On Sep 23, 3:17 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > On 23 Sep 2011, at 02:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > My assumption is that the experience of thinking of quantities in a > > series, like 1, 2, 3, 4 is an example of counting. > > This is fuzzy. Now, even if you succeed in making explicit assumptions > from which you can derive a form of counting, like 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ..., > you are might not yet been able to justify, or even define that 3 is > smaller than 5.
You're right for sure that counting alone does not imply >, <, or +, but to say that 3 is smaller than 5 is even more explicitly a comparison. > Usually "x < y" is defined by "it exists z such that x + z = y. You > need some explicit assumption for the manipulation of "+". > I don't think that you do need an explicit assumption. Wouldn't that be a third order logic about the first order counting and second order <> operations? If we are talking about the sensorimotive feelings which underlie arithmetic we need only a sense of 'more'. For instance, you can look at two piles of staples and guess wrong about which one has more. The fact of the literal count does not generate a corresponding feeling of 'moreness', but a feeling of moreness can be quantified and attached to a literal count. > > >>> The prejudice of arithmetic supremacy. > > >> I have chosen arithmetic because it is well taught in school. I could > >> use any universal (in the Post Turing Kleene Church comp sense) > >> machine or theory. And this follows from mechanism. The doctor > >> encoded > >> your actual state in a finite device. > > > I don't understand. Are you saying that you are not arithmetically > > biased or that it's natural/unavoidable to be biased? > > I am not arithmetically biased. I have make some attempt for using > combinators in the place of numbers. > I am "finitistically" biased, as any computationalist. But to handle > finite things, we can works with numbers, or other Turing universal > system. I don't see why finite has to be equated with computable though. Red is finite, but not computable. Hilarious is finite, but not quantifiable. > > > > >>>> You are the one talking like if you knew (how?) that some theory > >>>> (mechanism) is false, without providing a refutation. > > >>> What kind of refutation would you like? > > >> A proof that mechanism entails 0 = 1. > > > That demands that mechanism be disproved mechanically, > > Not necessarily. But indeed, it is better that the process of > verification of the proof, even if informal, can easily be thought as > capable of being formalized, so that anyone can, with enough patience, > be convinced. That excludes any truths which require the voluntary participation of the thinker to convince themselves. This is the crux of the problem with mechanism. It is predicated on a voyeuristic ontology, which I stipulate is theoretically possible, but is quite literally impossible to realize. To 'prove' that you exist is to eat your own head, tail first. Rather than trying to dodge that as an anomaly, I think you have to build the hypothesis from that point as the foundation. Just as the revelations of Galileo and Darwin required a braver confrontation with 'what actually is the case' than would earlier religious reckonings allow, these new understandings make empiricism seem lazy and cowardly. 'Convince me.' they say. 'Make it so I am overpowered by the evidence and have no ability to resist no matter how hard I try'.. The perfect ethos to usher in an era of patriarchical industrial conquest. The thing is that this ethos is played out. That era has peaked already, and no has devolved into it's decadent self-absorbed period. The new truths are sense based. Observation is the new existence. These truths you must meet half way. You must reclaim your share of 'common sense' and rescue your orphaned and disqualified subjectivity. > > > which gives an > > indication of what the problem with it is, but you have to read > > between the lines to get it. A literal approach has limitations which > > arise from it's very investment in literalism. > > Lol. You might become a good lawyer. Heh. I hate law too. Too much philosophy ;) > > > > >> Note a personal opinion according to which actual human machines are > >> creepy. > > > Not sure what you mean. Individual humans can certainly seem creepy, > > but I'm talking about there being a particular difference in our > > perception of living things vs non-living things which imitate living > > things. Even true of plants. Plastic plants are somewhat creepy in the > > same way for the same reason. I don't think that it can be assumed > > therefore that humans are only machines. They may be partially > > machines, but machines may not ever be a complete description of > > humanity. > > There is no complete description of humanity, nor is there any > complete theory of what are and can be machine. > For the nth times, you are just showing prejudice. Just because they both cannot be described completely doesn't mean that they intersect. > > You think like that: > axiom: machines are necessarily stupid, you tell me that I might be a > machine, so you tell me that I might be stupid. Not at all. I know you think that's what I think