On Sep 21, 2:08 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 20 Sep 2011, at 04:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>> I include comparison as a function of counting.
> >> Counting + the full first order logic is not enough for comparison.
> >> Counting + second order logic might be, but then second order logic
> >> is
> >> really set theory in disguise.
> > Isn't it necessary to be able to tell the difference between one count
> > and one count?
> > In order for x, (x+x), (x+x+x) to exist there must be an implicit
> > comparison between 1 and it's successor to establish succession,
> > mustn't there? Otherwise it's just x, x, x.
> I have no clue on what you are trying to say.

I'm saying that to assert that two is different from one is a
comparison, and that the assertion of difference between predecessor
and successor is the root essence of what counting is. Counting is
nothing but a process of comparisons.

> >>> You can't really have
> >>> one without the other.
> >> It depends on what you assume at the start. I have still no clue of
> >> what is your theory, except that strange, and alas familiar,
> >> skepticism on numbers and machine, which is conceptually very
> >> demanding since Gödel 1931.
> > I think that's your own prejudice blinding you from seeing my ideas.
> Which prejudices?

The prejudice of arithmetic supremacy.

> You are the one talking like if you knew (how?) that some theory
> (mechanism) is false, without providing a refutation.

What kind of refutation would you like? Mechanism is false as an
explanation of consciousness because I think that consciousness arises
from feeling which arises from sensation. Perception cannot be
constructed out of logic but logic always can only arise out of

> > You are defending the insights of post Gödelian understanding but I
> > have no bone to pick with those insights at all. I embrace what I
> > understand of those kinds of ideas; incompleteness, autopoeisis,
> > automation, simulation, etc. I just think that the progression of
> > these ideas lead to the mirror image of consciousness rather than
> > genuine sentience.
> > Nothing wrong with that, and for developing intelligent servants, it's
> > is exactly what we would want to use (otherwise they will most enslave
> > us). We can even gain great insights into our own nature by
> > understanding our similarities and differences to what I would call
> > intelliform arithmetic, but in all of the fruits of this approach we
> > have seen thus far, there is a distinct quality of aimless repetition,
> > even if not unpleasantly so (http://www.youtube.com/watch?
> > v=ZZu5LQ56T18)
> > Some of the musicality can be attributed to the sampled piano as well.
> > When you use a fundamental unit which is driven more exclusively by
> > digital mathematics, what we get I think sounds more like the native
> > chirps and pulses of abiotic semiconductors (http://www.youtube.com/
> > watch?v=Dh9EglZJvZs).
> > I think that my reservations about machine sentience are not at all
> > borne of skepticism but rather aesthetic supersensitivity. I can hear
> > what the machine is, and what it is will not become what we are, but
> > rather something slightly (but very significantly from our perspective
> > at least) different.
> Who we?

We humans, or maybe even we animals.

> All what I hear is "human made machines are creepy, so I am not a
> machine, not even a natural one?".
> This is irrational, and non valid.

I'm not saying that I'm not a machine, I'm just saying that I am also
the opposite of a machine. It's not based upon a presumed truth of
creepy stereotypes, but the existence and coherence of those
stereotypes supports the other observations which suggest a
fundamental difference between machine logic and sentient feeling.

> >>> As for exploring and referring to themselves I
> >>> think that's just projection of our own 1p experience onto
> >>> mechanism.
> >> That is possible, and literally necessary. I am currently projecting
> >> my 1p on you. That is not a reason for saying your don't have your
> >> own
> >> 1p. So you are correct, but it is not an argument against mechanism.
> > That's only if you believe that 1p is a solipsistic simulation. With
> > my sense-based model,
> I suggest you use the word "theory" instead of model which has a
> precise meaning for logicians.
> When I asked you to provide the theory, you said it was poetry.

I didn't say that it was only poetry. My sense-based theory is that
sensorimotive perception is the ontological complement to
electromagnetic relativity. Poetry is your term that you injected into
this. I was just confirming your intuition that poetry is an example
of how sensorimotive phenomena work - figurative semantic association
of qualities rather than literal mechanistic functions of quantity.

> I find a bit grave to use poetry to make strong negative statement on
> the possibilities of some entities.

