Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:44, benjayk wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined,
>>>>>> namely the very foundation of computations. We can define
>>>>>> computations in
>>>>>> terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in
>>>>>> terms of
>>>>>> +,*,N. But what is N? It is 0 and all it's successors. But what is
>>>>>> 0? What
>>>>>> are successors? They have to remain undefined. If we define 0 as a
>>>>>> natural
>>>>>> number, natural number remains undefined. If we define 0 as having
>>>>>> no
>>>>>> successor, successor remains undefined.
>>>>>
>>>>> All theories are build on unprovable axioms. Just all theories.
>>>>> Most scientific theories assumes the numbers, also.
>>>>> But this makes not them undefinable. 0 can be defined as the least
>>>>> natural numbers, and in all models this defines it precisely.
>>>> But natural *numbers* just make sense relative to 0 and it's
>>>> successors,
>>>> because just these are the *numbers*. If you define 0 in terms of
>>>> natural
>>>> numbers, and "least" (which just makes sense relative to numbers),  
>>>> you
>>>> defined them from something undefined.
>>>> So I ask you: What are natural numbers without presupposing 0 and  
>>>> its
>>>> successors?
>>>
>>> This is a bit a technical question, which involves logic. With enough
>>> logic, 0 and s can be defined from the laws of addition and
>>> multiplication. It is not really easy.
>> It is not technical at all.
> 
> But it is technical. I was just saying that we can axiomatize  
> arithmetic without taking 0 as a primitive. Of course we will need the  
> additive and multiplicative axiomatic definition, and the technical  
> definition of 0, will not be an explanation of zero, in the sense you  
> are using "explanation".
> Basically you can define 0 by the formula F(x) = "for all y (x + y =  
> y)". It is a number such that when add to any other number gives that  
> other number. Then you might be able to prove that it is unique, and  
> that it verifies what we usually take as a separate axiom, notably  
> that such a number cannot be a successor of any number.
These are just another bunch of definitions. I am very able to use a bunch
of definitions, my question is "What the hell do they MEAN?".


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> If you can't even explain to me what the
>> fundamental object of your theory is, your whole theory is  
>> meaningless to
>> me.
> 
> You are just supposed to have follow some course in elementary  
> arithmetic, like in high school.
They never explained what numbers as independent entities fundamentally are,
there. We just manipulated definitions and symbols, and interpreted them
with respect to measurable things (like geometric objects or graphs on a
piece of paper). We just used them as tools. But your claim is that they
have an existence in and of themselves (which was not a claim of our
teachers). In this case you should be able to explain what that means.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and  
>> multplication
>> without using numbers, though.
> 
> I am not sure this makes any sense. Addition of what?
> In scientific theories we don't pretend to explain everything from  
> nothing. We can only explain complex things from simpler things. The  
> rest is playing with word.
Yes, but your numbers aren't simple in the way you claim them to be. The
axioms are simple, yet is utterly unclear what they mean.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> But to get the comp point, you don't need to decide what numbers are,
>>> you need only to agree with or just assume some principle, like 0 is
>>> not a successor of any natural numbers, if x ≠ y then s(x) ≠  
>>> s(y),
>>> things like that.
>> I agree that it is sometimes useful to assume this principle, just  
>> as it
>> sometimes useful to assume that Harry Potter uses a wand. Just  
>> because we
>> can usefully assume some things in some contexts, do not make them  
>> universal
>> truth.
>> So if you want it this way, 1+1=2 is not always true, because there  
>> might be
>> other definition of natural numbers, were 1+1=&. So you might say  
>> that you
>> mean the usual natural numbers. But usual is relative. Maybe for me  
>> 1+1=& is
>> more usual. Usual is just another word anyway. You fix the  
>> definition of
>> natural numbers and use this to defend the absolute truths of the  
>> statements
>> about natural numbers. This is just dogmatism. Of course you are  
>> going to
>> get this result if you cling to your definition of natural numbers.
> 
> If you don't like the numbers, propose me anything else. Combinators  
> are more cute, and in fact much more easy than numbers, so here is an  
> alternative theory of everything for the ontic level:
> 
> Kxy = x
> Sxyz = xz(yz)
> 
> Search "combinators" in the archive for the explanation that this is  
> enough (together with some axioms on equality). I don't need logic.
