On 15 Sep 2011, at 22:22, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/15/2011 11:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Sep 2011, at 07:27, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/13/2011 10:01 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sep 13, 9:38 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>  wrote:
On 9/13/2011 4:07 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

The rules are at bottom the laws of physics.
That doesn't mean anything. The laws of physics are the rules. That's why I say it's circular reasoning. I ask you what is a rule, and you say it's at the bottom of laws, but laws are just another word for
rule. There is no bottom, because there's nothing there. It's an
intellectual construct.
Of course it's an intellectual construct, but it has predictive power.
I agree. Deferent and epicycle have predictive power too. It doesn't
mean they can't be understood in a greater context with more
explanatory if not predictive power.

And that's what Bruno is trying to do - provide explanations in terms of arithmetic; which he takes as basic. But explanation is cheaper than prediction.

But comp predicts, given that it predicts the predictable observable. To get more quantitative results asks for a lot of work and time. But comp predicts all what is predictible, at different levels or modalities, and it predict in principle much more given that it gives a glimpse on the complexity of death and all first person possible experiences. It shows also the abyssal complexity of numbers' epistemologies, and it frees the universal machine from all normative theories (the usual velleity of "other" local universal machines).

It is not for practical quantitative prediction, at least not before we get the physical laws from numbers' theology, but we are interested in fundamental question, aren't we?



Of course I don't expect you to be able explain why there are three generations of leptons or tell me what dark matter is. But we need some definite predictions to test a theory. To just 'predict' linearity or complexity is not very impressive. Physics is a very well developed field, so it's going to be hard to get from arithmetic to a new result.

Hard? Without doubt. But it is necessary (that *is* the point). I don't know what is dark matter, or if it exists. But I know that IF I am a machine, then dark matter does not exist, nor any matter. And I know that addition and multiplication decides all questions on the *observation* on matter and dark matter in the long run. Necessarily (that is what has been proved).

But theories of cogitation and consciousness are not well developed; so it is there I would hope for some real predictions. Here's some interesting observations from a friend. I wonder if your ideas might explain them.

I insist that I have no ideas. I just show the consequences of mechanism, which is assumed by almost everyone, with different degrees of explicitness. Did the theory of evolution predict anything? You must look at the mechanist assumption in a similar way: it shows that the laws of physics are not a given (like some people believed for biology and species before Darwin), but that the laws of physics emerge, in a precise way, from the way the universal numbers relate to each other.

To ask for using mechanism to say something concrete about dark matter, today, would be like asking if the theory of evolution can explain the action of some plant in the brain, or the working of my personal computer.

I'll just quickly caveat how far we can extend existing findings, of which there are a few in the last 4-5 years (see: www.wjh.harvard.edu/~dsweb/pdfs/06_01_EFC_DLS_ERG_RAS.pdf -- this was done in Dan Schacter's lab at Harvard; Schacter is a renowned memory researcher; and www.jneurosci.org/content/27/45/12190.full.pdf -- this was featured in Nature Reviews in 2007). In terms of memory and confidence, or how memory changes, Elizabeth Phelps at NYU has done some ground breaking work.

These findings focused on what is happening in the brain during an explicit statement of confidence in one's answer about some or other semantic statement. The caveat is I am not sure how far we can extend this to issues or questions for which an answer is unclear and unavailable, or very difficult to ascertain because veracity may depend on some type of understanding of conceptual material for which the respondent has limited knowledge. It is one thing to have confidence that the solution to the integral of cos x is sin x + C, but another to have confidence that there is a god, or that capitalism will fail. It seems in the latter two instances the reward system is more important in neural processing. But in all cases we are looking at the confidence in the belief that the memory being retrieved is accurate.

During feelings of confidence in which the respondent is correct (high-confidence and correct), medial and lateral parietal regions are active indicating a role for these areas in post-retrieval memory monitoring, but, note that limbic regions are also active for confidence in a recognition decision. In other words, confidence arises as a result of processing in regions associated with familiarity, on the one hand (and this is where errors occur), and/ or regions that are more closely or directly linked with the problem at hand - information that is used to solve the problem without so much digging into our vast data stores.

The second paper goes further and shows the difference between older and younger adults with respect to high confidence errors, among other things. The interesting findings, in my opinion, include the fact that the same brain regions (notably though is the DLPFC which is becoming ever more important as a region of interest in cognitive neuroscience- in this case it is thought to monitor or modulating decision processes across cognitive functions) are active during low confidence irrespective of whether or not a condition of true or false recognition was the case. But during high confidence different brain regions are active (posterior cingulate in this case) across true recognition and false recognition.

The conclusion which can be drawn after reading the second paper is that the MTL (medial temporal lobe, but includes the hippocampus and parahippocampus among other structures) is involved in high confidence feelings when the respondent is actually correct (and in the low confidence and incorrect condition), and that frontoparietal activity is dominant in cases where the respondent is highly confident but incorrect (but also active in cases of low confidence but correct recognition). There are other differences which can distinguish the results in parens, but the details are probably not interesting most here. It is interesting to note however that the activation of the MTL and frontoparietal regions are virtual mirror images across the high vs low confidence conditions for true and false recognition - almost like a see saw. We are dealing with on the one hand direct recollection in correct cases and familiarity in incorrect cases.

What is amazing here is that the brain processes high-confidence true and false recognition very differently, yet the feeling of confidence appears indistinguishable. It might be interesting to probe this.

The reward system was not a main region of interest in these studies, however, feelings of confidence are correlated with dopamine release, which necessarily involves the reward pathways and hence the basal ganglia. The more often one feels correct about something, especially in the absence of challenge, the more it becomes part of a belief system - and the more likely a statement fits into a belief system the more likely one is to be confident in that statement. The confirmation of one's belief system creates a rewarding feeling associated with these pathways.

It is very interesting, but I don't see why "my idea" should explain those facts. It is *their* approach which are based on "my idea" (mechanism) at the start. They discuss the aspects of the actual human mind implementation in the brain. It illustrates my basic postulates. You can't mention a paper based on "my" assumption and discard the conceptual consequences of that same assumption. Unless, of course, you have seen a reason to doubt the validity of the UDA argument, in which case it would be nice if you could elaborate. I did answer your remarks on both step 6, 7, and 8, but I am willing to explain if it remains something unclear, and I am willing, at least for awhile to add the 323 principle(*) in the definition of comp, if that is the problem, although I didn't see any reason to say "yes" to a digitalist doctor, if the 323 principle was not a consequence of mechanism. But here too, in our last conversation on the subject, you seem to agree that comp implies the 323 principle.


(*) The 323 principle asserts that if consciousness can be attributed to a computer running some computation in which the register n° 323 is not used, then the same consciousness can be similarly attributed to a computer running that same computation, but where the register n° 323 has been removed from the computer.


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