On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 7:54 AM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>wrote:
> On Aug 3, 1:37 am, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > What is your theory of identity? > > > > Would you agree that if a certain object has identical properties, > > roles, and relations that it is the same? > > Sameness is part of the phenomenology of pattern recognition, which is > a property of the subject. The subject's perception determines the > degree to which one complex of phenomena can be distinguished from > another. Ontologically, objectively, it may be that nothing is the > same as anything (possibly even as itself?) > > If you deny objectivity, then what determines the way carbon atoms feel in your theory? Further, if an object posesses identical properties in a given context, then it will appear identical to all observers in that same context. I see no need to define the objective properties in terms of observations (unless you need to explain some of the properties of quantum mechanics, which is a theory of observation in an infinitely large and diverse structure). > > If some object X in the context of this universe has the set of > > properties S. And some object Y in the context of a simulated > > universe has the same set of properties S. Then how can X be said to > > be different from Y? > > Because S is not an independent variable. S arises from the relation > between X and the observer Q utilizing antenna A, B, C, cumulatively > entangled through projection-perception coherence P. S(X) may appear > identical as S(Y) to P(Q) but another observer Q2 with antenna A, B, > D, and F is able to discern a difference, while observer Q3 with > antenna A cannot discern S(X) or S(Y) at all. > > Example: Color blind person Q sees two grey circles S(X) and S(Y) as > the same. Color sighted person Q2 sees a red and green circle S(X) and > S(Y) as different, and different in a specific qualitative way which > cannot be expressed or translated *in any way* to Q. Q3 is blind - as > a simulated brain would be to the contents and behaviors that we > attribute to that simulation, > If there is a detectable difference then the set of properties of an object must differ. If you assume the set of properties for the two circles is the same, then the two circles are the same. > > > You could say they exist in different contexts but then the existence > > of a difference becomes observer relative. A fire in the simulation > > only seems different from a fire in this universe because it is being > > comared from a different context. Likewise if our universe were a > > simulation then a fire in this universe would seem different from a > > fire in the universe hosting the simulation from the perspective of > > someone outside this universe. > > You are assuming that there is no difference between physical presence > and a simulation of a physical presence. You assume even if X = X, X might really not equal X. What is the difference between a carbon atom in this universe and an equivalent carbon atom in a universe of our creation (via simulation)? > I think it's important to > realize that all simulation requires physical resources, and therefore > demands a distinction between what can be simulated and what is itself > a resource. You can simulate the words in a book, but you cannot > simulate the physical book in your hands without it being an actual > book. Do you believe that what a simulated carbon atom feels depends on and is bound by what the underlying hardware is? What if I told you the program is written in Java? The atom would (despite having identical properties regardless of the underlying hardware) it would somehow be different or feel different, depending on whether I execute this program on a Mac, PC, Linux computer, or a set of ping pong balls and water pipes? What if I executed a simulation of a brain using a person's brain as the computer (Like the chinese room experiment) what would that simulated brain feel then? > My view is that awareness is resource dependent as well, but it > is not a simulation, it is the genuine experience of (or through) the > physical resource itself. > > But phone calls sound the same, whether they are carried on the physical network of copper, or fiber optics, or as logically represented as packets or circuits. It seems to me awareness if information dependent and independent of the physical medium. If I ran a simulated reality implemented as a Java program and hooked the inputs directly to my optic nerve, I would sense no difference if I ran the computer on an Intel or AMD processor, or any other physical architecture so long as it could meet the same frame rate. According to you, identity requires identical properties for all possible observers everywhere. If God fiddled with some unobservable or detectable property between two electrons such that only he could observe the difference (no one in this universe could) then that difference, according to your theory, may lead to important differences in what those two electrons could feel, despite the fact that the property makes no physical difference in any reaction. To me, this sounds almost like dualism, in which some particles or objects could be imbued with an invisible soul hich we could not detect, and that makes the difference between consciousness and unconsciousness. But even this you reject, since you say the presence of consciousness will eventually lead to detectable differences in behavior. I think so far your theory has led to many absurdities: - An entirely artificial brain cannot be conscious but if you add in a few biological neurons you can make the whole thing behave as if it were conscious. What about when these neurons are not active? Does the consciousness flicker on and off? - Muscles don't move because they are electrically stimulated by neurons but because they sympathize with some ghostly/unphysical desire or intention of the neurons. - There are some ways biological machines can respond to questions which non-biological machines could never replicate. Biological machines are super machines in this respect. Strong AI must be impossible. - Church-Turing is false - A fire in this universe, to be real, must cause fires outside this universe. (From God's perspective) - Neutrinos do not exist. Yet, if they did not exist, there would likely be no life in this universe, since they are responsible for causing dying stars to shed their outer layers into space, providing the necessary elements for life. - A person created not as the offspring between two humans (Like swamp man https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Swampman ) would not be conscious because he lacks the history of biological evolution. - A physically identical person (Like swamp man) since he is not conscious (or perhaps differently conscious), would behave differently. Despite being physically identical! Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