but it's your prejudice against my position. Machines are much smarter than us at some things, not as smart at others, and not capable at all for still other things. They are just different. Just like not all plants are edible. It's not to say that plants which are inedible to us are less than food, just that they aren't food for us. > > I think like that: > axiom: I might be not stupid. You tell me that I am a machine. Nice, > some machine might be non stupid. I understand that, but you don't see that I've already been there done that. I used to subscribe to that perspective too. In theory it makes perfect sense. We are sort of badly wired robots bumping into each other (and that is of course true), so it makes sense that a really nicely designed robot would be a big improvement. In practice though, there is something missing. Something subtle from a 3-p perspective, but quite significant from a 1-p perspective. If the theory were correct, that should not be the case and even the simplest logical program should give us warm inviting feelings - a deep comfort like hearing a human voice on the other end of the phone instead of a voicemail system when we really need help. It's not like that though. Mechanistic perfection leaves many people with a cold and sterile feeling. Not in spite of it's perfection, but in spite of our theoretical assumptions of perfection. Like medieval medicine, we just don't have it right yet. We are convinced that we are going in the right direction, again and again true progress seems to elude us on every front. > > > > >>> Mechanism is false as an > >>> explanation of consciousness > > >> Mechanism is not proposed as an explanation of consciousness, but > >> as a > >> survival technic. The explanation of consciousness just appear to be > >> given by any UMs which self-introspect (but that is in the > >> consequence > >> of mechanism, not in the assumption). It reduces the mind-body > >> problem > >> to a mathematical body problem. > > > Survival of what? > > Of your soul. Ohh. In my view survival of the soul may be a foregone conclusion if we understand that the singularity is the universe with all of the time and space nullified. > > > It sounds like you are saying that consciousness is > > just a consequence of being conscious, and that this makes the mind > > into math. > > The assumption: I can survive with a digital brain, like I can survive > with an artificial heart. The problem is that you aren't part of your heart, but you are part of your brain. > The consequence: an explanation of both mind and matter can be > extracted from addition and multiplication. But what is addition and multiplication extracted from? > > > > >>> because I think that consciousness arises > >>> from feeling which arises from sensation. Perception cannot be > >>> constructed out of logic but logic always can only arise out of > >>> perception. > > >> Right. But I use logic+arithmetic, and substituting "logic > >> +arithmetic" > >> for your "logic" makes your statement equivalent with non comp. So > >> you > >> beg the question. > > > I don't think that perception can be constructed out of logic > > +arithmetic either, but logic+arithmetic are covered under perception. > > But this is what we are expecting an explanation for. Again, you are > just saying that for *you* it seems obvious that a machine cannot be > conscious in virtue of processing the relevant information. > But in this field NOTHING is obvious. > And usually, people pretending to be sure on those matter, have slowed > the progress, when not torturing those who dare to doubt. I'm the one daring to doubt. In theory it isn't obvious that a machine cannot be conscious (independent of it's material enactment, which will provide whatever awareness can be utilized), but in practice, it does not at all appear to be the case. If it were we wouldn't be struggling to build faster smarter machines, we would just stick them in tanks of warm bubbly mineral oil and let them lead the way. > > >>>> Who we? > > >>> We humans, or maybe even we animals. > > >> Then it is trivial and has no bearing on mechanism. The machine you > >> can hear are, I guess, the human made machine. I talk about all > >> machines (devices determined by computable laws). > > > I would say that there are no devices determined by computable laws > > alone. They all have a non-comp substance component that contributes > > equally to the full phenomenology of the device. > > That is right, and is a non trivial (rarely understood) consequence of > the comp hypothesis. Any piece of matter has to obey to the statistics > coming from the first person indeterminacy, and the presence of oracle > in the UD* (the arithmetical running of the UD) entails a priori some > non computable feature sustaining the stability of that piece of > matter. Indeed, it is an open problem if the no-comp aspect is not > more important than the one we can already infer from observation > (like in QM or Q Many Worlds). > So again, that alley will not work for refuting comp. So if you are ok with non-comp substance being non-trivial to computation, then how can you know that there is an objectively true substitution level independent of substance? > > > > >>>> All what I hear is "human made machines are creepy, so I am not