> 
> With the numbers I can also abandon logic, but then the theory of  
> everything is a bit more complex (see below(*))
The same applies for every other formal system. Only through dogmatism can
the idea be rescued that they describe a independent thing, apart from being
a partial description of aspects of our experience.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>> Anyway, even if I completely agree on these principles, and you derive
>> something interesting from it, if you ultimately are unable to  
>> define what
>> numbers are, you effectively just use your imagination to interpret
>> something into the undefinedness of numbers, which you could as well
>> interpret into the undefinedess of consciousness.
> 
> Here yo are the one talking like a 19th rationalist who believe that  
> we can dismiss *intuition*.
I don't what you are talking about here. I am saying the opposite, we can
ONLY rely on intuition. I am precisely rejecting your claim that numbers
make sense as things apart from our intuitive recognition of our awareness
itself. You are the one claiming that numbers make sense apart from our
infinite capability of interpretation of what numbers are, that is, numbers
are just a tool that can potentially represent anything, but can't usefully
represent everything.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> The sort of explanation of 0 you ask me to give just does not exist at  
> all. Yet, 0 is used in *all* the sciences.
This is the point! In science 0 has a well defined meaning with respect to
measurement. Yet your theory disassociates from measurements, making 0
meaningless, or a symbol for everything or nothing.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But if the very foundation is undefined, it can mean anything, and
>>>>>> anything
>>>>>> derived from it can mean anything.
>>>>>
>>>>> Then all the scientific endeavor is ruined, including the one  
>>>>> done by
>>>>> the brains. This would mean that nothing can have any sense. This  
>>>>> is
>>>>> an argument against all science, not just mechanism.
>>>> No. It is an argument against science based on rationality. We can
>>>> use it
>>>> based on our intuition.
>>>
>>> That is something else. Science is build from intuition, always.
>>> Rationality is shared intuition. Choice of axioms are done by
>>> intuition. And comp explains the key role of intuition and first
>>> person in the very fabric of reality. I don't see the link with what
>>> you are saying above. It seems on the contrary that you are the one
>>> asking for precise foundation, where rationality says that there are
>>> none, and which is something intuition can grasp.
>> OK. I don't see how from the foundation being undefined, and possibly
>> meaning anything,
> 
> Undefined does not mean that it means anything.
Not in general, but if we are unable to explain what the undefined thing is,
it could mean anything for the person that ask for an explanation.
I can't give a definition of "chair" that ultimately settels what chairs
are, but I can say: "Look at what you are sitting at and it is clear what a
chair is".
You are saying "Look at the definitions and you know what numbers are". Yet,
when I look at the definition I find only more definitions, making it an
game of circling around definitions that could mean anything in a context
apart from measureable and countable things (where it is quite clear what
numbers are, as it is self-evident); which is reflected in Gödels discovery
that numbers escape themselves, as they simply have no meaning apart from
that which escapes them (our interpretation of them)!


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> One might argue that even though 0 and
>>>>>> successor can not be defined it is a specific thing that has a
>>>>>> specific
>>>>>> meaning. But really, it doesn't. 0 just signifies the absence of
>>>>>> something,
>>>>>
>>>>> It might be intepreted like that. But that use extra-metaphysical
>>>>> assumptions.
>>>> OK. But what else is 0?
>>>
>>> Nobody knows. But everybody agrees on some axioms, like above, and we
>>> start from that.
>> So why is it better to start with "nobody knows"-0
> 
> Nobody starts with "nobody knows 0".
> We start from "0 ≠ s(x)", or things like that.
But nobody knows what a successor is, either, apart from the concrete
meaning with respect to concrete countable or measureable objects.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> and derive something from
>> that than just start with "nobody knows"-consciousness and just  
>> interpet
>> what consciousness means to us?
> 
> Because 0, as a useful technical object does not put any conceptual  
> problem.
No, because it is just a symbol that can represent anything. But
concsciousness does not put any conceptual problem either, as it just is
beyond conceptions, and therefore does not has to make sense within any
conception.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>  Consciousness is far more complex.
