On Sep 1, 2:45 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 9/1/2011 10:57 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Sep 1, 11:03 am, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be>  wrote:
> >> On 31 Aug 2011, at 17:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> This is where we disagree. If the wetness or carbonic nature of the  
> >> brain plays a r le in our consciousness, this would just mean that the  
> >> comp level of substitution is low, not that it does not exist. For  
> >> having no comp subst level, you need to make the brain into an  
> >> infinite machine *of some sort* (not all infinite machine will work  
> >> for the task).
> >> Bruno
> > I think it's not the wetness or carbonic nature itself, those are only
> > the physical correlates. What matters is the interiority; the
> > experiences - animal stories are elaborations and collaborations of
> > cellular stories which are elaborations-collaborations of very
> > particular molecular stories. Silicon doesn't have access to those
> > organic stories and characters (because what stories it does or does
> > not have access to is the very thing that makes it silicon), but it
> > can maybe be inspired to discover it's own version of pseudomolecular
> > and pseudocellular experience.
> > I would assume however, that those experiences would even more alien
> > than an alien life form, and would instead be an order or sense alien
> > to life itself. Maybe it will be better? Maybe we are the organic Gods
> > of a yet unborn inorganic paradise. I've always liked the idea of
> > coming full circle from the origins of life in crystallized minerals
> > who use organic matter to differentiate themselves and increase
> > sensorimotive degrees of freedom, to a twilight of organic life using
> > crystalline mathematics to manifest a kind of freedom from
> > differentiation.
> > Craig
> You seem to have misapprehended Bruno's theory.   When he talks about 'comp' 
> he is
> referring to abstract computation, not silicon chip based computers.  For you 
> the question
> is whether the 'animal stories' and 'cellular stories' can be instantiated as 
> pure
> information and their 'collaborations' as abstract relations, i.e. 
> computations.

We're not talking about comp, we're talking about the relation of
human consciousness to the substance of the brain. I don't completely
understand parts of Bruno's theory as far as the examples go but I
think I have a good general grasp of what is meant by Universal
Machines as abstract machine logic rather than any specific
implementation of such a machine logic through a particular physical
medium (silicon, milk bottles, flesh, whatever).

As far as instantiating any sensorimotive experience ('story') as
'pure information' I don't believe that's possible. Information can
only arise in a context of sense, which requires a substrate that
physically exists. Without a physical substrate, privacy cannot be
localized and stories would have no specific relevance to the physical
(or spatiotemporal existential energetic with a physical shadow if you
prefer) storyteller.


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