On 13 Sep 2011, at 23:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Sep 13, 3:53 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 12 Sep 2011, at 22:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:

This sounds like a rejection of the mind-brain identity thesis,
which is
what functionalism / computationalism do. (Jason Resch)

It's a rejection of a simplistic version of the mind-brain identity
thesis in favor of my own sense-essence-existence identity thesis.

Which is worst than the mind-brain identity thesis, which does NOT
work with comp, except in the relative way.
If my consciousness remains unchanged in a digital substitution, *my*
consciousness will be ontically attached to an infinity of
computations defined by the arithmetical relations:

What is attaching it?

You.


Why do the computations need your consciousness
to enact their arithmetical relations?

The computations, including the inputs, need your consciousness to distinguish yourself from other computations.



It seems to me like expecting a
symphony to happen by transcribing the associated sheet music.

Not really, because your consciousness is associated with an infinity of computations. That would be the case if it was associated to one physical intantiation of a computation.



this explains
where the appearances of physical reality comes from, and is, I think,
the first simple explanations of most of the quantum weirdness (the
appearance of the many-realities, indeterminacy, non cloning of
matter, and non locality, and the math explains the notion of
entanglement).

I agree it could explain the physical reality that we can observe and
measure, but it doesn't really explain the experiences of being
physically real.

On the contrary: it explains both. This comes from the Gödel-Löb- Solovay splitting of the self reference logics.





And the theory of mind is rather natural too, the mind is all what a
machine can discover by introspection.

To me, what a machine can discover by introspection is precisely
nothing. By itself, a machine has no experience or introspection. It's
the enactment of the machine in mass-energy timespace which makes
introspection possible in the exact specifications generated by the
relation between the machine and the material enactment.

You are just making the comp level very low. It changes nothing in the conceptual consequences.




That contains public sharable
pieces, (quanta) and non sharable pieces (qualia).

My hypothesis agrees with that, although I would not say that qualia
is non sharable (otherwise we could not communicate) but that
qualitative sense is propagated privately (which is already a sharing
of neurological, biological, and physical levels of experience) and
shared intersubjectively.

No problem.





I mean we can conserve one half of the mind-brain identity thesis
(brain ---> mind), but we have to abandon (mind ---> brain) for (mind
---> infinity of brainS).

I agree, all human minds ---> infinity of individual brains, but any
particular human mind is ordinarily only available through a single
brain.

Not in DM.
Not in QM.



We don't have our mind fall into our shoes after a car
accident. If mind were so independent of brain, I would expect that
incidents of disembodied minds would be commonplace.

Lol :)

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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