On Aug 3, 10:45 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 7:54 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:
> > Sameness is part of the phenomenology of pattern recognition, which is
> > a property of the subject. The subject's perception determines the
> > degree to which one complex of phenomena can be distinguished from
> > another. Ontologically, objectively, it may be that nothing is the
> > same as anything (possibly even as itself?)
> If you deny objectivity, then what determines the way carbon atoms feel in
> your theory?

I don't deny objectivity, I just distinguish between the cognitive
understanding of two objects being alike or identical and the
noumenological nature of the two objects. As far as they way carbon
atoms feel, it's obviously sheer speculation and I'm not really trying
to assert a theory on the mechanics of how it works. Here's a little
visual aid I did last night: 

Feeling in general is sensorimotive phenomena, so it's the mirror
image of electromagnetism. What we would read as quantum events
(energy changes) caused by 'probability' would be experienced as a
kind of mood, so that externally it looks like probability, but
internally it feels something like stimulation and relaxation events,
(only much more primitive probably), and the more valence electrons
the atom has, the greater depth of perception and involvement it can

> Further, if an object posesses identical properties in a given context, then
> it will appear identical to all observers in that same context.  I see no
> need to define the objective properties in terms of observations (unless you
> need to explain some of the properties of quantum mechanics, which is a
> theory of observation in an infinitely large and diverse structure).

How can you say what properties an object possesses in any terms other
than that of an observation? All we know of the universe is what we
can observe or infer from what we observe.

> > > If some object X in the context of this universe has the set of
> > > properties S.  And some object Y in the context of a simulated
> > > universe has the same set of properties S.  Then how can X be said to
> > > be different from Y?
> > Because S is not an independent variable. S arises from the relation
> > between X and the observer Q utilizing antenna A, B, C, cumulatively
> > entangled through projection-perception coherence P.  S(X) may appear
> > identical as S(Y) to P(Q) but another observer Q2 with antenna A, B,
> > D, and F is able to discern a difference, while observer Q3 with
> > antenna A cannot discern S(X) or S(Y) at all.
> > Example: Color blind person Q sees two grey circles S(X) and S(Y) as
> > the same. Color sighted person Q2 sees a red and green circle S(X) and
> > S(Y) as different, and different in a specific qualitative way which
> > cannot be expressed or translated *in any way* to Q. Q3 is blind - as
> > a simulated brain would be to the contents and behaviors that we
> > attribute to that simulation,
> If there is a detectable difference then the set of properties of an object
> must differ.  If you assume the set of properties for the two circles is the
> same, then the two circles are the same.

Detectable to whom? There is no such thing as a 'detectable
difference' in an object. If you're color blind, there may not be a
detectable difference between red and green. If you're human there may
not be a detectable difference in the smell of a patch of soil that
contains truffles and one that does not. What I'm saying is that this
is what the cosmos is - interfering patterns of interior and exterior

> > > You could say they exist in different contexts but then the existence
> > > of a difference becomes observer relative.  A fire in the simulation
> > > only seems different from a fire in this universe because it is being
> > > comared from a different context.  Likewise if our universe were a
> > > simulation then a fire in this universe would seem different from a
> > > fire in the universe hosting the simulation from the perspective of
> > > someone outside this universe.
> > You are assuming that there is no difference between physical presence
> > and a simulation of a physical presence.
> You assume even if X = X, X might really not equal X.

Yep. The first X is a good 1/8th inch to the left by my reckoning,
plus there is an = sign between them. They are different.

> What is the difference between a carbon atom in this universe and an
> equivalent carbon atom in a universe of our creation (via simulation)?
> > I think it's important to
> > realize that all simulation requires physical resources, and therefore
> > demands a distinction between what can be simulated and what is itself
> > a resource. You can simulate the words in a book, but you cannot
> > simulate the physical book in your hands without it being an actual
> > book.
> Do you believe that what a simulated carbon atom feels depends on and is
> bound by what the underlying hardware is?

Since it's only a single atom, a silicon chip simulating a carbon atom
might very well 'feel' similar to a carbon atom.

>What if I told you the program is
> written in Java?  The atom would (despite having identical properties
> regardless of the underlying hardware) it would somehow be different or feel
> different, depending on whether I execute this program on a Mac, PC, Linux
> computer, or a set of ping pong balls and water pipes?

If you used the same math to emulate it I don't think the OS would
matter much. If you used ping pong balls and water pipes I don't think
it would feel like a carbon atom.

> What if I executed a
> simulation of a brain using a person's brain as the computer (Like the
> chinese room experiment) what would that simulated brain feel then?

If you could physically superimpose the states of the molecules of
someone's brain with a copy of those same states, then it would feel
no difference (theoretically of course, in reality it would not be
possible to rewire a trillion synapses precisely to a living brain).

> > My view is that awareness is resource dependent as well, but it
> > is not a simulation, it is the genuine experience of (or through) the
> > physical resource itself.
> But phone calls sound the same, whether they are carried on the physical
> network of copper, or fiber optics, or as logically represented as packets
> or circuits.

