On 18 Sep 2011, at 19:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Sep 18, 11:55 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 18 Sep 2011, at 06:13, Craig Weinberg wrote:



Accounting is not explaining. Which actually sums up my entire
position on this endless thread. Consciousness explains and counts.
Computers only count. Come up with an algorithm for explanation, and
put it into an electronic explainer, and we will have true AGI.

Computers can do much more than counting. Actual computer can compare,
explore, refer to themselves in the 3p- way, refer to themselves in
the 1p way and account of that difference between 1p and 3p.

I include comparison as a function of counting.

Counting + the full first order logic is not enough for comparison.
Counting + second order logic might be, but then second order logic is really set theory in disguise.


You can't really have
one without the other.

It depends on what you assume at the start. I have still no clue of what is your theory, except that strange, and alas familiar, skepticism on numbers and machine, which is conceptually very demanding since Gödel 1931.



As for exploring and referring to themselves I
think that's just projection of our own 1p experience onto mechanism.

That is possible, and literally necessary. I am currently projecting my 1p on you. That is not a reason for saying your don't have your own 1p. So you are correct, but it is not an argument against mechanism.


To set a function equal to another is not to say that either function
or the 'equality' knows what they refer to or that they refer at all.
A program only instructs - If X then Y, but there is nothing to
suggest that it understands what X or Y is or the relation between
them.

Nor is necessary to believe that an electron has any idea of the working of QED, or of what a proton is. If you say that an electron needs to have a 1p for interacting with a proton, then I don't see why we could not say that for a program instruction, on which we can already use intensional stance (like when we say that a routine is waiting for some inputs to get active, etc. But this is delaying the mind-body difficulty in the lower level. There are just no evidence that we have to delay it in the infinitely low level, except the willingness to make mechanism false.



I've named several examples which illustrate this: Record and CD
players don't learn music.

Nor do them compute. Or, if yopu see their activity as computations, it is not the kind of computation which can think. you need self- reference, and enough information loops, short and long term memories, universal hidden goal, etc.



I can see and copy Chinese characters
without understanding them in any way, and regardless of how many
Chinese manuscripts I manually transcribe, I will never learn to read
Chinese.

Why would you, if you do only simple task.
You find a stupid computation, and you declare from that that all computation is stupid. Jumping spider can't get to the moon, so living beings can't get to the moon.





As you say, we can use computation to account for the
difference between 1p and 3p but that accounting is not an explanation
or experience of 1p or 3p (as a 1p reflection...there is no 3-p
experience).

It explains bot 99% of it (I would say)
And it explain 100% of the reason why there is a remaining unexplainable 1% gap. technically, we can narrow it as much as we want, but will never been able, for logical reason, to explain 100% of the qualia or consciousness.



They can
believe, know, observe, feel, and be aware of the difference between
sharable and non sharable knowledge, and all this can be show, from
numbers + reasonable axiomatic definition of all those terms.

To say that it can be shown doesn't help anyone. To paraphrase Yoda,
"Show me, or do not".

Read the papers (and study some mathematical logic/computer science before).



Give me one example, one common sense metaphor,
one graphed function that could suggest to me that there is any
belief, feeling, or awareness.going on.

The fact that the universal machine remains silent on the deep question is enough for me to suggest they are quite like me. Don't ask me for a proof: there are none. it is a question of empathy. The work of Gödel-Löb-Solovay illustrates that they can introspect very deeply, and that they have a rich theology.



I have described how we
project emotion into images on a movie screen or see a face in a
coconut, so it is not enough that we satisfy our idea of what feeling
or awareness usually looks like. We need to know why, if numbers feel,
it seems like machines don't feel.

Current machines are far too young ... to express their feeling. They have not enough memory to integrate their experience in long stories. But mechanism is the thesis that *we* are machine, so it does look like some machine can feel: you and me are good example, in the mechanist theory.





In that paragraph you are showing that you seem to persist in
displaying  the reductionist pre-Gödel-Turing conception of what
machines are and can be.

Not at all. I think that I may understand more than you assume. I
agree that 'machine' can be a spiritual term. A self-redefining
process which grows and and evolves - but that's only part of what
life and consciousness is. The form (or one form) but not the content.
It's like electricity without a ground (this kind of ground:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ground_%28electricity%29). If it's not
anchored in the common reference of literal material in the literal
universe - with the unique instantiation coordinates drawn from
relation to the singularity, then it's a phantom imposter. A 3-p
accounting system imposed upon a compliant-but-dumb 1-p of a
semiconductor (or collection of inanimate objects, etc).

But then you have to explain us what is not Turing emulable in those processes.



That's why zombies, prosthetics, blow up dolls, body snatchers, wax
museums, taxidermy etc have the same creepy association. We sense the
emptiness, and the cognitive dissonance that arises in contrast to the
uncanny resemblance to the genuine living creature and the hollow form
only highlights the absence of life and awareness. Science Fiction is
replete with these metaphorical illustrations: Frankenstein, HAL,
Westworld, War of The Worlds,...so many examples of sinister
attributions to both the undead and unlive. It would seem unlikely
that these kinds of ideas could strike a chord were there not any
significant difference between a person and a machine beyond just a
prejudice of one relative level of complexity to another.

That is called racism. The foreigners looks to strange, it is creepy.
By machine, I just means "turing-emulable" (with or without oracle). That include us, by mechanism assumption.
It is a constant that novelist foresee the future(s).




I think that you are jumping to the conclusion that simulation does
not require an interpreter which is anchored in matter.

That follows from the UDA-step-8. If my own emulation requires a material digital machine, then it does not require a material machine. Matter is what glue the machine dreams, and consciousness select the gluing histories. This entails we can see the glue by looking at ourselves close enough, and quantum logic is what define the gluing. Here QM seems to fits very well with DM.



I'm not taking
a reductionist view of mechanism, even though in this discussion I
have to dwell on the most literal aspects of mechanism to make my
point that it is fundamentally incomplete to express consciousness.
That is the only way to illustrate the difference - with reductio ad
absurdum; to get to the essence of what mechanism, counting, and
computation is and how it is diametrically opposite of what free will,
perception, and experience is. Computation has no 1-p experience of
it's own.

Only a person has this, but person relies on computation, not on any particular implementations of them, but on all implementations existing in arithmetic.

Yopu might have some genuine intuition on 1p and 3p, but you are killing your "theory" by insisting it negates comp, where I see only argument for a very low level.



It is the 3-p relation-reflection between private 1-p non-
comp monads. It is the essence of existence, not the existence of
essence.

That's look like continental philosophy. It is not really in the scope of my job. Sorry.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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