a > >>>> machine, not even a natural one?". > >>>> This is irrational, and non valid. > > >>> I'm not saying that I'm not a machine, I'm just saying that I am > >>> also > >>> the opposite of a machine. > > >> This follows from mechanism. If 3-I is a machine, then, from my > >> perspective, 1-I is not a machine. > > > I think it's a continuum. Some parts of 1-I are more or less > > mechanical than others, and some 3-I machine appearances are more or > > less mechanical than others. Poetry is an example of a 1-p experience > > which is less mechanical than a 1-p experience of running in place. A > > rabbit is less mechanical of a 3-p experience than a mailbox. Do you > > agree or do you think it must be a binary distinction? > > You might be right, and comp makes it possible to make this testable. > It is not binary, given the 4+4*infinity internal person points of > view accessible to machines. Ok, cool. > > > > >>> It's not based upon a presumed truth of > >>> creepy stereotypes, but the existence and coherence of those > >>> stereotypes supports the other observations which suggest a > >>> fundamental difference between machine logic and sentient feeling. > > >> Logic + arithmetic. The devil is in the detail. > > > Why would the addition of arithmetic address feeling? > > Technically, addition is not enough, but addition and multiplication > (of integers, not of real numbers!) is enough to get universal löbian > machine, and they have rich introspective abilities. They have > feelings, provably so if you accept some definition of feeling of the > literature (especially in the Theaetus-Plato-Plotinus family). I think all definition of feeling is probably inherently incomplete. It can only be defined in 1-p. > > > > >> Define "ontological complement to electromagnetic relativity." Please > >> be clear on what you are assuming to make this concept sense full. > > > Ontological complement, meaning it is the other half of the process or > > principle behind electromagnetism and relativity (which I see as one > > thing; > > So you assume physics. Not as independent of perception, but yes as a description of existential phenomena from our perspective, sure physics is valid. > > > roughly 'The Laws of Physics' which I see as 3-p, mechanical, > > and pertaining to matter and energy as objects rather than > > experiences). > > Hmm. I can make sense, with a lot of works. Cool! > > > When we observe physical phenomena in 3-p changing and > > moving, we attribute it to 'forces' and 'fields' which exist in space > > but within ourselves we experience those same phenomena as feelings > > through time (sense) which insist upon our participation (motive). > > Here I see just a variant of the usual identity thesis. I don't see > any explanation of what is mind, nor matter. > At least serious Aristotelian philosophers of mind agree that the mind- > boy problem is far from having a solution. Mind and matter are opposite ends of an involuted continuum of 'common sense', which is the singularity. > > > > >>> Poetry is your term that you injected into > >>> this. > >>> I was just confirming your intuition that poetry is an example > >>> of how sensorimotive phenomena work - figurative semantic > >>> association > >>> of qualities rather than literal mechanistic functions of quantity. > > >> You were then just eluding the definition of sensorimotive. You > >> continue to do rhetorical tricks. > > > I'm not eluding the definition, I am saying that by definition it > > cannot be literally defined. It is the opposite of literal - it is > > figurative. That's how it gets one thing (I/we) out of many (the > > experience of a trillion neurons or billions of human beings). > > Comp explains a lot, and give rise to precise technical problem. You > are doing the old trick : "don't ask, don't search". > > I'm sure that comp does explain a lot, but so does any advanced system of inquiry. It's not a trick, you have to account for figurative dynamics if you are going to include consciousness in your cosmos. > > >>>> I find a bit grave to use poetry to make strong negative > >>>> statement on > >>>> the possibilities of some entities. > > >>> That's because you are an arithmetic supremacist, > > >> I assume things like 17 is prime! > > > I have no problem with 17 being prime, of course that is true. > > What a relief. I am serious. Sometimes discussion on comp with non- > comp people end up on differing on that question. Haha, nah, I'm very conservative on meddling with existing truths, I only want to revise what is absolutely necessary to get to the reinterpretation of the big picture - which is not really very much. Just a sensorimotive primitive instead of 'energy'. > > > I would > > even say that the kinds of truth arithmetic sensorimotives present is > > supremely unambiguous, > > Well, technically, they still are. We just cannot define the numbers. > All reasonable axiomatic of numbers have some intrinsic fuzzyness, and > bizarre object, clearly NOT numbers still verify the axioms. But OK. > It is a bit beyond the scope of the discussion here. > > > but I think that conflating unambiguity with > > universal truth is an assumption which needs to be examined much more > > carefully and questioned deeply. > > The conflation is the result of assuming