That's because you are an arithmetic supremacist, so therefore cannot
help yourself but to diminish the significance of subjective

> > your perceptions of me are the invariance
> > between your 1p projections and my 3p reflections. We can look at a
> > Rorschach inkblot and understand (under typical waking states of
> > consciousness) that the images we see are not being spontaneously
> > generated by the inkblot.
> > To say that a machine is referring to itself or exploring is to
> > anthropomorphize it's behavior,
> I disagree. the whole point of the theory of self-reference is that it
> is a 3p technical discovery.

I understand, but I don't think that it's truly 3p. How would we know
if it was?

> I have used to write "amoeabas" (self-
> reproducing programs---this has been done by many others), and to
> build "planarias", that is, programs that you can cut in pieces, and
> each pieces generates the whole program, despite having quite
> different functional rôle. The self-reproduction problem has been
> formulate precisely by Descartes, and solved conceptually by Stephen
> Kleene. For the Planaria, I have used a generalization by John Case.
> The existence of logic of self-reference G and G* relies on all this.
> There is no anthropomorphism: those program refers to themselves in
> the 3p way in precise and verifiable sense. I have often explain the
> basic idea (cf Dx = T(xx) => DD = T(DD)). A major part of theoretical
> computer science is based on the existence of such computational
> "fixed points".

These are 1-p conceptualizations for you, Kleene, Case, Descartes, etc
which refer to your logical reductions of 1-p selfhood from a pseudo 3-
p voyeur perspective. cf Dx = T(xx) => DD = T(DD) does not feel
anything, it is just a way to access arithmetic potentials of our own
1-p process.

> > which, objectively is neither
> > completely random nor intentional, but merely inevitable by the
> > conditions of the script. It's a precisely animated inkblot, begging
> > for misplaced and displaced interpretation.
> >>> To set a function equal to another is not to say that either
> >>> function
> >>> or the 'equality' knows what they refer to or that they refer at
> >>> all.
> >>> A program only instructs - If X then Y, but there is nothing to
> >>> suggest that it understands what X or Y is or the relation between
> >>> them.
> >> Nor is necessary to believe that an electron has any idea of the
> >> working of QED, or of what a proton is.
> > I think that it is. What we think of as an electron or a proton is 3-p
> > exterior of the senses and motives (ideas) of QED. We have an idea of
> > the workings of our niche, so it stands to reason that this
> > sensemaking capacity is part of what the universe can do.
> OK, but the point is that it is part of the arithmetical reality too.

It has arithmetic qualities to us, but only if we understand

> > We are the senses and motives of a person's life, which from our 3-p
> > looks like a human body or a set of images, autobiographical
> > narratives, or a collection of trillions of cells or a single
> > individual in a global human civilization. From a non human's 1-p
> > vantage point we have no idea what kind of sense our 3-p presence
> > makes to them.
> Sure.
> >> If you say that an electron needs to have a 1p for interacting with a
> >> proton, then I don't see why we could not say that for a program
> >> instruction,
> > Because an instruction has no 3-p existence.
> Ah?

It is not enough to have an instruction sequence, the instruction must
be executed as physical energy upon a material object (even if it's
our own brain chemistry) if it is to have any 3-p consequence.

> > It's just a motive to
> > reproduce a motive in something that we perceive as a 3-p objective
> > system. Our 1-p motive induces a 3-p consequence which is reflected
> > back to us through a 3-p objective system as a pseudo 1-p sequence.
> This might be true, without making an instruction being a locally 3p
> reality.
> >> on which we can already use intensional stance (like when
> >> we say that a routine is waiting for some inputs to get active, etc.
> > That's more anthropomorphizing. It's not waiting at all. If it was it
> > would eventually get irritated and leave.
> It would have been an anthropomorphism in case I did not precise the
> use of the intentional stance (with a "t", not an yes, sorry).

kind of garbled here, not sure what you're saying.

> >> But this is delaying the mind-body difficulty in the lower level.
> >> There are just no evidence that we have to delay it in the infinitely
> >> low level, except the willingness to make mechanism false.
> > There can't be any 3-p evidence by definition, because mechanism's
> > falseness is the difference between it's pseudo or a-signifying 1-p
> > and our genuine 1-p experience.
> Why is it pseudo. Like Stathis explained to you, if it is pseudo, you
> either get zombie, or you have to put the level infinitely low, and
> our bodies become infinite objects.

