On Sep 13, 3:53 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 12 Sep 2011, at 22:16, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > >> This sounds like a rejection of the mind-brain identity thesis, > >> which is > >> what functionalism / computationalism do. (Jason Resch) > > > It's a rejection of a simplistic version of the mind-brain identity > > thesis in favor of my own sense-essence-existence identity thesis. > > Which is worst than the mind-brain identity thesis, which does NOT > work with comp, except in the relative way. > If my consciousness remains unchanged in a digital substitution, *my* > consciousness will be ontically attached to an infinity of > computations defined by the arithmetical relations:
What is attaching it? Why do the computations need your consciousness to enact their arithmetical relations? It seems to me like expecting a symphony to happen by transcribing the associated sheet music. > this explains > where the appearances of physical reality comes from, and is, I think, > the first simple explanations of most of the quantum weirdness (the > appearance of the many-realities, indeterminacy, non cloning of > matter, and non locality, and the math explains the notion of > entanglement). I agree it could explain the physical reality that we can observe and measure, but it doesn't really explain the experiences of being physically real. > > And the theory of mind is rather natural too, the mind is all what a > machine can discover by introspection. To me, what a machine can discover by introspection is precisely nothing. By itself, a machine has no experience or introspection. It's the enactment of the machine in mass-energy timespace which makes introspection possible in the exact specifications generated by the relation between the machine and the material enactment. > That contains public sharable > pieces, (quanta) and non sharable pieces (qualia). My hypothesis agrees with that, although I would not say that qualia is non sharable (otherwise we could not communicate) but that qualitative sense is propagated privately (which is already a sharing of neurological, biological, and physical levels of experience) and shared intersubjectively. > > I mean we can conserve one half of the mind-brain identity thesis > (brain ---> mind), but we have to abandon (mind ---> brain) for (mind > ---> infinity of brainS). I agree, all human minds ---> infinity of individual brains, but any particular human mind is ordinarily only available through a single brain. We don't have our mind fall into our shoes after a car accident. If mind were so independent of brain, I would expect that incidents of disembodied minds would be commonplace. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
