On 04 Sep 2011, at 18:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
A short remark. I have decided start with philosophy, as it is more
entertaining as mathematical logic.
I'm afraid you are wrong on this, with all my respect. Mathematical
logic is the most entertaining thing in the world (except perhaps
salvia divinorum). Of course ML asks for some work, and the initial
work is a bit boring, and is the hardest part of logic (you have to
understand that at some point you are asked to NOT understand or even
interpret the symbols).
About "philosophy" I have no general opinion. The word has a different
meaning according to places and universities. When I was young, the
prerequisite for studying philosophy consists in showing veneration
and adoration for Marx. I made myself a lot of enemies by daring to be
just a little bit skeptical, if only on materialism. They have never
forgive me. In the country nearby, philosophy is literature, with an
emphasis of being vague, non understandable, and "authoritative". To
get good note, you need to leak the shoes of the teacher. It is
"religion" in disguise (pseudo-religion).
So, I don't believe in philosophy, per se. I don't take people like
Putnam or Maudlin, or Barnes, as philosopher, but as scientist.
because they are clear and refutable. Yet in the USA it is called
"philosophy", but it is not: it is just fundamental serious inquiry.
There is no difference between "philosophy of mind" and fundamental
I don't really believe in science either. I believe in the scientific
attitude, which is just an attempt toward clarity and modesty. A
scientific theory is just a torch lighter on the unknown. Many confuse
the torch and the unknown, or the shadows brought by the torch and
Right now I listen to lectures of Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen (in German)
His title "Controversy in philosophy" took my attention first but he
has some more offers. Say now I listen to "What is philosophy". He
speaks a bit too much but I have already got used to him.
The half of his series on controversies has been devoted to realism
vs. nominalism. If I understand correctly, your theorem proves that
comp implies realism
Could you define realism? For some weak-materialist (believer in
primitive matter), realism is physical realism.
Comp proves nothing on that, but it assumes arithmetical realism,
which is believed by all mathematicians and scientists (except some of
them when they do Sunday philosophy (that is non professionally)).
Arithmetical realism is the belief that a number is either prime or is
not prime. It is the belief that the excluded middle principle can be
applied for close arithmetical statement (close = without having a
variable which is not in the scope of a quantifier).
and in my view your argument is a mathematical model for realism.
My argument is just a proof that you cannot be rational, consistent,
mechanist and weakly materialist. It is a constructive proof that if
we are machine, physics cannot be the fundamental science, but that is
is derivable from number theory.
With the nice surprise, when we do the math, that we get a theory of
qualia extending naturally a theory of quanta.
It is interesting to note that Ockam was a nominalist and with his
razor he wanted to strip realism away.
Could you define 'nominalism'. I think nominalism needs arithmetical
realism. Mechanism needs arithmetical realism (only to define what is
a machine, really), but can be said to lead to some form of
epistemological realism. The physical universe is an illusion, but
that illusion is real, in some sense. Comp makes it 'more real' and
more 'solid' than what can be brought by any observation.
By the way, in the middle ages realism was quite popular as it was
easier to solve some theological problems this way. At some time,
one philosophy department had even two different chairs, one for
realism, another for nominalism. Hence Plato's ideas have not
disappeared during Christianity completely.
This is true. Christians do even reject some typical point of
Aristotle theology (like the mortality of the soul), and embrace a lot
in Platonism. Unfortunately they have taken Aristotle doctrine of
primary matter (which is certainly a quite good simplifying
methodological assumption, but is just basically wrong in case we are
Prof Hoenen specializes in the middle ages and it gives some charm
to his lectures.
I might try to understand when I got more time. Although I talked
German up to the age of 6, I have not practice it a lot since, and
German philosophers can do very long complex sentences.
On 03.09.2011 19:41 Bruno Marchal said the following:
> Hi Evgenii,
> On 02 Sep 2011, at 21:12, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>> Thanks a lot for your answers. I have said Bruno's theory just to
>> keep it short, nothing more, sorry.
> No problem. But logicians knows the devil is in the details, and,
> frankly, "theorem" is just one letter longer than theory, so I don't
> ask for so much. If you are skeptical it is a theorem, just say
>> Your theorem is on my list but presumably I will try to think it
>> over in some time, not right now. At the moment I just follow your
>> answers to others, in other words I am at the stage of gathering
>> information. I should say the list was so far very helpful to learn
>> many things.
>> Just one thing now. Do I understand correctly that your theorem
>> says that the 1st person view is uncomputable?
> You are right. This follows already from UDA 1-6. No need of
> except a rough idea of how most machines works (by obeying simple
> computable laws).
> The first person view is indeterminate, and non local. To predict
> precise result of a physical experience, you have to take into
> account that you don't know, and cannot know, which universal (or
> not) machine(s) execute(s) you (even just in the physical universe,
> if that exists). When a physicist uses a physical law, to predict a
> first person experience (like seeing an eclipse, or a needle
> on a number), he uses implicitly an identity thesis between his
> body/neighborhood and its experience. A logician would say that the
> physicist use an inductive close, like saying that my equation
> predicts I will see an eclipse, and no other laws or history is
> playing that role. But when we assume comp, such identity thesis
> cannot work (this subtle point *is* the main UDA point: basically
> can still escape, at step 6 and 7, such conclusion by assuming that
> the universe is little (finite and not too big).
> If you are a machine, you are duplicable. And if you are duplicated,
> iteratively, you (most of the resulting "you"s) can correctly bet
> that the outcome of the duplication(s) cannot been predicted in
> advance. Children get the UDA 1-6 point without problem. OK, for
> step 6" they have to be a little bit older and capable to understand
> the plot in "the prestige" or in "simulacron 3". No need of math, or
> even of technical or theoretical computer science.
> Now, In AUDA, the first person appears also to be "a non machine",
> from the machine's point of view. This is due to the Theaetetus'
> connection between belief and truth, to define a knower. That is
> *much more* technical (to see that we stay *in* the arithmetical, to
> study an internal vision which escapes completely the arithmetical).
> But you don't need this to understand that if we are machine weak
> materialism becomes a sort of vitalism. We don't need it, and it can
> only prevent the DM solution of the mind-body problem (the
> 'solution' being a pure body-appearance problem in arithmetic).
> Comp, alias DM, can lead toward a contradiction, but up to now, it
> leads to a quantum like reality. It leads to a many-words, or better
> many (shared) dreams, internal interpretations of elementary
> arithmetic (notably).
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