A phone call doesn't sound like anything unless it comes out of a
speaker. The speaker and microphone and the person's hearing are the
primary factors in the simulation. The energy pulses through copper
wire or silicon fiber, or in the semiconductor circuits don't sound
like anything, although sound quality of the call would be affected of
course by any imperfections in the physical network or compression
functions of the semiconductors.

> It seems to me awareness if information dependent and
> independent of the physical medium.


> If I ran a simulated reality
> implemented as a Java program and hooked the inputs directly to my optic
> nerve, I would sense no difference if I ran the computer on an Intel or AMD
> processor, or any other physical architecture so long as it could meet the
> same frame rate.
> According to you, identity requires identical properties for all possible
> observers everywhere.

I didn't say that. I said that identity is subjective pattern
recognition. The idea that identity is objective is a useful fiction.

> If God fiddled with some unobservable or detectable
> property between two electrons such that only he could observe the
> difference (no one in this universe could) then that difference, according
> to your theory, may lead to important differences in what those two
> electrons could feel, despite the fact that the property makes no physical
> difference in any reaction.

If the feeling of the electron changes, then it's energy also changes.

>  To me, this sounds almost like dualism, in
> which some particles or objects could be imbued with an invisible soul hich
> we could not detect, and that makes the difference between consciousness and
> unconsciousness.

No, you're not getting it. Every material thing has an invisible
interiority. The more that material thing is like what we physically
are and do, the more it's interiority will resemble something we can
relate to as 'conscious'.

>But even this you reject, since you say the presence of
> consciousness will eventually lead to detectable differences in behavior.

I never talk in terms of a 'presence of consciousness'. Consciousness
is something that awareness does. It pays attention to paying
attention. The quality of attention a human psyche has to work with is
orders of magnitude richer than what can likely be achieved with
simple, generic molecular arrangements that would be found in a
silicon semiconductor.

> I think so far your theory has led to many absurdities:
> - An entirely artificial brain cannot be conscious but if you add in a few
> biological neurons you can make the whole thing behave as if it were
> conscious.  What about when these neurons are not active?  Does the
> consciousness flicker on and off?

I never say 'behave as if it were conscious'. That is a fallacious
concept. I'm thinking that if there are enough live neurons in a
plastic brain, it could use that plastic as a prosthetic if it were
designed as such. Such neurons would have to take their place in some
kind executive processing role in order to do this, and therefore
would be quite busy when they are awake. When they are not active,
they would be unconscious; asleep.

> - Muscles don't move because they are electrically stimulated by neurons but
> because they sympathize with some ghostly/unphysical desire or intention of
> the neurons.

They do move because they are electrically stimulated by neurons. The
electrical 'stimulation' feels like moving your arm to your brain,
feels like something more fibrous and cellular to your arm. It's the
same underlying invariance but it is experienced differently as the
event takes place in the body. If you use an electrified copper wire
to stimulate the muscle instead, then the tissue still responds as if
it were connected to a brain, but there's no way of knowing whether it
feels the same.

> - There are some ways biological machines can respond to questions which
> non-biological machines could never replicate.  Biological machines are
> super machines in this respect.  Strong AI must be impossible.
> - Church-Turing is false

No. Responding to questions is not a test of biological or
neurological equivalence. It's impressive to us, because we are
conditioned to infer consciousness when something acts like us, but
that has nothing to do with an android being able to successfully live
indefinitely as a human being. I say Church-Turing is false only
because my worldview identifies the two categories of C-T,
calculability and computability, as being essentially the same thing
relative to awareness, which is neither calculable nor computable and
in fact cannot be separated from it's associated physical phenomena.

> - A fire in this universe, to be real, must cause fires outside this
> universe.  (From God's perspective)

No. There is no 'outside this universe'. The universe is 'God's
perspective', and fire is a phenomena of matter, not of computation.

> - Neutrinos do not exist.  Yet, if they did not exist, there would likely be
> no life in this universe, since they are responsible for causing dying stars
> to shed their outer layers into space, providing the necessary elements for
> life.

Neutrinos are a mathematical entity used to explain physical
phenomena. Like Dark Matter, Dark Energy, and Superstrings. They will
likely be superseded by a better explanation sooner or later. My views
point the way to a possible sooner.

> - A person created not as the offspring between two humans (Like swamp 
> manhttps://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Swampman) would not be
> conscious because he lacks the history of biological evolution.

No I think Swamp Man could be conscious. The physical copy is the
living archaeological record of it's biological evolution.

> - A physically identical person (Like swamp man) since he is not conscious
> (or perhaps differently conscious), would behave differently.  Despite being
> physically identical!

Jury is out on that. I think that a swamp baby might behave the same,
but a fully formed adult being created from scratch might be at least
amnesiac, or it could go into seizure or mental illness right away.


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