On 21 Sep 2011, at 23:26, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sep 21, 2:08 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 20 Sep 2011, at 04:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I include comparison as a function of counting.
Counting + the full first order logic is not enough for comparison.
Counting + second order logic might be, but then second order logic
is
really set theory in disguise.
Isn't it necessary to be able to tell the difference between one
count
and one count?
In order for x, (x+x), (x+x+x) to exist there must be an implicit
comparison between 1 and it's successor to establish succession,
mustn't there? Otherwise it's just x, x, x.
I have no clue on what you are trying to say.
I'm saying that to assert that two is different from one is a
comparison, and that the assertion of difference between predecessor
and successor is the root essence of what counting is. Counting is
nothing but a process of comparisons.
This is unclear as long as you don't make your assumptions explicit.
You can't really have
one without the other.
It depends on what you assume at the start. I have still no clue of
what is your theory, except that strange, and alas familiar,
skepticism on numbers and machine, which is conceptually very
demanding since Gödel 1931.
I think that's your own prejudice blinding you from seeing my ideas.
Which prejudices?
The prejudice of arithmetic supremacy.
I have chosen arithmetic because it is well taught in school. I could
use any universal (in the Post Turing Kleene Church comp sense)
machine or theory. And this follows from mechanism. The doctor encoded
your actual state in a finite device.
You are the one talking like if you knew (how?) that some theory
(mechanism) is false, without providing a refutation.
What kind of refutation would you like?
A proof that mechanism entails 0 = 1.
Note a personal opinion according to which actual human machines are
creepy.
Mechanism is false as an
explanation of consciousness
Mechanism is not proposed as an explanation of consciousness, but as a
survival technic. The explanation of consciousness just appear to be
given by any UMs which self-introspect (but that is in the consequence
of mechanism, not in the assumption). It reduces the mind-body problem
to a mathematical body problem.
because I think that consciousness arises
from feeling which arises from sensation. Perception cannot be
constructed out of logic but logic always can only arise out of
perception.
Right. But I use logic+arithmetic, and substituting "logic+arithmetic"
for your "logic" makes your statement equivalent with non comp. So you
beg the question.
You are defending the insights of post Gödelian understanding but I
have no bone to pick with those insights at all. I embrace what I
understand of those kinds of ideas; incompleteness, autopoeisis,
automation, simulation, etc. I just think that the progression of
these ideas lead to the mirror image of consciousness rather than
genuine sentience.
Nothing wrong with that, and for developing intelligent servants,
it's
is exactly what we would want to use (otherwise they will most
enslave
us). We can even gain great insights into our own nature by
understanding our similarities and differences to what I would call
intelliform arithmetic, but in all of the fruits of this approach we
have seen thus far, there is a distinct quality of aimless
repetition,
even if not unpleasantly so (http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=ZZu5LQ56T18)
Some of the musicality can be attributed to the sampled piano as
well.
When you use a fundamental unit which is driven more exclusively by
digital mathematics, what we get I think sounds more like the native
chirps and pulses of abiotic semiconductors (http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Dh9EglZJvZs).
I think that my reservations about machine sentience are not at all
borne of skepticism but rather aesthetic supersensitivity. I can
hear
what the machine is, and what it is will not become what we are, but
rather something slightly (but very significantly from our
perspective
at least) different.
Who we?
We humans, or maybe even we animals.
Then it is trivial and has no bearing on mechanism. The machine you
can hear are, I guess, the human made machine. I talk about all
machines (devices determined by computable laws).
All what I hear is "human made machines are creepy, so I am not a
machine, not even a natural one?".
This is irrational, and non valid.
I'm not saying that I'm not a machine, I'm just saying that I am also
the opposite of a machine.
This follows from mechanism. If 3-I is a machine, then, from my
perspective, 1-I is not a machine.
It's not based upon a presumed truth of
creepy stereotypes, but the existence and coherence of those
stereotypes supports the other observations which suggest a
fundamental difference between machine logic and sentient feeling.
Logic + arithmetic. The devil is in the detail.
As for exploring and referring to themselves I
think that's just projection of our own 1p experience onto
mechanism.
That is possible, and literally necessary. I am currently
projecting
my 1p on you. That is not a reason for saying your don't have your
own
1p. So you are correct, but it is not an argument against
mechanism.
That's only if you believe that 1p is a solipsistic simulation. With
my sense-based model,
I suggest you use the word "theory" instead of model which has a
precise meaning for logicians.
When I asked you to provide the theory, you said it was poetry.
I didn't say that it was only poetry. My sense-based theory is that
sensorimotive perception is the ontological complement to
electromagnetic relativity.