It's pseudo because it's a simulation of a 1-p form with no relevant 1-
p contents. Zombie or substitution level is in the eye of the
beholder. There is no zombie, only prognosia/HADD. There is no
substitution 'level', only a ratios of authenticity. The closer your
substitute is to native human sensemaking material, the more of the
brain can be replaced with it, but with diminishing returns at high
levels so that complete replacement would not be desirable.

> > Genuine because it is the native 1-p
> > of our 3-p neurology, and not an idiopathic simulacra.
> You beg the question.

I don't think I am. I'm saying that a semiconductor computer can't
appreciate music because music is a sense experience that is
perceptually mismatched to it's sensemaking capabilities - not because
of any sentimental prejudice I have against technology overreaching
into human domains.

> > There is no
> > reason to think that our naive theoretical presumptions about 3-p
> > substitution level of 1-p would be any more accurate than any of our
> > naive theoretical presumptions about anything. We don't know much of
> > anything about the substitution level of the psyche.
> People differ on which one. The neurophilosophers suggest the neuronal
> level. Hammerof suggest the quantum level.

Those are examples of our contemporary consensus naive theoretical

> Everyone agree that if the level is infinitely low, then current
> physics is false. To speculate that physics is false for making
> machine stupid is a bit of far stretching.

Physics isn't false, it's just incomplete. A good Eurocentric map of
the world before the Age of Discovery isn't false, just not applicable
to the other hemisphere.

> > It seems far from
> > scientific at this point to dismiss objections to an arbitrary
> > physical substitution level.
> With all known theories, there is a level. To negate comp you must
> diagonalize on all machines, + all machines with oracles, etc. I think
> you misinterpret computer science.

I'm not trying to interpret computer science, I'm trying to interpret
the cosmos.

> >>> I've named several examples which illustrate this: Record and CD
> >>> players don't learn music.
> >> Nor do them compute. Or, if yopu see their activity as computations,
> >> it is not the kind of computation which can think. you need self-
> >> reference, and enough information loops, short and long term
> >> memories,
> >> universal hidden goal, etc.
> > It's not compelling to me. You can have fancy playlists on internet
> > radio like Pandora or iTunes which I think satisfy your criteria to a
> > minimal extent to establish some hint that the program was
> > understanding music or the user. That's the marketing sell, but it's
> > hollow. It doesn't work that well. It's limitations are perhaps subtle
> > to describe in 3-p terms, but it just doesn't know music. Listening to
> > it's occasionally fruitful but oddly dissonant selections are, like
> > the cellular automation music, very definitely missing something.
> > You may not be as sensitive to it, or you may account for it by
> > promising that these are just newborn tadpoles, but I can see that
> > increased sophistication will only mask the underlying emptiness. It
> > may progress to the point that my naive perception of it will be
> > fooled, but that gives me no confidence that such a technology would
> > fool my brain (or it's trillions of micro-sentiences within).
> Nobody expect confidence in those matter. Comp even prevents
> confidence: it explains that machines cannot really believe that they
> are machines.
> But the very problem is not that you lack confidence in comp (i do
> too!), but that you seem to have confidence in non-comp. That *is* the
> problem.

I don't have confidence in non-comp either - although I have to make a
case for non-comp to counter the doctrines of arithmetic supremacy to
balance the accusations. I have confidence in the relation between
comp and non-comp. That is the invariance, the reality, and a theory
of Common Sense.

> >>> I can see and copy Chinese characters
> >>> without understanding them in any way, and regardless of how many
> >>> Chinese manuscripts I manually transcribe, I will never learn to
> >>> read
> >>> Chinese.
> >> Why would you, if you do only simple task.
> >> You find a stupid computation, and you declare from that that all
> >> computation is stupid.
> >> Jumping spider can't get to the moon, so living beings can't get to
> >> the moon.
> > Living beings can't get to the moon by themselves, and computation
> > can't become human on it's own.
> That is ambiguous and confuse levels of reality.

My point is that your counterexample is contingent upon a definition
of living beings that includes spaceships. I'm showing how the initial
proposition that living beings can't get to the moon is in fact
correct, and that it's the interpretation of fallacy that confuses
levels of reality. My insinuation is that you are projecting the same
overconfidence on computation, presuming that it can build it's own
computational vehicle to travel through mammalian emotive 'space'. I
don't rule out that computation can be used to build such a vehicle,
but I do not think that it will be made out of arithmetic. It needs
fluids - water, cells. Something that lives and dies and makes a mess.