No, it is very simple. Consciousness is that which is always complete and
utterly self-evident. It can be defined as being itself, and knowing itself
directly as being itself. It is a very simple recursive definition.
Consciousness is consciousness is consciousness is consciousness is what
obviously IS namely consciousness.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> If there is 0€ in a bank account, this is sad, but is not very  
> mysterious.
0€ is not mysterious, but 0 removed from any concrete context is utterly
mysterious, just as mysterious as consciousness itself. Therefore it can
even be used to represent consciousness itself. Not without any reason many
spiritual "teachers" call consciousness "empty", namely empty of everything
other that itself. Zero is also made totally of itself and only itself
0=0+0+0+0+0=0*0*0*0


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>  If someone is in a comatose state, the question of  
> consciousness is much more conceptually troubling.
I don't think so. In a comatose state, there simply is no manifest
consciousness, which just another way of saying that it is the case that
there is no (individual) experience that corresponds to the time when the
individual was "unconscious".


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>  For consciousness, there are  
> still many scientist who does not believe in it, lie some people does  
> not understand the notion of qualia.
Because there is nothing to understand there. They are trapped in their
mind. It is too SIMPLE to be understood, not too complex. You have it
backwards. Altough of course, it is true that consciousness is infinitely
complex, also, in the way it expresses itself (because an infinite creative
singularity if bound to lead to endless complexity). So it very simple,
indeed the simplest thing - it is simple even beyond having complexity as
its opposite. It's oppositeless and therefore totally simple, utterly
obvious, obvious without comparison with "non-obvious" (which just means
"relatively less obvious"). The only difficulty in this is that the most
simple thing can still be seemingly difficult to understand if you are so
unconscious that you miss the obvious. 


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>  Is consciousness related to  
> matter, is it primary, ... all that are question still debated.
It only is debated becuse they debate some image that they have of
consciousness. Consciousness itself is utterly obvious and simple and
necessarily 1-primary, as there is nothing else from the 1-perspective.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>  For  consciousness, it is almost like for God: there are too much open  
> problems.
In fact there is no open problem. Consciousness is obvious. The only open
problem is making sense of what consciousness entails. This is a never
ending journey, but it is not required to be far on this journey in order to
see that consciousness is very clearly and obviously and concretely what is
here right now.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> which makes sense if we count things, but as a foundation for a  
>>>>>> TOE,
>>>>>> it is
>>>>>> just meaningless (absence of anything at all?), or could mean
>>>>>> anything (the
>>>>>> absence of anything in particular). Successor signifies that there
>>>>>> is "one
>>>>>> more" of something, which makes sense with concrete object, but  
>>>>>> what
>>>>>> is one
>>>>>> more of the "absence of something" (which could mean anything).
>>>>>
>>>>> 1 is the successor of 0. You are confusing the number 0 and its
>>>>> cardinal denotation.
>>>> OK. But what else is 1?
>>>
>>> The successor of zero. The predecessor of 2. The only number which
>>> divides all other numbers, ...
>>> (I don't see your point).
>> But what does successor mean? You are just circling within your own
>> definitions, which doesn't explain anything.
> 
> You have to study mathematical logic. yes I am circling. This is  
> allowed and encouraged in foundations. There are precise technic to  
> make such circles senseful.
Of course, circling is all we do. We all circle around the fact that we are
what we are. The point is that this circling can lead anywhere, and it is
simply dogmatic to claim that mathematical circling is "more true" or "more
explantory" or even "more clear" or "more precise" then circling around your
own interpretation of what consciousness is.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> I have already explain that nobody knows what are the numbers. But  
> everybody agrees on the main axioms, which appear to be quickly Turing  
> universal.
But the axioms can mean anything  (outside of the obvious meaning in the
obvious context that we learned as children), making it just as useful as
all other kind of metaphysical speculation.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> In fact it is the key point, Numbers, or combinatirs, or programs are  
> so terribly complex, that it is preposterous to believe that there is  
> anything else.
LOL. This statement is ludicrous. Why should complex things be the only
thing that exsts? It seems you are trapped in some conception of reality as
a necessarily terrible complex thing.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> because
>>>>>> it's very foundation is undefined. Everything derived from it also
>>>>>> is
>>>>>> undefined, that is, it is totally open to interpretation. We can
>>>>>> just name
>>>>>> the "undefinedness" of 0 as "matter" or "consciousness",
>>>>>
>>>>> No, we can't. or prove it.
