On 03 Oct 2011, at 00:47, meekerdb wrote:

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On 10/2/2011 7:13 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:On Sun, Oct 2, 2011 at 3:01 AM, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>wrote:It's a strange, almost paradoxical result but I think observermomentscan be sub-conscious. If we say the minimum duration of a consciousmoment is 100ms then 99ms and the remaining 1ms of this can occuratdifferent times, perhaps billions of years of real time apart,perhapssimultaneously or in the reverse order. You would have theexperienceprovided only that the full 100ms even if broken up intoinfinitesimalintervals occurs somewhere, sometime.That sounds like a temporal homunculus. :-) Note that on a nanosecond scale there is no "state of the brain". Relativity applies to brains too and so the time order of events onopposite sides of your head only defined to within about ananosecond.The brain is limited for technical reasons, relativity being theleastof them.Sure. Action potentials are only few hundred meters/sec.It isn't possible to stop it for a microsecond and restart it at exactly the same state. With a computer you can do this although you are limited to discrete digital states: you can't save the state as logic circuits are transitioning from 1 to 0.But you can do it, and in fact it's implicit in a Turing machine,i.e. an abstract computation. So I'm wondering what consequencesthis has for Bruno's idea that "you" are a bundle of computationsthat are passing through "your" current state?

`Some care has to be taken on the wording. With the computational`

`supervenience thesis, "you" are not a bundle of computations that are`

`passing through "your" current state, "you" (1-you) are a person,`

`with referential and self-referential means and that 1-you only`

`supervene on that bundle of computations. Your actions and decisions,`

`through the computational state of the self-referential programs, can`

`"select" among quite different "bundles of computations" . "You" are a`

`living conscious person with partial free will and taxes, and`

`gravitational constraints, and things like that apparently, you can`

`memorize them, make planning, scheduling, etc. As UM knowing we are`

`UMs (like any LUMs) we know we can change ourselves, it is part of our`

`first personhood.`

The computational states are sharp, discrete things. The brainsstates are fuzzy distributed things.

`Brain states are computational states. Just take a Turing machine`

`emulating a brain (at the right level).`

`A crisp computational state can represent a fuzzy brain state, and`

`also can belong to a fuzzy set of crisp state, which is relevant for`

`the 1-p statistics.`

`Fuzzy Turing machine are Turing emulable, like quantum computer are`

`Turing emulable too, despite the extravagant relative slow down that`

`we can suspect.`

Bruno

But this doesn't change the argument that, to the extent that the physics allows it, the machine states may be arbitrarily divided. It then becomes a matter of definition whether we say the conscious states can also be arbitrarily divided. If stream of consciousness A-B-C supervenes onmachine state a-b-c where A-B, B-C, A-B-C, but not A, B or C aloneareof sufficient duration to count as consciousness should we say the observer moments are A-B, B-C and A-B-C, or should we say that the observer moments are A, B, C? I think it's simpler to say that theatomic observer moments are A, B, C even though individually theylackcontent.I think we've discussed this before. It you define them as A, B, Cthen the lack of content means they don't have inherent order; whereas AB, BC, CD,... do have inherent order because they overlap. Idon't think this affects the argument except to note that OMs arenot the same as computational states.Brent --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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