> >>> As you say, we can use computation to account for the
> >>> difference between 1p and 3p but that accounting is not an
> >>> explanation
> >>> or experience of 1p or 3p (as a 1p reflection...there is no 3-p
> >>> experience).
> >> It explains bot 99% of it (I would say)
> >> And it explain 100% of the reason why there is a remaining
> >> unexplainable 1% gap. technically, we can narrow it as much as we
> >> want, but will never been able, for logical reason, to explain 100%
> >> of
> >> the qualia or consciousness.
> > You say that, but I have not yet heard anything that explains it to
> > me.
> I gave the references, but you answer you don't want to study them.
> What can I do?

You can turn your understanding of what you refer to into some handy
examples - concrete illustrations, thought experiments, aphorisms,

> >>>> They can
> >>>> believe, know, observe, feel, and be aware of the difference
> >>>> between
> >>>> sharable and non sharable knowledge, and all this can be show, from
> >>>> numbers + reasonable axiomatic definition of all those terms.
> >>> To say that it can be shown doesn't help anyone. To paraphrase Yoda,
> >>> "Show me, or do not".
> >> Read the papers (and study some mathematical logic/computer science
> >> before).
> > Why not just tell me briefly what is in the papers that makes sense of
> > it?
> I have done this very often. Look in the archive or read the papers. I
> am explaining UDA on a forum for non mathematicians, and I gave the
> link. But for the quanta and qualia, I'm afraid you need to invest a
> bit in mathematical logic. The book by Mendelson is very good, or the
> book by Cutland. References can be found from my URL.

How does the brain understand these things if it has no access to the

> But you don't seem serious in "arguing" against comp, and admitting
> you don't know anything in computer science.

Oh I freely admit that I don't know anything in computer science. My
whole point is that computer science only relates to half of reality.
I'm not trying to make the universe fit into a computer science
theory. I only argue against comp because it's what is distracting you
from seeing the bigger picture.

> > Even the most complex ideas can be illustrated metaphorically.
> > Hofstadter's "a record titled "I Cannot Be Played on Record Player X"
> > for example, shows a bit of what I think you mean. That kind of self-
> > reference, I agree is germane to the sense of consciousness as
> > awareness of awareness, but it's just the silhouette of consciousness,
> > not the contents.
> You are right on this. What Hofstadter miss is the definition of
> knowledge, making it possible (for both human and machine) to see
> where the difference between 1-self and 3-self comes from.

What would be the title of a record that illustrates this?

> >>> Give me one example, one common sense metaphor,
> >>> one graphed function that could suggest to me that there is any
> >>> belief, feeling, or awareness.going on.
> >> The fact that the universal machine remains silent on the deep
> >> question
> > What deep question?
> 'are you consistent?", "do you believe in a reality", "do you believe
> in after life", etc.

Have you considered that it's silent because it's not equipped to
answer the question?

> >> is enough for me to suggest they are quite like me.
> >> Don't ask me for a proof: there are none.
> > I'm not asking for a proof, I'm asking for some reason to think that
> > there's something I'm not seeing. Something that suggests that a
> > mechanical device or abstraction can feel or maybe that produces some
> > result that it refuses to reproduce on command.
> You miss computer science. Programs which obeys command are a minority
> of slaves.

Are there programs which refuse to obey commands?

> >> it is a question of empathy.
> >> The work of Gödel-Löb-Solovay illustrates that they can introspect
> >> very deeply, and that they have a rich theology.
> > The work of Weinberg-King-Searles illustrates that they cannot
> > introspect very deeply and have an austere theology.
> Hoftstadter and Dennett have refuted already that kind of argument.
> See the book "Mind's I".
> I refuted it independently, and is a large part of my (very oldest)
> work.
> All finite entities, with or without oracle, believing in the
> induction axioms, get the maximal logically possible introspective
> power.
> I am not sure you can extend it, even by using magic.

Sorry, it's just argument from authority to me.

> >>> I have described how we
> >>> project emotion into images on a movie screen or see a face in a
> >>> coconut, so it is not enough that we satisfy our idea of what
> >>> feeling
> >>> or awareness usually looks like. We need to know why, if numbers
> >>> feel,
> >>> it seems like machines don't feel.
> >> Current machines are far too young ... to express their feeling. They
> >> have not enough memory to integrate their experience in long stories.
> >> But mechanism is the thesis that *we* are machine, so it does look
> >> like some machine can feel: you and me are good example, in the
> >> mechanist theory.
> > I see that as affirming the consequent.
> I assume comp indeed. Still waiting your argument that comp is false.
> I am not trying to convince you that comp is true (that is the big
> difference between us: where I say we don't know, you are saying that
> you know.

