On 10/3/2011 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 03 Oct 2011, at 00:47, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/2/2011 7:13 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, Oct 2, 2011 at 3:01 AM, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>  wrote:

It's a strange, almost paradoxical result but I think observer moments
can be sub-conscious. If we say the minimum duration of a conscious
moment is 100ms then 99ms and the remaining 1ms of this can occur at
different times, perhaps billions of years of real time apart, perhaps
simultaneously or in the reverse order. You would have the experience
provided only that the full 100ms even if broken up into infinitesimal
intervals occurs somewhere, sometime.


That sounds like a temporal homunculus.  :-)

Note that on a nanosecond scale there is no "state of the brain".
 Relativity applies to brains too and so the time order of events on
opposite sides of your head only defined to within about a nanosecond.
The brain is limited for technical reasons, relativity being the least
of them.

Sure.  Action potentials are only few hundred meters/sec.

It isn't possible to stop it for a microsecond and restart it
at exactly the same state. With a computer you can do this although
you are limited to discrete digital states: you can't save the state
as logic circuits are transitioning from 1 to 0.

But you can do it, and in fact it's implicit in a Turing machine, i.e. an abstract computation. So I'm wondering what consequences this has for Bruno's idea that "you" are a bundle of computations that are passing through "your" current state?

Some care has to be taken on the wording. With the computational supervenience thesis, "you" are not a bundle of computations that are passing through "your" current state, "you" (1-you) are a person, with referential and self-referential means

I thought you were trying to explain what a person is in terms of arithmetic and computations. Now you seem to be invoking "person" as a separate entity.

and that 1-you only supervene on that bundle of computations. Your actions and decisions, through the computational state of the self-referential programs, can "select" among quite different "bundles of computations" .

You put "select" in scare quotes. So are you saying that you select (via free will?) which bundles of computations "you" supervene on? or which are your most probable continuation?

"You" are a living conscious person with partial free will and taxes, and gravitational constraints, and things like that apparently, you can memorize them, make planning, scheduling, etc. As UM knowing we are UMs (like any LUMs) we know we can change ourselves, it is part of our first personhood.





The computational states are sharp, discrete things. The brains states are fuzzy distributed things.

Brain states are computational states. Just take a Turing machine emulating a brain (at the right level).

A crisp computational state can represent a fuzzy brain state, and also can belong to a fuzzy set of crisp state, which is relevant for the 1-p statistics.

Fuzzy Turing machine are Turing emulable, like quantum computer are Turing emulable too, despite the extravagant relative slow down that we can suspect.

Yes, I understand that. But brain states are not "states of consciousness", i.e. "thoughts" or "observer moments".

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to