On Tue, Aug 16, 2011 at 3:53 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:
> On 15.08.2011 19:18 Bruno Marchal said the following:
>> Hi Evgenii,
>> On 14 Aug 2011, at 21:25, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>>> Let me put it this way. I guess that a Lobian machine could be
>>> implemented, or it has been already implemented. So let us then
>>> take some Lobian machine and then you demonstrate practically that
>>> such a machine is conscious. Then it would much easier to
>>> understand what you mean.
>> I don't think we can demonstrate technically that anything is
>> conscious. If someone did this for anything, he would have solve the
>> mind body problem.
>> It is generally accepted that we cannot prove our own consciousness
>> (we can know our own, here and now, but we cannot provide a proof for
>> that). It is accepted that we cannot prove that something is
> Well, let me quote Jeffrey Gray
> p. 18. “Philosophers sometimes endow conscious experience with an inviolable
> privacy, rendering it incapable of meeting the scientific requirement for
> replicability of empirical observations. Nothing could be further from the
> truth, as attested by the reliability of visual illusions, among many other
> p. 135. "These experiments demonstrate yet again, by the way, that the
> 'privacy' of conscious experience offers no barrier to good science.
> Synaesthetes claim a form of experience that is, from the point of view of
> most people, idiosyncratic in the extreme. Yet it can be successfully
> brought into the laboratory."
> He seems to disagree with you. Hence, as I have said, your meaning of
> "conscious" seems to be different from his meaning.
But the scientists could be studying zombies. There is no way of
knowing. What we can know is that IF the original brain is conscious
and is modified with a functional analogue THEN the modified brain
will also be conscious.
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