On 03 Oct 2011, at 00:47, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/2/2011 7:13 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, Oct 2, 2011 at 3:01 AM, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

It's a strange, almost paradoxical result but I think observer moments
can be sub-conscious. If we say the minimum duration of a conscious
moment is 100ms then 99ms and the remaining 1ms of this can occur at different times, perhaps billions of years of real time apart, perhaps simultaneously or in the reverse order. You would have the experience provided only that the full 100ms even if broken up into infinitesimal
intervals occurs somewhere, sometime.


That sounds like a temporal homunculus.  :-)

Note that on a nanosecond scale there is no "state of the brain".
 Relativity applies to brains too and so the time order of events on
opposite sides of your head only defined to within about a nanosecond.
The brain is limited for technical reasons, relativity being the least
of them.

Sure.  Action potentials are only few hundred meters/sec.

It isn't possible to stop it for a microsecond and restart it
at exactly the same state. With a computer you can do this although
you are limited to discrete digital states: you can't save the state
as logic circuits are transitioning from 1 to 0.

But you can do it, and in fact it's implicit in a Turing machine, i.e. an abstract computation. So I'm wondering what consequences this has for Bruno's idea that "you" are a bundle of computations that are passing through "your" current state?

Some care has to be taken on the wording. With the computational supervenience thesis, "you" are not a bundle of computations that are passing through "your" current state, "you" (1-you) are a person, with referential and self-referential means and that 1-you only supervene on that bundle of computations. Your actions and decisions, through the computational state of the self-referential programs, can "select" among quite different "bundles of computations" . "You" are a living conscious person with partial free will and taxes, and gravitational constraints, and things like that apparently, you can memorize them, make planning, scheduling, etc. As UM knowing we are UMs (like any LUMs) we know we can change ourselves, it is part of our first personhood.





The computational states are sharp, discrete things. The brains states are fuzzy distributed things.

Brain states are computational states. Just take a Turing machine emulating a brain (at the right level).

A crisp computational state can represent a fuzzy brain state, and also can belong to a fuzzy set of crisp state, which is relevant for the 1-p statistics.

Fuzzy Turing machine are Turing emulable, like quantum computer are Turing emulable too, despite the extravagant relative slow down that we can suspect.

Bruno




But this doesn't
change the argument that, to the extent that the physics allows it,
the machine states may be arbitrarily divided. It then becomes a
matter of definition whether we say the conscious states can also be
arbitrarily divided. If stream of consciousness A-B-C supervenes on
machine state a-b-c where A-B, B-C, A-B-C, but not A, B or C alone are
of sufficient duration to count as consciousness should we say the
observer moments are A-B, B-C and A-B-C, or should we say that the
observer moments are A, B, C? I think it's simpler to say that the
atomic observer moments are A, B, C even though individually they lack
content.



I think we've discussed this before. It you define them as A, B, C then the lack of content means they don't have inherent order; where as AB, BC, CD,... do have inherent order because they overlap. I don't think this affects the argument except to note that OMs are not the same as computational states.

Brent

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