On Aug 28, 2011, at 7:09 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Aug 28, 4:07 pm, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Aug 28, 2011, at 8:21 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>


Why do I have to choose between a song not existing or it being some
kind if immaterial phantom in order to explain how one
phenomenological text can be encoded through the patterns of other
contexts in mutual supervenience? It's not very hard to understand.
The same thing that makes a molecule a molecule also makes a cell a
cell, and makes it out of molecules. That doesn't mean that a cell is
just a bigger version of a molecule -

Craig,

I think it is illuminating that you admit this for a cell, but when it comes to computers "it's just a big silicon molecule". You can't have
it both ways.

I hear what you're saying, but no, there's an important difference.
When we encode our programmatic texts on silicon, we get software out
of it, but that isn't what the chip gets out of it. The silicon isn't
becoming software in any way that would compare with molecules
becoming a cell.

The hardware of a computer undergoes physical changes just as elaborate and intricate as the software running upon it. The computer is to the software as physics and biochemistry is to the brain or the life form. It provides a stable platform with fixed rules upon which very complex patterns can be sustained.

A cell develops it's own autopoietic processes for
it's own purposes, where a chip is never inspired by our human
software to adopt those scripts as it's own. The chip never grows or
dies or lives on it's own, it just politely hosts our texts which we
have designed to piggyback on their natural molecular processes.

Right, but neither do the laws of physics grow or evolve, rather physics and chemistry politely host the DNA texts chosen through billions of years of natural selection.




it's radically different, just
as a song is different from a pattern of bytes in an mp3 file.

Just because it is different doesn't give it the ability to violate
well-established theories such as the conservation of energy and
momentum. Spontaneous motion from nothing would be magic in the sense
that it violated these laws.

It doesn't violate any well-established theories at all. Just like a
tree is able to transport water from the roots up to the top of the
tree 40 feet in the air without violating the law of gravity. The
motion isn't from nothing, it's from the tree as a whole plus the
atmosphere and soil. It's sending matter deeper into the earth and
higher into the air to get more water, nutrients, and sunlight. The
substance monist view, if applied literally, would preclude any form
of life from existing, which is why it's so catastrophically
misguided.

Capillary action is not a violation of the laws of physics. What about substance monism precludes any life form from existing?

Also are you saying you are a substance dualist?




Do you not believe in the conservation of momentum?


I try not to believe anything, but I do assume the validity of every
conventionally accepted law and principle of science. My view now only
differs in that I have a different interpretation of the topology of
electromagnetism, the consequences of which cascade into re-
interpretations of cosmology, psychology, and philosophy.

If your view is only a different interpretation rather than a different theory then is computationalism an equally valid interpretation? Is the acceptance of your view vs. computationalism only a matter of taste?



Craig

PS - Someone mentioned "The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat" to me
today. Are you familiar with agnosia?

Yes.

Is that evidence that partial
zombies conditions with absent actually exist? If not, why not?

In this case the person is not able to identify objects correctly so I don't think it meets the normal definition of a zombie.




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