>>>> I don't have to prove that we can tack a name onto something. It is
>>>> like
>>>> asking you to prove that the name of 1 is "one".
>>>
>>> It is a common rule to not use a word which has some meaning for
>>> another concept. It can only confuse people.
>>> You might remember what "glory" means, for Humpty-Dumpty.
>>>
>>> May be we cannot defined 0 (in some broad sense), and we cannot  
>>> define
>>> "consciousness", but even in that case, we are not allow to equate  
>>> them.
>>> In fact we have a pretty clear intuition of what is 0, and what is
>>> consciousness. There are many things which we cannot defined, and
>>> still can have a lot of precise idea about.
>> OK. The point is that the intuition of what 0 is breaks down if we  
>> regard
>> something that is immeasurable and uncountable, as reality itself.
> 
> Why?
Because you failed to provide any explanation what it means in this case. 


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> In which
>> case 0 does not really mean something else then consciousness or  
>> reality,
>> because it just represents existence itself.
> 
> That sentence does not make sense to me.
I don't know what's hard to understand about it. 0 can represent everything
or nothing, just as "existence". OK, I have to admit that it is less useful
than the word "existence" or "consciousness", because it is far less clear
what it points to, as usually numbers are used in other contexts.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> What you say here is meaningless.
>>>> What is meaningless about saying we can call something that remains
>>>> undefined, and unspecified pretty much every term that is so broad
>>>> as to be
>>>> undefined, and unspecified.
>>>
>>> ?
>> What is your question? What I mean is that if we talk about  
>> everything we
>> could as well just use the nothing, or God.
> 
> Only if you give me your axioms of nothing or for God. Or you are just  
> coming back to the tradition of playing with words.
There are no axioms for nothing or God. Ultimate truth is not axiomatizable.
ALL we can do with words or mathematical symbols is playing with words, or
mathematical symbols, when it comes to fundamental matters. We are doing
poetry, as we use something rigid to convey the uncoveyable fundamental
reality. In effect we are just trying to make something resonate within the
other, just like with music.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Just explains me how you will derive the existence and the mass of the  
> proton.
We measure it and there we have it. 1.672621777(74)×10−27kg. See? Not really
difficult.
Or, to put it another way, there is nothing to derive here. It just can be
observed. 
So, explain how you derive the mass and existence of the proton, and please
give concrete numbers.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>  Comp provides the complete explanation for such kind of  
> things, like string theory, except that it is far more complex than in  
> string theory (the advantage of comp is that it explains also the  
> qulaia),
If this were true, predict something concrete, otherwise you are just making
assertions without any evidence.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>  and then, (and this is the UDA point), once you say "yes" to  
> the doctor, there is no choice in this matter, except question of  
> taste? If youy don't like numbers and combinators, take java programs,  
> or Lisp expression, I don't care. Butwhatvere universal system you  
> chose, give me the axiomatic definitions. (if you want a scientific  
> theology).
I don't want any scientific theology. Fundamental matters are beyond
science. As long as we try to settle it through science we will remain
unconscious to our real nature, which is obviously that we are the self
itself - beyond anything science can even begin to grasp.
The good thing about science is the openess to new ideas, the passion, the
creativity, the usefulness, the fact that it often was an inspiration to
open our eyes and look directly at what is instead of relying on dogma. But
what is NOT at all good about science is when we start to think it is the
solution of everything, especially fundamental matters. It just gets
riduculous. I find it laughable how scientist say they are close to a TOE,
when they really have no clue at all WHY anything *fundamentally* is the way
it is.
Science is a tool, but not a tool for being aware of the ultimate reality,
as there are no tools for that. We can just look directly and discover that
"we are that", without an other. At the moment this is just a belief of
mine, but I am quite confident that it can be my experiential reality in a
not so far future. It is quite strange that I feel that there is an other
and still talk from the belief that there is none.  Really I am not able to
see an other, but nevertheless it still appear as if there is an other.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> It gets critical
>>>> when COMP is interpreted as an abstract statement about abstract
>>>> digital
>>>> machines,
>>>
>>> I don't do that.