I don't say that I know, I say that I have a different idea that I
think makes more sense. Comp isn't false, it just doesn't recognize
the contribution of the non-comp substrate of computation, so it's not
applicable for describing certain kinds of consciousness where non-
comp is more developed.

> > We are machines and we can
> > feel, therefore machines can feel. Jet engines are machines they can
> > fly at 30,000 feet, therefore we can fly at 30,000 feet.
> Indeed.

Without an airplane?

> > I'd like to
> > help you out here and really give you the benefit of the doubt, but it
> > just sounds like you're shrugging off a fairly obvious gap between
> > theory and reality. If functionalism-machinism were true, I would
> > expect that bacteria, viruses, fungi, parasites, etc could infect
> > computers, cell phones, or computations themselves.
> But they can be infected by digital viruses. To ask a program to be
> infected by a carbon based viruses is just a begging of the question,
> and a confusion of reality levels.

Why is it any different to ask a program to be infected by carbon
based personalities?

> > By comp, there should be no particular reason why a Turing machine
> > should no be vulnerable to the countless (presumably Turing emulable)
> > pathogens floating around.
> They are no programmed for doing that. They are programmed to infect
> very particular organism.

If it's close enough to emulate the consciousness of a particular
organism, why not it's vulnerability to infections?

> > But of course that is absurd. We cannot
> > look forward to reviving the world economy by introducing medicine and
> > vaccines for computer hardware. What accounts for this one-way bubble
> > which enjoys both total immunity from biological threats but provides
> > full access to biological functions? If computation alone were enough
> > for life, at what point will the dogs start to smell it?
> Confusion of level.
> With comp, dogs already smell them, in some sense.

Not confusion of level; clarification of level. In what sense do dogs
smell abstract Turing emulations?

> >>>> In that paragraph you are showing that you seem to persist in
> >>>> displaying  the reductionist pre-Gödel-Turing conception of what
> >>>> machines are and can be.
> >>> Not at all. I think that I may understand more than you assume. I
> >>> agree that 'machine' can be a spiritual term. A self-redefining
> >>> process which grows and and evolves - but that's only part of what
> >>> life and consciousness is. The form (or one form) but not the
> >>> content.
> >>> It's like electricity without a ground (this kind of ground:
> >>>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ground_%28electricity%29). If it's not
> >>> anchored in the common reference of literal material in the literal
> >>> universe - with the unique instantiation coordinates drawn from
> >>> relation to the singularity, then it's a phantom imposter. A 3-p
> >>> accounting system imposed upon a compliant-but-dumb 1-p of a
> >>> semiconductor (or collection of inanimate objects, etc).
> >> But then you have to explain us what is not Turing emulable in those
> >> processes.
> > It's the the hole that it makes in the singularity.
> Give me a proof that such an hole (definition please) is not Turing
> emulable (nor Turing projectable: that is, a result of the comp first
> person indeterminacy).

The hole is the unique identifier of an event which constitutes it's
sequestration within the singularity. It is a timespace signature
composed of sensorimotive mass-energy. It is the formalization of an
event as a specific energy event and as such cannot be emulated, owing
to the cohesiveness of the singularity. There isn't any other place to
put the hole and have it not be the hole.

> > A thing's unique
> > identity in relation to the rest of the universe.
> Define "universe".

The total coherence and relation of all perceptions.

> > I's a MAC address
> > than cannot be spoofed. Ultimately, a thing 'is what it is' and not
> > what just we believe it to be.
> Which things. You cannot pretend to refute something with statement
> that vague.

I don't see how it's vague. I'm saying that everything is uniquely
instantiated from an absolutely objective perspective. Spoofing is a
second order function of interpretation, equating one thing for
another, but there is always the chance that some other perspective
will be able to recover the distinction.

