On 8/4/2011 12:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 4, 1:08 pm, 1Z<peterdjo...@yahoo.com>  wrote:
On Aug 3, 9:14 pm, Craig Weinberg<whatsons...@gmail.com>  wrote:

On Aug 3, 1:35 pm, 1Z<peterdjo...@yahoo.com>  wrote:
On Aug 3, 1:54 pm, Craig Weinberg<whatsons...@gmail.com>  wrote:
Sameness is part of the phenomenology of pattern recognition, which is
a property of the subject. The subject's perception determines the
degree to which one complex of phenomena can be distinguished from
another. Ontologically, objectively, it may be that nothing is the
same as anything (possibly even as itself?)
Or it might be that there are a bunch of robustly objective
facts about identity.
If there was such a thing as an objective fact, then it would be
experienced by dead observers as well as living.
That's a monumental non sequitur.
Why? In order for something to be a truly, absolutely objective fact,
it would have to permeate all contexts. The only facts we can ever
access are those which are accessible and detectable by what we are
and what we can use. Why should we assume that those facts are
applicable outside of our range of possible experiences?

The problem is not with the "objective" but with the "observe". Facts that we can observe (in the most general sense of infer from aided perception) are facts for dead people too, but it's not clear that they can "experience" them. The whole discussion is about what it takes to "experience" something. If there are somethings which we cannot experience, e.g. the personal visions of a mystic, then those are not objective facts. I think "objective" should be roughly thought of as "that on which we can have inter-subjective agreement".

Brent

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