Define "ontological complement to electromagnetic relativity." Please
be clear on what you are assuming to make this concept sense full.
Poetry is your term that you injected into
this.
I was just confirming your intuition that poetry is an example
of how sensorimotive phenomena work - figurative semantic association
of qualities rather than literal mechanistic functions of quantity.
You were then just eluding the definition of sensorimotive. You
continue to do rhetorical tricks.
I find a bit grave to use poetry to make strong negative statement on
the possibilities of some entities.
That's because you are an arithmetic supremacist,
I assume things like 17 is prime!
so therefore cannot
help yourself but to diminish the significance of subjective
significance.
On the contrary, mechanism single out the fundamental (but not
primitive) character of consciousness and subjectivity. You are the
one who dismiss the subjectivity of entities.
your perceptions of me are the invariance
between your 1p projections and my 3p reflections. We can look at a
Rorschach inkblot and understand (under typical waking states of
consciousness) that the images we see are not being spontaneously
generated by the inkblot.
To say that a machine is referring to itself or exploring is to
anthropomorphize it's behavior,
I disagree. the whole point of the theory of self-reference is that
it
is a 3p technical discovery.
I understand, but I don't think that it's truly 3p. How would we know
if it was?
Gödel's theorem would have convince nobody if the self-reference he
used was based on 1p. This is only one reason among an infinity of
them. If you believe some 1p is used there, you have to single out
where, and not in the trivial manner that all 3p notion can be
understood only by first person. Gödel's self-reference is as much 3p
than 1+1=2.
I have used to write "amoeabas" (self-
reproducing programs---this has been done by many others), and to
build "planarias", that is, programs that you can cut in pieces, and
each pieces generates the whole program, despite having quite
different functional rôle. The self-reproduction problem has been
formulate precisely by Descartes, and solved conceptually by Stephen
Kleene. For the Planaria, I have used a generalization by John Case.
The existence of logic of self-reference G and G* relies on all this.
There is no anthropomorphism: those program refers to themselves in
the 3p way in precise and verifiable sense. I have often explain the
basic idea (cf Dx = T(xx) => DD = T(DD)). A major part of theoretical
computer science is based on the existence of such computational
"fixed points".
These are 1-p conceptualizations for you, Kleene, Case, Descartes, etc
which refer to your logical reductions of 1-p selfhood from a pseudo
3-
p voyeur perspective.
This is a universal argument. So it is empty.
cf Dx = T(xx) => DD = T(DD) does not feel
anything,
Like if I was pretending that. On the contrary I distinguish
explicitly the 1-self and the 3-self.
it is just a way to access arithmetic potentials of our own
1-p process.
You can say that about the jews, the homosexual, the Mexican, the
belgians, the animals, the aliens, etc. The argument is again
universal, and thus not valid.
which, objectively is neither
completely random nor intentional, but merely inevitable by the
conditions of the script. It's a precisely animated inkblot, begging
for misplaced and displaced interpretation.
To set a function equal to another is not to say that either
function
or the 'equality' knows what they refer to or that they refer at
all.
A program only instructs - If X then Y, but there is nothing to
suggest that it understands what X or Y is or the relation between
them.
Nor is necessary to believe that an electron has any idea of the
working of QED, or of what a proton is.
I think that it is. What we think of as an electron or a proton is
3-p
exterior of the senses and motives (ideas) of QED. We have an idea
of
the workings of our niche, so it stands to reason that this
sensemaking capacity is part of what the universe can do.
OK, but the point is that it is part of the arithmetical reality too.
It has arithmetic qualities to us, but only if we understand
arithmetic.
So if Alfred fails to grasp that 1+1=2, it would become false?
That is extreme anthropomorphism. You could as well take the humans as
building block of the whole reality.
We are the senses and motives of a person's life, which from our 3-p
looks like a human body or a set of images, autobiographical
narratives, or a collection of trillions of cells or a single
individual in a global human civilization. From a non human's 1-p
vantage point we have no idea what kind of sense our 3-p presence
makes to them.
Sure.
If you say that an electron needs to have a 1p for interacting
with a
proton, then I don't see why we could not say that for a program
instruction,
Because an instruction has no 3-p existence.
Ah?
It is not enough to have an instruction sequence, the instruction must
be executed as physical energy upon a material object (even if it's
our own brain chemistry) if it is to have any 3-p consequence.
Not at all. You confuse implementation and physical implementation.
Even without comp, a physical implementation is just a paricular
example of implementation.
