>On Oct 7, 12:38 pm, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: > If you have the prediction and not the model... then you don't have the same > external input. > > The internal stimuli are modeled by the model, that's the all point of the > model.
Subjective internal, not medical internal. > > If it's not the case, then simply the model is wrong. > Yes and no. A model of a tree based only on the shape of it's silhouette you could say is wrong, or incomplete or adequate depending on the intent behind the model. > 2011/10/7 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> > > > > > > > >On Oct 7, 10:28 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > 2011/10/7 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> > > > > > On Oct 6, 10:24 pm, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg < > > whatsons...@gmail.com> > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events > > but > > > > > >> the observable behaviour of the brain can be. > > > > > > > Yes, the 3-p physical behaviors that can be observed with our > > > > > > contemporary instruments can be understood in terms of biochemical > > > > > > events, but that doesn't mean that they can be modeled accurately > > or > > > > > > that those models would be able to produce 1-p experience by > > > > > > themselves. We can understand the behaviors of an amoeba in terms > > of > > > > > > biochemical events but that doesn't mean we can tell which > > direction > > > > > > it's going to move in. > > > > > > It's also difficult to tell exactly which way a leaf in the wind will > > > > > move. The leaf may have qualia: > > > > > Theoretically it may, but I don't think so. If it's connected to the > > > > tree it might have qualia, and the individual cells might have qualia, > > > > but it seems like once it's detached from the tree, it loses it's high > > > > level context. > > > > > >it is something-it-is-like to be a > > > > > leaf, and the qualia may differ depending on whether the leaf goes > > > > > left or right. As with a brain, the leaf does not break any physical > > > > > laws and its behaviour can be completely described in terms of > > > > > physical processes, but such a description would leave out an > > > > > important part of the picture, the subjectivity. While it may be > > > > > correct to say that the leaf moves to the right because it wants to > > > > > move to the right, since moving to the right is associated with > > > > > right-moving willfulness, this does not mean that the qualia have a > > > > > causal effect on its behaviour. > > > > > No because if the wind is also pushing other inanimate objects in the > > > > same direction and the leaf never resists that, then we can assume > > > > that it has no ability to choose it's direction. > > > > > >A causal effect of the qualia on the > > > > > leaf's behaviour would mean that the leaf moves contrary to physical > > > > > laws, confounding scientists by moving to the right when the forces > > on > > > > > it suggest it should move to the left. It's similar with the brain: a > > > > > direct causal effect of qualia on behaviour would mean that neurons > > > > > fire when their physical state would suggest that they not fire. > > > > > You aren't hearing me, so I am going to start counting how many times > > > > I answer your false assertion - even though it's probably been at > > > > least 5 or 6 times, I'll start the countdown at ten, and at 0, I'm not > > > > going to answer this question again from you. > > > > > 10: There is no such thing as a physical state which suggests whether > > > > a neuron that can fire (ie, has repolarized, replenished, or otherwise > > > > recovered from it's last firing) actually will fire. You can induce it > > > > to fire manually, but left to it's own devices, you can't say that a > > > > neuron which triggers a voluntary movement is going to fire without > > > > knowing when the person whose arm it is decides to move it. You can > > > > look at every nerve in my body right now and not know whether I will > > > > be standing or sitting in one hour's time. There is no physical law > > > > whatsoever that has an opinion one way or the other either way. > > > > That's you who do not understand, because your assertion : "You can > > > look at every nerve in my body right now and not know whether I will > > > be standing or sitting in one hour's time." simply ignore the *external > > > input*. > > > > Without it, you can't, with an accurate mode + external stimuli you can. > > The > > > model **can't** predict external input, if it could that would only means > > > the model is not about the brain only but about the brain + the entire > > > environment. > > > That's my point. Modeling the brain doesn't let you predict it's > > behavior - not just because it lacks the external inputs, but the > > internal inputs (which are disqualified under materialist monism). You > > don't need a model of the brain or knowledge of external inputs if you > > have subjective control. The subject can decide that they will stand > > up in an hour, and be able to influence the veracity of that > > prediction to a great degree. To get the same degree of accuracy > > through physics at best would be the looong way around, plus it would > > not have an explanatory power. > > > Craig > > > > > >I'm > > > > > sorry that you don't like this, > > > > > It's not that I don't like it, it's just that I see that you are wrong > > > > about it yet you want me to treat it as a plausible theisis. The > > > > consequences of your view is that we can't tell the difference between > > > > a living protozoa and a hairy bubble. It's sophistry. You see a salmon > > > > swim upstream, does that not mean they 'move contrary to physical > > > > laws'? How does the salmon do that? Is it magic? Salmon cannot exist. > > > > Such a thing would confound scientists! > > > > > Life is ordinary on this planet. It uses the laws of physics for it's > > > > own purposes which may or may not relate to physical existence. I'm > > > > sorry that you don't like that, but in a contest between theory and > > > > reality, reality always wins. It doesn't matter if you don't > > > > understand it, you have my condolences, but I do understand it and I'm > > > > telling you that it is for that reason that I am certain your view is > > > > factually less complete than mine. My view includes your view, but > > > > your view ignores mine. > > > > > > but it is what it would mean if the > > > > > relationship between qualia and physical activity were bidirectional > > > > > rather than the qualia being supervenient. > > > > > If qualia were not bidirectional, you could not read or write. > > > > > Craig > > > > > -- > > > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups > > > > "Everything List" group. > > > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > > > For more options, visit this group at > > > >http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > -- > > > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > For more options, visit this group at > >http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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