On Oct 6, 10:24 pm, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but
> >> the observable behaviour of the brain can be.
>
> > Yes, the 3-p physical behaviors that can be observed with our
> > contemporary instruments can be understood in terms of biochemical
> > events, but that doesn't mean that they can be modeled accurately or
> > that those models would be able to produce 1-p experience by
> > themselves. We can understand the behaviors of an amoeba in terms of
> > biochemical events but that doesn't mean we can tell which direction
> > it's going to move in.
>
> It's also difficult to tell exactly which way a leaf in the wind will
> move. The leaf may have qualia:

Theoretically it may, but I don't think so. If it's connected to the
tree it might have qualia, and the individual cells might have qualia,
but it seems like once it's detached from the tree, it loses it's high
level context.

>it is something-it-is-like to be a
> leaf, and the qualia may differ depending on whether the leaf goes
> left or right. As with a brain, the leaf does not break any physical
> laws and its behaviour can be completely described in terms of
> physical processes, but such a description would leave out an
> important part of the picture, the subjectivity. While it may be
> correct to say that the leaf moves to the right because it wants to
> move to the right, since moving to the right is associated with
> right-moving willfulness, this does not mean that the qualia have a
> causal effect on its behaviour.

No because if the wind is also pushing other inanimate objects in the
same direction and the leaf never resists that, then we can assume
that it has no ability to choose it's direction.

>A causal effect of the qualia on the
> leaf's behaviour would mean that the leaf moves contrary to physical
> laws, confounding scientists by moving to the right when the forces on
> it suggest it should move to the left. It's similar with the brain: a
> direct causal effect of qualia on behaviour would mean that neurons
> fire when their physical state would suggest that they not fire.

You aren't hearing me, so I am going to start counting how many times
I answer your false assertion - even though it's probably been at
least 5 or 6 times, I'll start the countdown at ten, and at 0, I'm not
going to answer this question again from you.

10: There is no such thing as a physical state which suggests whether
a neuron that can fire (ie, has repolarized, replenished, or otherwise
recovered from it's last firing) actually will fire. You can induce it
to fire manually, but left to it's own devices, you can't say that a
neuron which triggers a voluntary movement is going to fire without
knowing when the person whose arm it is decides to move it. You can
look at every nerve in my body right now and not know whether I will
be standing or sitting in one hour's time. There is no physical law
whatsoever that has an opinion one way or the other either way.

>I'm
> sorry that you don't like this,

It's not that I don't like it, it's just that I see that you are wrong
about it yet you want me to treat it as a plausible theisis. The
consequences of your view is that we can't tell the difference between
a living protozoa and a hairy bubble. It's sophistry. You see a salmon
swim upstream, does that not mean they 'move contrary to physical
laws'? How does the salmon do that? Is it magic? Salmon cannot exist.
Such a thing would confound scientists!

Life is ordinary on this planet. It uses the laws of physics for it's
own purposes which may or may not relate to physical existence. I'm
sorry that you don't like that, but in a contest between theory and
reality, reality always wins. It doesn't matter if you don't
understand it, you have my condolences, but I do understand it and I'm
telling you that it is for that reason that I am certain your view is
factually  less complete than mine. My view includes your view, but
your view ignores mine.

> but it is what it would mean if the
> relationship between qualia and physical activity were bidirectional
> rather than the qualia being supervenient.

If qualia were not bidirectional, you could not read or write.

Craig

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