Hi Bruno,

`A short remark. I have decided start with philosophy, as it is more`

`entertaining as mathematical logic. Right now I listen to lectures of`

`Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen (in German)`

http://podcasts.uni-freiburg.de/podcast_content/courses?id_group=12

`His title "Controversy in philosophy" took my attention first but he has`

`some more offers. Say now I listen to "What is philosophy". He speaks a`

`bit too much but I have already got used to him.`

`The half of his series on controversies has been devoted to realism vs.`

`nominalism. If I understand correctly, your theorem proves that comp`

`implies realism and in my view your argument is a mathematical model for`

`realism. It is interesting to note that Ockam was a nominalist and with`

`his razor he wanted to strip realism away.`

`By the way, in the middle ages realism was quite popular as it was`

`easier to solve some theological problems this way. At some time, one`

`philosophy department had even two different chairs, one for realism,`

`another for nominalism. Hence Plato's ideas have not disappeared during`

`Christianity completely.`

`Prof Hoenen specializes in the middle ages and it gives some charm to`

`his lectures.`

Evgenii On 03.09.2011 19:41 Bruno Marchal said the following: > Hi Evgenii, > > > On 02 Sep 2011, at 21:12, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > >> Bruno, >> >> Thanks a lot for your answers. I have said Bruno's theory just to >> keep it short, nothing more, sorry. > > No problem. But logicians knows the devil is in the details, and, > frankly, "theorem" is just one letter longer than theory, so I don't > ask for so much. If you are skeptical it is a theorem, just say > "argument". > > > >> >> Your theorem is on my list but presumably I will try to think it >> over in some time, not right now. At the moment I just follow your >> answers to others, in other words I am at the stage of gathering >> information. I should say the list was so far very helpful to learn >> many things. >> >> Just one thing now. Do I understand correctly that your theorem >> says that the 1st person view is uncomputable? > > > You are right. This follows already from UDA 1-6. No need of anything > except a rough idea of how most machines works (by obeying simple > computable laws). > > The first person view is indeterminate, and non local. To predict the > precise result of a physical experience, you have to take into > account that you don't know, and cannot know, which universal (or > not) machine(s) execute(s) you (even just in the physical universe, > if that exists). When a physicist uses a physical law, to predict a > first person experience (like seeing an eclipse, or a needle pointing > on a number), he uses implicitly an identity thesis between his > body/neighborhood and its experience. A logician would say that the > physicist use an inductive close, like saying that my equation > predicts I will see an eclipse, and no other laws or history is > playing that role. But when we assume comp, such identity thesis > cannot work (this subtle point *is* the main UDA point: basically you > can still escape, at step 6 and 7, such conclusion by assuming that > the universe is little (finite and not too big). > > If you are a machine, you are duplicable. And if you are duplicated, > iteratively, you (most of the resulting "you"s) can correctly bet > that the outcome of the duplication(s) cannot been predicted in > advance. Children get the UDA 1-6 point without problem. OK, for "UDA > step 6" they have to be a little bit older and capable to understand > the plot in "the prestige" or in "simulacron 3". No need of math, or > even of technical or theoretical computer science. > > Now, In AUDA, the first person appears also to be "a non machine", > from the machine's point of view. This is due to the Theaetetus' > connection between belief and truth, to define a knower. That is > *much more* technical (to see that we stay *in* the arithmetical, to > study an internal vision which escapes completely the arithmetical). > > But you don't need this to understand that if we are machine weak > materialism becomes a sort of vitalism. We don't need it, and it can > only prevent the DM solution of the mind-body problem (the > 'solution' being a pure body-appearance problem in arithmetic). > > Comp, alias DM, can lead toward a contradiction, but up to now, it > leads to a quantum like reality. It leads to a many-words, or better > many (shared) dreams, internal interpretations of elementary > arithmetic (notably). > > Best, > > Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.