> >>> That's why zombies, prosthetics, blow up dolls, body snatchers, wax
> >>> museums, taxidermy etc have the same creepy association. We sense
> >>> the
> >>> emptiness, and the cognitive dissonance that arises in contrast to
> >>> the
> >>> uncanny resemblance to the genuine living creature and the hollow
> >>> form
> >>> only highlights the absence of life and awareness. Science Fiction
> >>> is
> >>> replete with these metaphorical illustrations: Frankenstein, HAL,
> >>> Westworld, War of The Worlds,...so many examples of sinister
> >>> attributions to both the undead and unlive. It would seem unlikely
> >>> that these kinds of ideas could strike a chord were there not any
> >>> significant difference between a person and a machine beyond just a
> >>> prejudice of one relative level of complexity to another.
> >> That is called racism. The foreigners looks to strange, it is creepy.
> > It's not racism at all. Cadavers are not members a race.
> Machines are not cadaver.

No, but they are the unliving organizations. When they are presented
as living organisms, they are equivalent to animated cadavers as far
as sentience goes.

> > They aren't
> > just unfamiliar, they are the walking dead and unliving persons.
> Machines are not necessarily zombies.

Okay, we can call them meople or something if you like.

> > They
> > are the antithesis of human life.
> So you say, without any argument. That confirms that it is a sort of
> racism.

Race has nothing to do with it. That just casts some kind of social
shaming into it. It's just a functional definition. Human life is
living organisms. The antithesis of that would be things which act
like organisms but have either never been alive (machines) or have
died already but continue to supernaturally perform superficial
ambulatory-predatory functions (zombies).

> >> By machine, I just means "turing-emulable" (with or without oracle).
> >> That include us, by mechanism assumption.
> >> It is a constant that novelist foresee the future(s).
> > What if 'emulation' is a 1-p hallucination?
> Why would it be like that?

Because it's an interpretation that varies from subject to subject.
You see a program thinking and experiencing, I see an inevitable
execution of unexperienced instructions. Even in zoology, phenomena
like camouflage suggest that emulation is only 'skin deep'. If deep
emulation were possible, I think you would have organisms which evolve
chameleon powers which fool all predators, not just some. An animal
that can turn into a stone would be far superior to one which can
imagine funny stories.

> > How could it really not
> > be? If we only can project our perception of a process onto a machine,
> > why would the rest of the process that we can't perceive automatically
> > arise?
> Why not?

Because we're not putting it in there. It's like if you have only a
way to detect sugar and water, your version of imitation orange juice
would be the same as your imitation grape juice, just sugar water.

> >>> I think that you are jumping to the conclusion that simulation does
> >>> not require an interpreter which is anchored in matter.
> >> That follows from the UDA-step-8. If my own emulation requires a
> >> material digital machine, then it does not require a material
> >> machine.
> > Not to produce the 3-p simulacra of you, no, but to produce your
> > genuine 1-p emulation, it would require the same material machine as
> > you do.
> Why?

Because the interior of that material is the subject which is
experiencing the 1-p phenomena.

> > A material digital machine would not suffice because the
> > material which the machine is being executed digitally on already has
> > it's own (servile and somnambulant compared to organic chemistry)
> > genuine 1-p experience.
> So our consciousness is the consciousness of our basic elements.

No, not at all. It is the conscious synthesis of the consciousness of
our basic elements.

> This
> explains nothing. Neither consciousness nor matter. It leads to an
> open infinite regress, which needs infinities to overcome all possible
> machines.

I think it explains everything. I don't see any infinities at all.

> >> Matter is what glue the machine dreams,
> > I think that it is obviously not. If we were machines and that were
> > true, then we should come out of the womb filled with intuitions about
> > electronics, chemistry, and mathematics, not ghosts and space
> > monsters. Dreams are not material, they are living subjective
> > feelings. Matter is what is too boring and repetitive to be dreamed
> > of. Too tiny and too vast, too hot and cold, dense and ephemeral for
> > dreams. Dream bullets don't make much of an impact.  Dream injuries
> > don't have to heal.
> You beg the question.

I don't see how.

> >> and consciousness select the
> >> gluing histories. This entails we can see the glue by looking at
> >> ourselves close enough, and quantum logic is what define the gluing.
> >> Here QM seems to fits very well with DM.
> > Because QM and DM are different aspects of the same thing.
> That's my point. But to prove it needs work.

I'm not trying to prove that. I think there's a fairly obvious
overlap, both in intention and realization.

