On Oct 5, 10:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 12:39 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> If you are right then there would be a violation of physical law in
> >> the brain. You have said as much, then denied it. You have said that
> >> neurons firing in the brain can't be just due to a chain of
> >> biochemical events.
> > They can be due to a chain of biochemical events, but they also *are*
> > biochemical events, and therefore can influence them intentionally as
> > well as be influenced by them. I don't understand why this is such a
> > controversial ideal. Just think of the way that you actually function
> > right now. Your personal motives driving what *you* do with *your*
> > mind and *your* body. If the mind could be understood just as
> > biochemical events among neurons, then we would have no way to think
> > of our bodies as ours - the brain would not need to think of itself in
> > any other terms other than the biochemical events that it literally
> > is. Why make up some bogus GUI if there is no user?
> The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but
> the observable behaviour of the brain can be.

Yes, the 3-p physical behaviors that can be observed with our
contemporary instruments can be understood in terms of biochemical
events, but that doesn't mean that they can be modeled accurately or
that those models would be able to produce 1-p experience by
themselves. We can understand the behaviors of an amoeba in terms of
biochemical events but that doesn't mean we can tell which direction
it's going to move in.

> >>That would mean that, somewhere, a neuron fires
> >> where examination of its physical state would suggest that it should
> >> not fire.
> > I guess you are never going to get tired of me correcting this
> > factually incorrect assumption.
> > The physical state of a neuron only suggests whether it is firing or
> > not firing at the moment - not the circumstances under which it might
> > fire. If you examine neurons in someone's amygdala, how is that going
> > to tell you whether or not they are going to play poker next week or
> > not? If the neurons feel like firing, does a casino appear?
> Whether a neuron in the amygdala or anywhere else fires depends on its
> present state, inputs from the neurons with which it interfaces and
> other aspects of its environment including things such as temperature,
> pH and ion concentrations. If the person thinks about gambling, that
> changes the inputs to the neuron and causes it to fire. It can't fire
> without any physical change. It can't fire without any physical
> change. It can't fire without any physical change.

"If the person thinks about gambling, that changes the inputs..."

Start there. If a person thinks... means that they are initiating the
physical change with their thought. Their thought is the
electromagnetic change which drives the physical change. The thought
or intention is the signifying sensorimotive view, the electomagnetic
view is a-signifying voltage, charge, detection of ligands, etc. It is
bidirectional so that the reason for firing can be driven by the
biochemistry, or by the content of a person's mind. This is just
common sense, it's not disputable without sophistry.

Here's how I think it might work: You can be excited because you
decide to think about something that excites you, or you can ingest a
stimulant drug and you will become excited in general and that
excitement will lead your mind by the nose to the subjects that most
excite it. They are the same thing but going in opposite directions.

Think of it as induction:

Imagine that this works like an electric rectifier (http://
transformer.jpg) except that instead of electric current generating a
magnetic field through a coil which pushes or pulls the magnetic force
within the other coil - the brain's electromagnetic field is pushing
to and/or pulling from changes in the sensorimotive experience. The
difference though is that with a rectifier, it is the identical
physical ontology which is mirrored in parallel (electromagnetic :||:
magnetic-electric) whereas in sensorimotive *the ontology is
perpendicular* (meaning that what it actually is can only be
*experiences linked together through time*, not *objects separated
across space*), so there are four mirrorings:

electromagnetic :||: sensorimotive (3SI) - brain changes induce
sensorimotive :||: electromagnetic (1SI) - feelings induce brain
magnetic-electric :||: motive-sensory (3MI) - mechanical actions
induce involuntary reactions
and motive-sensory :||: magnetic-electric (1MI) - voluntary actions
induce mechanical actions

Note that the motive inductions are about projecting to and from the
brain, body and it's environments while sensory inductions are about
receiving sense from the experiences which can be consciously decoded
from the environment, body, and mind. Think cell/body+dendrites vs
axons, brain vs spinal cord, head vs tail. Many vs one. Motive
projects intention actively through obstacles and objects like a
magnet pulls iron filings into shapes and magnetizes other iron
objects to make them magnets. Sense interprets and experiences,
detecting though analog and metaphor, reproducing local versions of
remote phenomena.

In the objective sensory induction (3SI) 3-p electromagnetic changes
(cocaine hydrochloride binds at dopamine sites) induce complementary
changes in the corresponding 1-p sensory fields, (the psyche as a
whole is compelled to feel animated and driven).

In the subjective sensory induction (1SI) 1-p sensory events (guy
thinks about skydiving while getting sexual with the girlfriend)
induces change in 3-p electomagnetic fields (testosterone, dopamine,
and epinephrine are released).

Both of these are cases where feelings and physical changes are
produced (either with electromagnetic cocaine binding or sensorimotive
fantasy), but I'm calling it Sensory Induction in either case because
the significance of both; the effect that we are producing is
ultimately a conscious experience. If it were not for the possibility
of the conscious experience, we wouldn't care about the effect of
cocaine on the brain any more than we would chalk dust. It wouldn't

In the case of subjective motor induction (1MI), 1-p motives and
intentions induce the electromagnetic changes in the corresponding
neural pathways from the brain down the spinal cord to the efferent
nerves to the muscles which move the finger actively. This need not
involve conscious thought or sense-making at all. It is a dumb command
which can be simulated in the muscle or the brain reflexively with a
live electrode or TMS. That reflex automatic response would be:
Objective motor induction (3MI).

So there is no magic, it's just that experiences over time cannot be
translated directly into objects across space. They are perpendicular
ontologies, but they share a common sense. They share a where and when
but the who and why doesn't have to care about the what and how, and
the what and how aren't even aware of the who and why. Them
materialist monist position is blind to 1-p causality, so it looks
like magic that a person can contract the muscles in their arm just by
doing it. It has no language for who or why, so it fails again and
again, struggling in vein to find some pseudo-why hidden behind the
complexity of the what and how. I am giving you a language to
transform that problem into a new and exotic hemisphere of cosmology,
which has soul or psyche, but it is NOT soul or anima. It is
sensorimotive phenomenology.


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