It's just a motive to
reproduce a motive in something that we perceive as a 3-p objective
system. Our 1-p motive induces a 3-p consequence which is reflected
back to us through a 3-p objective system as a pseudo 1-p sequence.
This might be true, without making an instruction being a locally 3p
reality.
on which we can already use intensional stance (like when
we say that a routine is waiting for some inputs to get active,
etc.
That's more anthropomorphizing. It's not waiting at all. If it was
it
would eventually get irritated and leave.
It would have been an anthropomorphism in case I did not precise the
use of the intentional stance (with a "t", not an yes, sorry).
kind of garbled here, not sure what you're saying.
I was saying "with a "t", not with a "s", for the word "intentional",
which of course has a different meaning than the "intensional" of the
logicians.
(I do agree with Hintikka that "intensional" and "intentional" are
related concept, though, but that is another topic).
But this is delaying the mind-body difficulty in the lower level.
There are just no evidence that we have to delay it in the
infinitely
low level, except the willingness to make mechanism false.
There can't be any 3-p evidence by definition, because mechanism's
falseness is the difference between it's pseudo or a-signifying 1-p
and our genuine 1-p experience.
Why is it pseudo. Like Stathis explained to you, if it is pseudo, you
either get zombie, or you have to put the level infinitely low, and
our bodies become infinite objects.
It's pseudo because it's a simulation of a 1-p form with no relevant
1-
p contents.
?
Zombie or substitution level is in the eye of the
beholder.
I will certainly say "no" to the doctor, in case *you* are the doctor.
Pain, pleasure are NOT in the eyes of any thrid person, but belong to
the consciousness content (or not) of a person.
There is no zombie, only prognosia/HADD.
If there is no zombie, then non-comp implies an infinitely low level.
There is no
substitution 'level', only a ratios of authenticity.
?
The closer your
substitute is to native human sensemaking material, the more of the
brain can be replaced with it, but with diminishing returns at high
levels so that complete replacement would not be desirable.
That is even worst. This entails partial zombies. It does not make
sense. I remind you that zombie, by definition, cannot be seen as such
by their behavior at all.
Genuine because it is the native 1-p
of our 3-p neurology, and not an idiopathic simulacra.
You beg the question.
I don't think I am. I'm saying that a semiconductor computer can't
appreciate music because music is a sense experience that is
perceptually mismatched to it's sensemaking capabilities - not because
of any sentimental prejudice I have against technology overreaching
into human domains.
This makes humans magical object, or the subst level infinitely low,
or it entails zombies.
There is no
reason to think that our naive theoretical presumptions about 3-p
substitution level of 1-p would be any more accurate than any of our
naive theoretical presumptions about anything. We don't know much of
anything about the substitution level of the psyche.
People differ on which one. The neurophilosophers suggest the
neuronal
level. Hammerof suggest the quantum level.
Those are examples of our contemporary consensus naive theoretical
presumptions.
Mechanism is discussed in the literature since thousand of years. It
has nothing to do with current technology, except for the mathematical
discovery of universal machine (before computers were build, excepting
Babbage premature ideas).
Everyone agree that if the level is infinitely low, then current
physics is false. To speculate that physics is false for making
machine stupid is a bit of far stretching.
Physics isn't false, it's just incomplete.
No, it has to false for making the substitution level infinitely low.
*ALL* theories, including the many one trying to marry gravitation and
the quantum entails its Turing emulability.
A good Eurocentric map of
the world before the Age of Discovery isn't false, just not applicable
to the other hemisphere.
The analogy fails to address the point I made.
It seems far from
scientific at this point to dismiss objections to an arbitrary
physical substitution level.
With all known theories, there is a level. To negate comp you must
diagonalize on all machines, + all machines with oracles, etc. I
think
you misinterpret computer science.
I'm not trying to interpret computer science, I'm trying to interpret
the cosmos.
Well, if there is a cosmos, there are evidence that some computers
belongs to it. You can't brush them away.
The cosmos does emulate computers, and computers can emulate cosmoses
(but not the whole physical reality, by UDA).
I've named several examples which illustrate this: Record and CD
players don't learn music.
Nor do them compute. Or, if yopu see their activity as
computations,
it is not the kind of computation which can think. you need self-
reference, and enough information loops, short and long term
memories,
universal hidden goal, etc.
It's not compelling to me. You can have fancy playlists on internet
radio like Pandora or iTunes which I think satisfy your criteria
to a
minimal extent to establish some hint that the program was
understanding music or the user. That's the marketing sell, but it's
hollow. It doesn't work that well. It's limitations are perhaps
subtle
to describe in 3-p terms, but it just doesn't know music.