> > Modeling
> > the 1-p essence of 3-p.
> >>> I'm not taking
> >>> a reductionist view of mechanism, even though in this discussion I
> >>> have to dwell on the most literal aspects of mechanism to make my
> >>> point that it is fundamentally incomplete to express consciousness.
> >>> That is the only way to illustrate the difference - with reductio ad
> >>> absurdum; to get to the essence of what mechanism, counting, and
> >>> computation is and how it is diametrically opposite of what free
> >>> will,
> >>> perception, and experience is. Computation has no 1-p experience of
> >>> it's own.
> >> Only a person has this, but person relies on computation, not on any
> >> particular implementations of them, but on all implementations
> >> existing in arithmetic.
> > I would say that the person and their computation both rely upon a
> > single common sense, but that is neither essential-experiential (A)
> > nor existential-arithmetic (Ω) but the unexperienced potential (ɐ)
> > and
> > uncomputed arithmetic (ʊ) that comprises the singularity.
> ?

Common sense is the sum total of unexperienced potential and
uncomputed arithmetic which drives experience and computation.

> > Think of the cellular automation music compared to music played by a
> > master musician.
> Here is a piece of music composed by a very little program, with very
> few parameters.
> http://reglos.de/musinum/midi/sphere4.mid
> If the parameters are close to 2^n, it produces baroque music:
> http://reglos.de/musinum/midi/aintbaroque.mid
> It took time for professional composers to admit that the following
> piece was produced by that same little program:
> http://reglos.de/musinum/midi/class2.mid

I like the baroque one best. They are all very cool, but they all have
an unmistakably generic and wandering feel to my ear. Our musical
styles can be and frequently are inspired by computational influences,
but they are informed by non-comp feelings and experiences as well.

> The reason is that it solves correctly a musical problem that it takes
> years to be familiar with.
> Interestingly, the Mandelbrot set generates implicitly all the musics
> of that program.
> > Even a note or two played by a great pianist or
> > violinist could be recognizable to someone familiar with their work. A
> > single stroke of paint can evoke Matisse or Van Gogh. They are
> > proprietary and signifying. You could listen to 10^100 computers
> > playing the same cellular automata for 100,000 years and never get a
> > Mozart equivalent.
> Mozart is equivalent to an infinity of "cellular automata", unless you
> show me what is not Turing emulable in Mozart. here again you don't
> take into account the results of the logicians which should at the
> least makes you more humble with respect of machines.

Mozart pieces could be generated by cellular automata, but it wouldn't
know the difference between that and random wandering sounds. Mozart
has no significance to the computation, but he does to us who can
listen and know.

> > You wouldn't even find one which could be
> > considered qualitatively different from the others. Beautiful or
> > awful, they would all have the same generic, a-signifying composer. No
> > 1p flourishes or stylistic trends would appear in one computer and be
> > copied or enjoyed by the others. They could be programmed to act like
> > they were doing that perhaps, but they would never generate that kind
> > of logic on their own as silicon devices.
> Racist pretension. You judge (negatively) beings from their clothes.

No, it's just an observation that it seems that they have nothing
under their clothes.

> >> Yopu might have some genuine intuition on 1p and 3p, but you are
> >> killing your "theory" by insisting it negates comp, where I see only
> >> argument for a very low level.
> > That's how you pigeonhole my idea, but I don't see comp as a viable
> > primitive. Simulation is just a way to get machines to fool us in the
> > exact way that we want to be fooled.
> For simulation, perhaps. For emulation: no. If I duplicate you at the
> correct substitution level, the new you will be as unpredictible as
> the original.

I think you are assuming a substitution level in arithmetic terms,
where I think that it substitution could only be accomplished through

> >>> It is the 3-p relation-reflection between private 1-p non-
> >>> comp monads. It is the essence of existence, not the existence of
> >>> essence.
> >> That's look like continental philosophy. It is not really in the
> >> scope
> >> of my job. Sorry.
> > It's funny, I hate philosophy.
> ?!?!?!??
> So why do you do philosophy?

I don't think that I do? I don't care about clever arguments or
schools of thought, I care only about making sense of the big picture.

> I love philosophy, and that is why I
> naswer your post, despite it has nothing to do with my "professional
> work". In science we NEVER assert that an idea is true or false. We
> suggest theories, and try to refute them.
> How can you say that you hate philosophy, and send so much post on the
> philosophical assertion that comp is false without proposing a any
> refutation (by which I mean a derivation of a contradiction).

I'm an unwilling draftee into the debate on comp. It's just the
contemporary technology fetish that has captured the minds of our
academic establishment at the moment and distracts from understanding
the simple truth of who we are and what the universe is.


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