that the brain works like a > natural material machine. The brain does work like a natural material machine, but the person using the brain picks up where the brain leaves off, extending into the far reaches of never-never-mechanism land. > > > What would unambiguous facts be > > without ambiguous fiction? Not just from a anthropocentric point of > > view, but ontologically, how do you have something that can be > > qualified as arithmetic if nothing is not arithmetic? > > Since Gödel 1931, or just by Church thesis, I can assure you that > arithmetic is beyond human imagination, even without assuming comp. > And besides, arithmetic can explain why, seen from inside, real non > arithmetical appearances grow. > Like Rieman use complex analytical theory to study the prime number > distribution, we know that the relation between numbers can reflect a > mathematical reality which is beyond numbers. Hmm. a mathematical reality beyond numbers. If that's the case, then why call it arithmetic? Why not call it something like sense? > > > Arithmetic > > compared to what? What can it be but life, love, awareness, qualia, > > free will? > > Assuming comp (or not) we can say that arithmetic is full of life, > love, awareness, qualia, and ... quanta. Indeed, it is a reason to > find mechanism plausible. > I don't know what your reason for saying that is, other than you have already concluded in advance that it must be that way or that it could be that way. I don't experience anything to suggest that it is that way in practice. > > > >>> so therefore cannot > >>> help yourself but to diminish the significance of subjective > >>> significance. > > >> On the contrary, mechanism single out the fundamental (but not > >> primitive) character of consciousness and subjectivity. You are the > >> one who dismiss the subjectivity of entities. > > > It singles it out as just another generic process so that a trash can > > that says THANK YOU stamped on the lid is not much different from a > > handwritten letter of gratitude from a trusted friend. I don't dismiss > > the subjectivity of any physical entity, I just suspect a finite range > > of perceptual channels which scale to the caliber of the particular > > physical entity or class of entities. > > But a self-referential Löbian machine is not a trash. > You could make one out of trash, couldn't you? > > > >> Gödel's theorem would have convince nobody if the self-reference he > >> used was based on 1p. > > > Why not? It's just intersubjective 1p plural. The 1p that we share > > with the least common denominators of existence. > > No. You would be right for physics, here, but not for arithmetic. > Gödel's theorem convince everyone because the self-reference used in > his proof are 3p communicable. They are of the type 1+1=2, or 17 is > prime. > 1+1=2 is still intersubjective 1-p, it just has a low substitution level. A very common sense. It doesn't exist independently of the thinkers thinking it though. > > > >> This is only one reason among an infinity of > >> them. If you believe some 1p is used there, you have to single out > >> where, and not in the trivial manner that all 3p notion can be > >> understood only by first person. Gödel's self-reference is as much > >> 3p > >> than 1+1=2. > > > 1+1=2 is 1-p also. > > Also, yes. But the point is that this is not used in Gödel's proof. It's still a human concept. You have to be a human to understand it. > > > It's part of the firmament of the 'psychic unity of > > mankind', but it is still something that we have to learn as young > > children through language and cognition. 2 is just another name for 1 > > and 1 together. > > >>>> I have used to write "amoeabas" (self- > >>>> reproducing programs---this has been done by many others), and to > >>>> build "planarias", that is, programs that you can cut in pieces, > >>>> and > >>>> each pieces generates the whole program, despite having quite > >>>> different functional rôle. The self-reproduction problem has been > >>>> formulate precisely by Descartes, and solved conceptually by > >>>> Stephen > >>>> Kleene. For the Planaria, I have used a generalization by John > >>>> Case. > >>>> The existence of logic of self-reference G and G* relies on all > >>>> this. > >>>> There is no anthropomorphism: those program refers to themselves in > >>>> the 3p way in precise and verifiable sense. I have often explain > >>>> the > >>>> basic idea (cf Dx = T(xx) => DD = T(DD)). A major part of > >>>> theoretical > >>>> computer science is based on the existence of such computational > >>>> "fixed points". > > >>> These are 1-p conceptualizations for you, Kleene, Case, Descartes, > >>> etc > >>> which refer to your logical reductions of 1-p selfhood from a pseudo > >>> 3- > >>> p voyeur perspective. > > >> This is a universal argument. So it is empty. > > > I'm not familiar with universal arguments. > > >>> cf Dx = T(xx) => DD = T(DD) does not feel > >>> anything, > > >> Like if I was pretending that. On the contrary I distinguish > >> explicitly the 1-self and the 3-self. > > >>> it is just a way to access arithmetic potentials of our own > >>> 1-p process. > > >> You can say that about the jews, the homosexual, the Mexican, the > >> belgians, the animals, the aliens, etc. The argument is again > >> universal, and