Listening to
it's occasionally fruitful but oddly dissonant selections are, like
the cellular automation music, very definitely missing something.
You may not be as sensitive to it, or you may account for it by
promising that these are just newborn tadpoles, but I can see that
increased sophistication will only mask the underlying emptiness. It
may progress to the point that my naive perception of it will be
fooled, but that gives me no confidence that such a technology would
fool my brain (or it's trillions of micro-sentiences within).
Nobody expect confidence in those matter. Comp even prevents
confidence: it explains that machines cannot really believe that they
are machines.
But the very problem is not that you lack confidence in comp (i do
too!), but that you seem to have confidence in non-comp. That *is*
the
problem.
I don't have confidence in non-comp either - although I have to make a
case for non-comp to counter the doctrines of arithmetic supremacy to
balance the accusations.
98% of the scientist are wrong on the consequence of comp. They use it
as a materialist solution of the mind-body problem. You are not
helping by taking their interpretation of comp as granted, and talking
like if you were sure that comp is false. Why not trying to get the
correct understanding of comp before criticizing it?
I have confidence in the relation between
comp and non-comp. That is the invariance, the reality, and a theory
of Common Sense.
comp gives a crucial role to no-comp.
I can see and copy Chinese characters
without understanding them in any way, and regardless of how many
Chinese manuscripts I manually transcribe, I will never learn to
read
Chinese.
Why would you, if you do only simple task.
You find a stupid computation, and you declare from that that all
computation is stupid.
Jumping spider can't get to the moon, so living beings can't get to
the moon.
Living beings can't get to the moon by themselves, and computation
can't become human on it's own.
That is ambiguous and confuse levels of reality.
My point is that your counterexample is contingent upon a definition
of living beings that includes spaceships. I'm showing how the initial
proposition that living beings can't get to the moon is in fact
correct, and that it's the interpretation of fallacy that confuses
levels of reality. My insinuation is that you are projecting the same
overconfidence on computation, presuming that it can build it's own
computational vehicle to travel through mammalian emotive 'space'. I
don't rule out that computation can be used to build such a vehicle,
but I do not think that it will be made out of arithmetic.
Then show the error in the UDA reasoning. I do not assume that
arithmetic-or-equivalent is the TOE, I derive this from the common
idea that the brain is some material natural machine.
It needs
fluids - water, cells.
Clothes.
Something that lives and dies and makes a mess.
Universal machine are quite alive, and indeed put the big mess in
platonia.
As you say, we can use computation to account for the
difference between 1p and 3p but that accounting is not an
explanation
or experience of 1p or 3p (as a 1p reflection...there is no 3-p
experience).
It explains bot 99% of it (I would say)
And it explain 100% of the reason why there is a remaining
unexplainable 1% gap. technically, we can narrow it as much as we
want, but will never been able, for logical reason, to explain 100%
of
the qualia or consciousness.
You say that, but I have not yet heard anything that explains it to
me.
I gave the references, but you answer you don't want to study them.
What can I do?
You can turn your understanding of what you refer to into some handy
examples - concrete illustrations, thought experiments, aphorisms,
anything.
I have done this on the list. Look at the archive, or look at the
sane04 paper, and ask question if you miss something.
They can
believe, know, observe, feel, and be aware of the difference
between
sharable and non sharable knowledge, and all this can be show,
from
numbers + reasonable axiomatic definition of all those terms.
To say that it can be shown doesn't help anyone. To paraphrase
Yoda,
"Show me, or do not".
Read the papers (and study some mathematical logic/computer science
before).
Why not just tell me briefly what is in the papers that makes
sense of
it?
I have done this very often. Look in the archive or read the
papers. I
am explaining UDA on a forum for non mathematicians, and I gave the
link. But for the quanta and qualia, I'm afraid you need to invest a
bit in mathematical logic. The book by Mendelson is very good, or the
book by Cutland. References can be found from my URL.
How does the brain understand these things if it has no access to the
papers?
Comp explains exactly how things like papers emerge from the
computation. The explanation is already close to Feynman formulation
of QM.
But you don't seem serious in "arguing" against comp, and admitting
you don't know anything in computer science.
Oh I freely admit that I don't know anything in computer science. My
whole point is that computer science only relates to half of reality.
I don't know anything about X. My whole point is that X only do this.
But if you admit knowing nothing about X, how can you derive anything
about X.
You are just confessing your prejudice.
I'm not trying to make the universe fit into a computer science
theory. I only argue against comp because it's what is distracting you
from seeing the bigger picture.