>> But you do assume that they exist beyond just being mere ideas (with  
>> no
>> necessary objective relation to reality).
> 
> What do you mean by "reality"?
The reality of undeniably being myself (not some particular self, just
myself). The reality of there undeniably being consciousness. *Ulitmate*
reality cannot be denied, even though an attempt to deny it can and often
does arise within consciousness. Reality is obvious. It is itself. Reality
is what reality is, is what reality is, is what reality is. Right here,
right now. Obvious. Really, really, really, really obvious. Completely
obvious in fact. It couldn't be more obvious. What is obvious? It is obvious
that it is itself, and it is as it is.
What is less obvious is that I am reality itself (as are you), but this is
just a belief at the moment (supported by a strong intuition). I don't
directly recognize that I am reality itself. I rather feel to be a person
within reality.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> This is what we search, by making some assumption.
I don't have to search reality, it is already there. What are you searching
for? Isn't reality already there?


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> What are your assumptions?
None. Assumptions are not so helpful for realizing reality, as they are just
another thing arising in reality.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> and there we have
>>>>>> the very same mystery we wanted to explain.
>>>>>
>>>>> No. It follows from comp that we have to derive physics from Number
>>>>> theory. This is a theorem, and not an assumption.
>>>> Yes, but what are numbers? This is the mystery.
>>>
>>> Er, well yes.
>> Yes. So you want to explain mysterious consciousness and substitute  
>> the
>> equally mysterious numbers. Where exactly lies the explanation in  
>> that?
> 
> If you can derive the mass of the proton from a theory of  
> consciousness, explain me how.
I go to someone knowing the mass, by having measured it (or knowing someone
that measured it) and then I derive it by listening to him and writing it
down. In this case the someone is wikipedia and it says the mass is
"1.672621777(74)×10−27kg".


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> I have never met any difficulty about any statement I have ever made  
> on any finite beings constituting universal systems. But on  
> consciousness, humans have never cease to met difficulties.
> The numbers are taught in high school. Consciousness has entered in  
> *some* university level course, and only with many difficulties.
That's just because we are pretty much unconscious. We are unconscious with
respect to what we are. It doesn't mean that conciousness is more
complicated than numbers, in fact the opposite is the case. Consciousness is
completely simple. It has no parts to make it complex.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> Numbers can represent
>>>> everything, or nothing.
>>>
>>> That's not true. Actually numbers, in arithmetic, are the object we
>>> talk about. They do not represent anything than themselves, but they
>>> can partcipate in computational relations, and sometimes they can  
>>> play
>>> the role of addresses (like in 17 is the number street of my friend).
>>> But they are not arbitrary beings.
>> If they do not represent anything, then please explain what numbers  
>> are in
>> the first place.
> 
> Go back to school. There are good teachers there.
You are bit disrespectful here. You know very well that I know what numbers
are as tools. But we never learned what numbers are apart from them
representing things, or apart from mere definitions that are used to derive
other definitions.
Rather than making slighty sarcastic remarks maybe you could explain to
litte Benjamin what numbers are apart from representations or mere
definitions?


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> So can "material" or "consciousness". What's the
>>>> difference?
>>>
>>> It is hard for me to follow you.
>> What does it matter what we call the mystery? Isn't it ultimately one
>> mystery anyway?
> 
> Sure. But the goal of science is terrestrial.
Honestly, fixating on terrestrial goals doesn't make sense for (the) divine
being(s). And it makes even less sense to use science to attempt to
understand the divine reality (reality itself) and then claim that the goal
of science is terrestrial. All of reality is divine, and therefore if we
want to know about reality as such, terrestrial science is not of very much
use.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>   We want to understand the how and why of the quanta and the qualia.
Which is not possible. Qualia can be experienced, not understood.
Understanding doesn't even apply to what the word qualia represents. It is
like eating ideas. But according to your theory we eat the inside view of
numbers, or something :P, so this just fits.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> And my point is that we assume mechanism (like 99,999% of scientist  
> and laymans) we have to derive the quanta from the qualia. Then I show  
> that universal number already provide the explanation, and this in a  
> way which makes the theology testable (and thus academical).
