On Aug 31, 10:01 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > Those are arguments against the comp metaphor, which compare the > brain with man made universal machine, and which is very naïve. Not > against the comp hypothesis which assert the existence of a level > where we are Turing emulable.
Yes, it's just about brain vs contemporary electronic semiconductor computer. I mainly wanted to post this in corroboration with my position on the viability of artificial neurons or the conception of the psyche as a product of electric switching through neurons. I wouldn't say that it supports comp hypothesis though either, whereas I would expect that it would support it if the data fit that interpretation. The point about relying on continuous sense connections of the body with it's outside world would seem to support my view that sense is fundamental and not solipsistic simulations or arithmetic representations. Other points made, like content addressable memory and self-organization seem to favor a signifying, 1p architecture rather than a 3-p a-signifying scripted organization. Every point he mentions seems to go along well with my position, but nothing compels me one way or the other in it about comp hypothesis. The #6 item about hardware and software being distinctly different in a typical PC but not in the brain supports my contention that our use of computers piggybacks our own human codes and experiences onto a completely unfeeling inorganic substrate which has no capacity to feel or learn to feel. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