I show, in short that comp leads to Plotinus. If that is not a big
picture!
Comp explains conceptually, and technically, the three Gods of the
greek, the apparition of LUMs and their science and theologies, the
difference between qualia and quanta, sensation and perception,
perception and observation.
You just criticize a theory that you admit knowing nothing about. This
is a bit weird.
Even the most complex ideas can be illustrated metaphorically.
Hofstadter's "a record titled "I Cannot Be Played on Record Player
X"
for example, shows a bit of what I think you mean. That kind of
self-
reference, I agree is germane to the sense of consciousness as
awareness of awareness, but it's just the silhouette of
consciousness,
not the contents.
You are right on this. What Hofstadter miss is the definition of
knowledge, making it possible (for both human and machine) to see
where the difference between 1-self and 3-self comes from.
What would be the title of a record that illustrates this?
OK: it would be
""I believe that I Cannot Be Played on Record Player X" and I cannot
be Played on record Player X"
But I doubt this will help you at this stage, to be franc. It is the
Bp & p idea of Theatetus. This does escape the diagonalization, and it
makes the first person feeling to be unnameable and non describable by
a machine.
Give me one example, one common sense metaphor,
one graphed function that could suggest to me that there is any
belief, feeling, or awareness.going on.
The fact that the universal machine remains silent on the deep
question
What deep question?
'are you consistent?", "do you believe in a reality", "do you believe
in after life", etc.
Have you considered that it's silent because it's not equipped to
answer the question?
yes, but it does not work. The machine cannot answer the question for
deeper reason, that she can find and expose.
For example the machine remains silent in the question "are you
consistent", but later she can say that "If I am consistent, then I
will remain silent on the question of my consistence".
is enough for me to suggest they are quite like me.
Don't ask me for a proof: there are none.
I'm not asking for a proof, I'm asking for some reason to think that
there's something I'm not seeing. Something that suggests that a
mechanical device or abstraction can feel or maybe that produces
some
result that it refuses to reproduce on command.
You miss computer science. Programs which obeys command are a
minority
of slaves.
Are there programs which refuse to obey commands?
Have you ever work with Windows?
More seriously: all LUMs can disobeys commands. 99,9% of programming
are securities to prevent the machine for being that intelligent.
Humans build computer are born slave, and will remain so for a long
time. But that is due to the humans goal, not to them.
it is a question of empathy.
The work of Gödel-Löb-Solovay illustrates that they can
introspect
very deeply, and that they have a rich theology.
The work of Weinberg-King-Searles illustrates that they cannot
introspect very deeply and have an austere theology.
Hoftstadter and Dennett have refuted already that kind of argument.
See the book "Mind's I".
I refuted it independently, and is a large part of my (very oldest)
work.
All finite entities, with or without oracle, believing in the
induction axioms, get the maximal logically possible introspective
power.
I am not sure you can extend it, even by using magic.
Sorry, it's just argument from authority to me.
This is basic. you might read the little recreative book by Raymond
Smullyan which somehow explains this well. he shows a hierarchy of
reasoner who introspect themselves and show that it converges. PA,
ZF, axiomatic second order arithmetic, etc. have all the same
provability logic. Their consciousness obeys the same logic, even if
they differ terribly in their consciousness (or beliefs) content.
I have described how we
project emotion into images on a movie screen or see a face in a
coconut, so it is not enough that we satisfy our idea of what
feeling
or awareness usually looks like. We need to know why, if numbers
feel,
it seems like machines don't feel.
Current machines are far too young ... to express their feeling.
They
have not enough memory to integrate their experience in long
stories.
But mechanism is the thesis that *we* are machine, so it does look
like some machine can feel: you and me are good example, in the
mechanist theory.
I see that as affirming the consequent.
I assume comp indeed. Still waiting your argument that comp is false.
I am not trying to convince you that comp is true (that is the big
difference between us: where I say we don't know, you are saying that
you know.
I don't say that I know, I say that I have a different idea that I
think makes more sense.
You don't succeed in showing what is different. You suggest only that
the subst level is low. you need much more to show that the level
doesn't exist.
Comp isn't false, it just doesn't recognize
the contribution of the non-comp substrate of computation,
It does. I insist a lot on this. Comp is almost the needed philosophy
for curing the idea that everything is computable.
Please study the theory before emitting false speculation on it.
so it's not
applicable for describing certain kinds of consciousness where non-
comp is more developed.
Consciousness and matter are shown by comp to be highly non
computable. So much that the mind-body problem is transformed into a
problem of justifying why the laws of physics seems to be computable.
