On 13 Aug 2011, at 16:47, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 13.08.2011 14:08 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
On Sat, Aug 13, 2011 at 9:45 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi<use...@rudnyi.ru>
If your visual cortex is replaced by an electronic device that
produces the appropriate outputs at its borders, the rest of
your brain will respond normally.
This is just an assumption. I guess that at present one cannot
prove or disprove it. Let me quote an opposite assumption from
Jeffrey Gray (p. 232, section 15.5 Consciousness in a brain
How could the rest of your brain possibly respond differently if it
receives exactly the same stimulation? Perhaps you mean that it
would be able to tell that there is an artificial device there due
to electric fields and so on; but in that case the artificial device
is not appropriately reproducing the I/O behaviour of the original
The question is what does it mean the same stimulation. I guess that
you mean now only electrical signals. However, it well might be the
qualia plays the role as well.
If I understand you correctly, you presume that conscious experience
could be resolved within 'normal science' (there is no Hard Problem).
The hard problem can be formulated in 'normal science'. But it is a
Jeffrey Gray on the other hand acknowledges the Hard Problem and he
believes that a new scientific theory will be needed to solve it.
The theory exists. Computer science and mathematical logic can be used
to formulate precisely the hard problem. And to solve it including a
'meta-solution' of the hard part of it.
But the result might contradict the prejudices of the Aristotelians
(the believer in substances, aware or not aware that such a belief is
of the type 'theological').
We don't need a new science, we need only to get back to science. This
means to make always explicit the ontological assumption when applying
a theory to an idea of what reality can be. But most materialists
scientist hates the idea of making explicit that they *assume* a basic
ontologically real (existing) physical universe.
From a computationalist perspective, with respect to the mind body
problem, this is a god-of-the-gap type of use of the notion of
physical universe. Comp transforms the "hard" problem of consciousness
into an "easy" problem of matter, easy because it is soluble in
computer science (even in number theory).
I think few people realize the impact of the discovery of the
universal machine (or if you prefer the discovery of the Post Church
Kleene Turing Markov thesis).
"Might it be the case that, if one put a slice of V4 in a dish in
this way, it could continue to sustain colour qualia?
Functionalists have a clear answer to this question: no, because a
slice of V4, disconnected from its normal visual inputs and motor
outputs, cannot discharge the functions associated with the
experience of colour. But, if we had a theory that started, not
from function, but from brain tissue, maybe it would give a
different answer. Alas, no such theory is to hand. Worse, even one
had been proposed, there is no known way of detecting qualia in a
It's not clear that an isolated piece of brain tissue would have
normal qualia since it may require the whole brain or at least a
large part of the brain to produce qualia. A neuron in the language
centre won't have an understanding of a small part of the letter
We do not know this now. It was just an idea in the book (among many
other ideas). It seems to me though that such an idea is at the same
level as to suppose that a robot will have conscious experience
What do you mean? Some robot, running some program can be conscious,
like us (assuming mechanism). This does not mean that *any* robot
would be able to think.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at