck
in the box of canned answers to questions about the kinds of things
that we discuss in this List. While I will quibble with the claim that
"biological neurons can instantiate consciousness" as I believe that
consciousness is not just a 'phenomena of carbon based chemistry', it
is obvious that 'only a conscious being can act like a conscious
being", that follows from the basic principle of Identity. A thing is
itself and it behaves as itself would. A trivial fact but one that
gets ignored too often.
A consciousness can no more be copied than the state of a QM system.
That's the point in question. If Tegmark is right, it can.
Tegmark is wrong.
But you have not proposed any way to resolve the bet.
Brent
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