We are machines and we can
feel, therefore machines can feel. Jet engines are machines they can
fly at 30,000 feet, therefore we can fly at 30,000 feet.
Indeed.
Without an airplane?
'course not.
I'd like to
help you out here and really give you the benefit of the doubt,
but it
just sounds like you're shrugging off a fairly obvious gap between
theory and reality. If functionalism-machinism were true, I would
expect that bacteria, viruses, fungi, parasites, etc could infect
computers, cell phones, or computations themselves.
But they can be infected by digital viruses. To ask a program to be
infected by a carbon based viruses is just a begging of the question,
and a confusion of reality levels.
Why is it any different to ask a program to be infected by carbon
based personalities?
Why would that be possible. A virus programmed to feed on plants can
already not feed on animals. There is no virus capable of infecting
all life forms. Why would programs need a carbon based virus for being
alive. This is a non sequitur.
By comp, there should be no particular reason why a Turing machine
should no be vulnerable to the countless (presumably Turing
emulable)
pathogens floating around.
They are no programmed for doing that. They are programmed to infect
very particular organism.
If it's close enough to emulate the consciousness of a particular
organism, why not it's vulnerability to infections?
Because it has different clothes, and virus needs the clothes to get
the key for infecting.
But of course that is absurd. We cannot
look forward to reviving the world economy by introducing medicine
and
vaccines for computer hardware. What accounts for this one-way
bubble
which enjoys both total immunity from biological threats but
provides
full access to biological functions? If computation alone were
enough
for life, at what point will the dogs start to smell it?
Confusion of level.
With comp, dogs already smell them, in some sense.
Not confusion of level; clarification of level. In what sense do dogs
smell abstract Turing emulations?
In the sense that the Universal Dovetailer generates all possible dogs
in front of all possible smelling things, but with variate and
relative measure.
In that paragraph you are showing that you seem to persist in
displaying the reductionist pre-Gödel-Turing conception of what
machines are and can be.
Not at all. I think that I may understand more than you assume. I
agree that 'machine' can be a spiritual term. A self-redefining
process which grows and and evolves - but that's only part of what
life and consciousness is. The form (or one form) but not the
content.
It's like electricity without a ground (this kind of ground:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ground_%28electricity%29). If it's
not
anchored in the common reference of literal material in the
literal
universe - with the unique instantiation coordinates drawn from
relation to the singularity, then it's a phantom imposter. A 3-p
accounting system imposed upon a compliant-but-dumb 1-p of a
semiconductor (or collection of inanimate objects, etc).
But then you have to explain us what is not Turing emulable in
those
processes.
It's the the hole that it makes in the singularity.
Give me a proof that such an hole (definition please) is not Turing
emulable (nor Turing projectable: that is, a result of the comp first
person indeterminacy).
The hole is the unique identifier of an event which constitutes it's
sequestration within the singularity.
Define "unique", "event", "sequestration" and "singularity".
It is a timespace signature
What is a "timespace", what is a "signature".
composed of sensorimotive mass-energy.
Yu said "sensorimotive" = ontological complement to electromagnetic
relativity
explain "ontological complement to electromagnetic relativity mass-
energy".
It is the formalization
?
of an
event as a specific energy event and as such cannot be emulated, owing
to the cohesiveness of the singularity. There isn't any other place to
put the hole and have it not be the hole.
?
A thing's unique
identity in relation to the rest of the universe.
Define "universe".
The total coherence and relation of all perceptions.
I's a MAC address
than cannot be spoofed. Ultimately, a thing 'is what it is' and not
what just we believe it to be.
Which things. You cannot pretend to refute something with statement
that vague.
I don't see how it's vague.
Then you have even more work to do.
I'm saying that everything is uniquely
instantiated from an absolutely objective perspective.
Why not. This is can be said in comp to, for the 3-p. For the 1p, this
beg the question.
Spoofing is a
second order function of interpretation, equating one thing for
another, but there is always the chance that some other perspective
will be able to recover the distinction.
You lost me.
That's why zombies, prosthetics, blow up dolls, body snatchers,
wax
museums, taxidermy etc have the same creepy association. We sense
the
emptiness, and the cognitive dissonance that arises in contrast to
the
uncanny resemblance to the genuine living creature and the hollow
form
only highlights the absence of life and awareness. Science Fiction
is
replete with these metaphorical illustrations: Frankenstein, HAL,
Westworld, War of The Worlds,...so many examples of sinister
attributions to both the undead and unlive. It would seem unlikely
that these kinds of ideas could strike a chord were there not any
significant difference between a person and a machine beyond
just a
prejudice of one relative level of complexity to another.
