On 31 Aug 2011, at 17:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 31, 10:01 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Those are arguments against the comp metaphor, which compare the
brain with man made universal machine, and which is very naïve. Not
against the comp hypothesis which assert the existence of a level
where we are Turing emulable.
Yes, it's just about brain vs contemporary electronic semiconductor
computer. I mainly wanted to post this in corroboration with my
position on the viability of artificial neurons or the conception of
the psyche as a product of electric switching through neurons.
I wouldn't say that it supports comp hypothesis though either, whereas
I would expect that it would support it if the data fit that
interpretation. The point about relying on continuous sense
connections of the body with it's outside world would seem to support
my view that sense is fundamental and not solipsistic simulations or
arithmetic representations. Other points made, like content
addressable memory and self-organization seem to favor a signifying,
1p architecture rather than a 3-p a-signifying scripted organization.
Every point he mentions seems to go along well with my position, but
nothing compels me one way or the other in it about comp hypothesis.
The #6 item about hardware and software being distinctly different in
a typical PC but not in the brain supports my contention that our use
of computers piggybacks our own human codes and experiences onto a
completely unfeeling inorganic substrate which has no capacity to feel
or learn to feel.
This is where we disagree. If the wetness or carbonic nature of the
brain plays a rôle in our consciousness, this would just mean that the
comp level of substitution is low, not that it does not exist. For
having no comp subst level, you need to make the brain into an
infinite machine *of some sort* (not all infinite machine will work
for the task).
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