On Sep 1, 2:45 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 9/1/2011 10:57 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > On Sep 1, 11:03 am, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> On 31 Aug 2011, at 17:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: > >> This is where we disagree. If the wetness or carbonic nature of the > >> brain plays a r le in our consciousness, this would just mean that the > >> comp level of substitution is low, not that it does not exist. For > >> having no comp subst level, you need to make the brain into an > >> infinite machine *of some sort* (not all infinite machine will work > >> for the task). > > >> Bruno > > I think it's not the wetness or carbonic nature itself, those are only > > the physical correlates. What matters is the interiority; the > > experiences - animal stories are elaborations and collaborations of > > cellular stories which are elaborations-collaborations of very > > particular molecular stories. Silicon doesn't have access to those > > organic stories and characters (because what stories it does or does > > not have access to is the very thing that makes it silicon), but it > > can maybe be inspired to discover it's own version of pseudomolecular > > and pseudocellular experience. > > > I would assume however, that those experiences would even more alien > > than an alien life form, and would instead be an order or sense alien > > to life itself. Maybe it will be better? Maybe we are the organic Gods > > of a yet unborn inorganic paradise. I've always liked the idea of > > coming full circle from the origins of life in crystallized minerals > > who use organic matter to differentiate themselves and increase > > sensorimotive degrees of freedom, to a twilight of organic life using > > crystalline mathematics to manifest a kind of freedom from > > differentiation. > > > Craig > > You seem to have misapprehended Bruno's theory. When he talks about 'comp' > he is > referring to abstract computation, not silicon chip based computers. For you > the question > is whether the 'animal stories' and 'cellular stories' can be instantiated as > pure > information and their 'collaborations' as abstract relations, i.e. > computations.
We're not talking about comp, we're talking about the relation of human consciousness to the substance of the brain. I don't completely understand parts of Bruno's theory as far as the examples go but I think I have a good general grasp of what is meant by Universal Machines as abstract machine logic rather than any specific implementation of such a machine logic through a particular physical medium (silicon, milk bottles, flesh, whatever). As far as instantiating any sensorimotive experience ('story') as 'pure information' I don't believe that's possible. Information can only arise in a context of sense, which requires a substrate that physically exists. Without a physical substrate, privacy cannot be localized and stories would have no specific relevance to the physical (or spatiotemporal existential energetic with a physical shadow if you prefer) storyteller. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.