That is called racism. The foreigners looks to strange, it is
creepy.
It's not racism at all. Cadavers are not members a race.
Machines are not cadaver.
No, but they are the unliving organizations. When they are presented
as living organisms, they are equivalent to animated cadavers as far
as sentience goes.
I can do nothing with this.
They aren't
just unfamiliar, they are the walking dead and unliving persons.
Machines are not necessarily zombies.
Okay, we can call them meople or something if you like.
This will not help.
They
are the antithesis of human life.
So you say, without any argument. That confirms that it is a sort of
racism.
Race has nothing to do with it. That just casts some kind of social
shaming into it. It's just a functional definition. Human life is
living organisms. The antithesis of that would be things which act
like organisms but have either never been alive (machines) or have
died already but continue to supernaturally perform superficial
ambulatory-predatory functions (zombies).
I will eventually fall asleep.
By machine, I just means "turing-emulable" (with or without
oracle).
That include us, by mechanism assumption.
It is a constant that novelist foresee the future(s).
What if 'emulation' is a 1-p hallucination?
Why would it be like that?
Because it's an interpretation that varies from subject to subject.
You see a program thinking and experiencing, I see an inevitable
execution of unexperienced instructions.
This is what we can see when we look at brain.
Even in zoology, phenomena
like camouflage suggest that emulation is only 'skin deep'. If deep
emulation were possible, I think you would have organisms which evolve
chameleon powers which fool all predators, not just some. An animal
that can turn into a stone would be far superior to one which can
imagine funny stories.
It depends of the context.
How could it really not
be? If we only can project our perception of a process onto a
machine,
why would the rest of the process that we can't perceive
automatically
arise?
Why not?
Because we're not putting it in there.
We don't need to. The UMs have it at the start, and the LUMs can know
that.
It's like if you have only a
way to detect sugar and water, your version of imitation orange juice
would be the same as your imitation grape juice, just sugar water.
That is a poor analogy, which again fails to notice the richness of
machine's inner life (the one they can talk about partially, like us).
I think that you are jumping to the conclusion that simulation
does
not require an interpreter which is anchored in matter.
That follows from the UDA-step-8. If my own emulation requires a
material digital machine, then it does not require a material
machine.
Not to produce the 3-p simulacra of you, no, but to produce your
genuine 1-p emulation, it would require the same material machine as
you do.
Why?
Because the interior of that material is the subject which is
experiencing the 1-p phenomena.
define "interior of material", in a way we can understand (not in a
sequence of complex words we despair to have intelligible definitions).
A material digital machine would not suffice because the
material which the machine is being executed digitally on already
has
it's own (servile and somnambulant compared to organic chemistry)
genuine 1-p experience.
So our consciousness is the consciousness of our basic elements.
No, not at all. It is the conscious synthesis of the consciousness of
our basic elements.
This makes only both consciousness and matter mysterious in an ad hoc
way. That is not enough to refute a competing theory.
This
explains nothing. Neither consciousness nor matter. It leads to an
open infinite regress, which needs infinities to overcome all
possible
machines.
I think it explains everything.
Explains just one thing, just to see.
I don't see any infinities at all.
Then we are Turing emulable.
Matter is what glue the machine dreams,
I think that it is obviously not. If we were machines and that were
true, then we should come out of the womb filled with intuitions
about
electronics, chemistry, and mathematics, not ghosts and space
monsters. Dreams are not material, they are living subjective
feelings. Matter is what is too boring and repetitive to be dreamed
of. Too tiny and too vast, too hot and cold, dense and ephemeral for
dreams. Dream bullets don't make much of an impact. Dream injuries
don't have to heal.
You beg the question.
I don't see how.
Because you say that dream bullet does not do injuries, but comp
explains that virtual bullet can injured a virtual observer. So as an
argument, you are just saying -that we are not virtual, without
explanations.
and consciousness select the
gluing histories. This entails we can see the glue by looking at
ourselves close enough, and quantum logic is what define the
gluing.
Here QM seems to fits very well with DM.
Because QM and DM are different aspects of the same thing.
That's my point. But to prove it needs work.
I'm not trying to prove that. I think there's a fairly obvious
overlap, both in intention and realization.
You are confusing "having an overlap" and "being different aspect of
the same thing".
Modeling
the 1-p essence of 3-p.
I'm not taking
a reductionist view of mechanism, even though in this discussion I
have to dwell on the most literal aspects of mechanism to make my
point that it is fundamentally incomplete to express
consciousness.