thus not valid. > > > I think that position is non-falsifiable sophistry. Saying that a > > trash can probably can't feel (very much) is not the same thing as > > saying that Lithuanians can't feel. > > A trash? may be. Surely, even. But a self-referential numbers is > something different. > > It's ok for it to be different from trash, but why can't it also be different from human consciousness? > > >>>>> which, objectively is neither > >>>>> completely random nor intentional, but merely inevitable by the > >>>>> conditions of the script. It's a precisely animated inkblot, > >>>>> begging > >>>>> for misplaced and displaced interpretation. > > >>>>>>> To set a function equal to another is not to say that either > >>>>>>> function > >>>>>>> or the 'equality' knows what they refer to or that they refer at > >>>>>>> all. > >>>>>>> A program only instructs - If X then Y, but there is nothing to > >>>>>>> suggest that it understands what X or Y is or the relation > >>>>>>> between > >>>>>>> them. > > >>>>>> Nor is necessary to believe that an electron has any idea of the > >>>>>> working of QED, or of what a proton is. > > >>>>> I think that it is. What we think of as an electron or a proton is > >>>>> 3-p > >>>>> exterior of the senses and motives (ideas) of QED. We have an idea > >>>>> of > >>>>> the workings of our niche, so it stands to reason that this > >>>>> sensemaking capacity is part of what the universe can do. > > >>>> OK, but the point is that it is part of the arithmetical reality > >>>> too. > > >>> It has arithmetic qualities to us, but only if we understand > >>> arithmetic. > > >> So if Alfred fails to grasp that 1+1=2, it would become false? > > > No, not at all. It's just undiscovered to him. > > That's my point. > > > > >> That is extreme anthropomorphism. You could as well take the humans > >> as > >> building block of the whole reality. > > > Well, human perception is the building block of *our* whole reality. > > How can that be denied? > > But we try to study "everything", not just "our everything". > > I'm saying that we can only ever see the parts of everything that are ours to study. > > >>>>> Because an instruction has no 3-p existence. > > >>>> Ah? > > >>> It is not enough to have an instruction sequence, the instruction > >>> must > >>> be executed as physical energy upon a material object (even if it's > >>> our own brain chemistry) if it is to have any 3-p consequence. > > >> Not at all. You confuse implementation and physical implementation. > >> Even without comp, a physical implementation is just a paricular > >> example of implementation. > > > Then you are asserting a zombie implementation. > > You beg the question. You light just say that you postulate non-comp. > I am not sure that you need this axiom, which is awfully complex to > make precise. > Isn't it inconsistent though to say that you can't have a human body without there being a human experience but you can have a disembodied program? > > > >> I was saying "with a "t", not with a "s", for the word "intentional", > >> which of course has a different meaning than the "intensional" of the > >> logicians. > >> (I do agree with Hintikka that "intensional" and "intentional" are > >> related concept, though, but that is another topic). > > > I still don't get it. I'm saying that projecting human sense intention > > into a machine is anthropomorphizing. > > If you say "my car is tired", it might be anthropomorphizing. If you > refuse to give a steak to my sun in law because he got an artificial > brain, then you are doing racism. > haha, well yeah it's not my place to discriminate. I was just being metaphorical saying I have a restaurant. I think your son in law would be the one who misses having a brain. > > >>>>>> But this is delaying the mind-body difficulty in the lower level. > >>>>>> There are just no evidence that we have to delay it in the > >>>>>> infinitely > >>>>>> low level, except the willingness to make mechanism false. > > >>>>> There can't be any 3-p evidence by definition, because mechanism's > >>>>> falseness is the difference between it's pseudo or a-signifying > >>>>> 1-p > >>>>> and our genuine 1-p experience. > > >>>> Why is it pseudo. Like Stathis explained to you, if it is pseudo, > >>>> you > >>>> either get zombie, or you have to put the level infinitely low, and > >>>> our bodies become infinite objects. > > >>> It's pseudo because it's a simulation of a 1-p form with no relevant > >>> 1- > >>> p contents. > > >> ? > > > The 1-p of a TV set doesn't match the 1-p of a human TV audience > > member. Therefore the TV set is not capable of watching the TV program > > is it displaying. > > A TV set is not a computer (even if today they have Turing universal > components, but they are not exploited as such. > > > > >>> Zombie or substitution level is in the eye of the > >>> beholder. > > >> I will certainly say "no" to the doctor, in case *you* are the > >> doctor. > >> Pain, pleasure are NOT in the eyes of any thrid person, but belong to > >> the consciousness content (or not) of a person. > > > That's why I say that being a zombie does not belong to the > > consciousness content of a person. > > I can only agree. cool (gotta continue with this later.. thanks) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