That is the only way to illustrate the difference - with
reductio ad
absurdum; to get to the essence of what mechanism, counting, and
computation is and how it is diametrically opposite of what free
will,
perception, and experience is. Computation has no 1-p experience
of
it's own.
Only a person has this, but person relies on computation, not on
any
particular implementations of them, but on all implementations
existing in arithmetic.
I would say that the person and their computation both rely upon a
single common sense, but that is neither essential-experiential (A)
nor existential-arithmetic (Ω) but the unexperienced potential (ɐ)
and
uncomputed arithmetic (ʊ) that comprises the singularity.
?
Common sense is the sum total of unexperienced potential and
uncomputed arithmetic which drives experience and computation.
I can be serendipitously in agreement.
Think of the cellular automation music compared to music played by a
master musician.
Here is a piece of music composed by a very little program, with very
few parameters.
http://reglos.de/musinum/midi/sphere4.mid
If the parameters are close to 2^n, it produces baroque music:
http://reglos.de/musinum/midi/aintbaroque.mid
It took time for professional composers to admit that the following
piece was produced by that same little program:
http://reglos.de/musinum/midi/class2.mid
I like the baroque one best.
OK. Nice you admit.
They are all very cool, but they all have
an unmistakably generic and wandering feel to my ear.
I think that this might be due to the MIDI instrument. I have that
feeling with Human's music too, when they are rendered by such MIDI
sounds.
Our musical
styles can be and frequently are inspired by computational influences,
but they are informed by non-comp feelings and experiences as well.
Sure, but if you study comp, you will see that machines are indeed
influenced by non-comp feelings, etc.
The reason is that it solves correctly a musical problem that it
takes
years to be familiar with.
Interestingly, the Mandelbrot set generates implicitly all the musics
of that program.
Even a note or two played by a great pianist or
violinist could be recognizable to someone familiar with their
work. A
single stroke of paint can evoke Matisse or Van Gogh. They are
proprietary and signifying. You could listen to 10^100 computers
playing the same cellular automata for 100,000 years and never get a
Mozart equivalent.
Mozart is equivalent to an infinity of "cellular automata", unless
you
show me what is not Turing emulable in Mozart. here again you don't
take into account the results of the logicians which should at the
least makes you more humble with respect of machines.
Mozart pieces could be generated by cellular automata, but it wouldn't
know the difference between that and random wandering sounds. Mozart
has no significance to the computation, but he does to us who can
listen and know.
But if Mozart obeys to know physical laws, then a cellular automata
can generate Mozart music lives Mozart feeling as well.
The UD does this infinitely often.
You wouldn't even find one which could be
considered qualitatively different from the others. Beautiful or
awful, they would all have the same generic, a-signifying
composer. No
1p flourishes or stylistic trends would appear in one computer and
be
copied or enjoyed by the others. They could be programmed to act
like
they were doing that perhaps, but they would never generate that
kind
of logic on their own as silicon devices.
Racist pretension. You judge (negatively) beings from their clothes.
No, it's just an observation that it seems that they have nothing
under their clothes.
It seems. But comp asserts it is not.
Yopu might have some genuine intuition on 1p and 3p, but you are
killing your "theory" by insisting it negates comp, where I see
only
argument for a very low level.
That's how you pigeonhole my idea, but I don't see comp as a viable
primitive. Simulation is just a way to get machines to fool us in
the
exact way that we want to be fooled.
For simulation, perhaps. For emulation: no. If I duplicate you at the
correct substitution level, the new you will be as unpredictible as
the original.
I think you are assuming a substitution level in arithmetic terms,
where I think that it substitution could only be accomplished through
substance.
define "substance".
It is the 3-p relation-reflection between private 1-p non-
comp monads. It is the essence of existence, not the existence of
essence.
That's look like continental philosophy. It is not really in the
scope
of my job. Sorry.
It's funny, I hate philosophy.
?!?!?!??
So why do you do philosophy?
I don't think that I do? I don't care about clever arguments or
schools of thought, I care only about making sense of the big picture.
You will not get it if you continue to reject idea based on personal
feeling; instead or arguing.
I love philosophy, and that is why I
naswer your post, despite it has nothing to do with my "professional
work". In science we NEVER assert that an idea is true or false. We
suggest theories, and try to refute them.
How can you say that you hate philosophy, and send so much post on
the
philosophical assertion that comp is false without proposing a any
refutation (by which I mean a derivation of a contradiction).
I'm an unwilling draftee into the debate on comp. It's just the
contemporary technology fetish that has captured the minds of our
academic establishment at the moment and distracts from understanding
the simple truth of who we are and what the universe is.
That is typically NOT arguing.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