No, they don't. You don't explain anything at all. You just claim that
numbers are something simple and understandable and then wave your hands to
"derive" a lot of stuff (a part of which happens to be pretty good and
accurate, no doubt about that, like that we are immaterial beings and so
on).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Are you defending the pope or what?
What? I have no clue what you want to express with this question, except
that may be an inept attempt to insult without insulting.
I am doing the opposite of defending the pope. I am calling your pope(s) of
numbers, mathematics, logic, science, etc.. into question.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> That's even worse, so we have an
>>>>>> infinity of undefined computations. Every computation (or infinite
>>>>>> computations) can correspond to every (or none) experience, that  
>>>>>> is,
>>>>>> ultimately COMP says nothing about experience. If it would, it had
>>>>>> to give a
>>>>>> mapping of computation (/infinite computations) to experiences...
>>>>>> But since
>>>>>> experience is ultimately not divisible in chunks of concrete,
>>>>>> seperate
>>>>>> experiences, this attempt is bound to fail.
>>>>>
>>>>> On the contrary, comp maps the experience with the internal  
>>>>> brain(s)
>>>>> processes.
>>>> But how can we map the experience, if it is indivisible? There is no
>>>> useful
>>>> mapping if the domain of the mapping consists of only one thing.
>>>
>>> You confuse consciousness and content of consciousness. Universal
>>> person and particular moment of particular person.
>> I think that we have to confuse consciousness and content of  
>> consciousness.
>> They are inseperable, even though they are not the same.
> 
> Inseparable, perhaps. That is not a reason to confuse them, if they  
> are not the same.
OK, I am not sure on that one. We don't have to confuse them, but the words
are so vague that within words the concepts can be confused. Is is more
accurate that there really is no content of consciousness that is something
other than consciousness. There only is consciousness being aware of itself
as itself in the way it is aware of itself. Content or not content is just a
construction of our mind.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> But in which theory? Are you suggesting an axiom on consciousness?
Yes. It is "Consciousness is what is obviously is.". From this everything
can be derive by using the second axiom "All derivation is done through your
intuition and you know what that is".


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Anyway, I defend no ideas. I shows just that f the brain is a  
>>> machine,
>>> then the theology of aristotle does not work, and we have to come  
>>> back
>>> to Plato's one.
>> To be frank, I think you are dishonest here. You defend a lot of  
>> ideas, like
>> the validity of your reasoning,
> 
> Not at all. I submit it to the judgment of others. And of course I  
> have problem with those who want continue to manipulate the others  
> through fuzzy arbitrary pseudo-theories (which unfortunately can be  
> influent members of academies which betrays the very idea of what is  
> an academy).
Unfortunately your theory appears to me to be a fuzzy arbitrary
pseudo-theory. The good part is that in practice you mange to interpret it
in a way that had many good points, probably because your theory is so
incredibly vague in its intellectual obfuscation.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> and rational reasoning in general.
> 
> That is implicit in my defense of coming back to a scientific approach  
> to theology.
Yes, so you admit you are defending an idea. The scientific approach. I
think it is bullshit in this context we speak of here. "Theology" itself
doesn't really make sense. God can not be known through science, neither
known through the intellect (though this is better than relying on dogma to
know God). Spirituality is much better, as it doesn't rely on knowledge,
rather direct experience (at least some kind of spirituality, in reality
most spirituality is just esotericism).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> If you defend irrationality in the public argument, you make the money  
> stealer happy.
Not at all. I defend non-rationality, or trans-rationality when it comes to
fundamental topics (with respect to reality).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Innumeracy makes easy to convince people that cheap plant are bad, and  
> expensive pharmaceutical BS is good.
That's nonsense. Numbers have little to do with politics. Of course, people
that know how to handle numbers tend to be a bit more conscious than those
who don't (and thus are a bit more skeptical towards politics), but this is
just a correlation.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> I know how to well how and why machines and numbers can and use  
> irrationality to short term ego centered purpose.
Yes this isn't good, as no short term ego centered purpose is good. Yet I am
in full support of trans-rationality in spiritual purposes.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> I have no theory. It just seems natural to me that the ultimately we
>>>> can
>>>> just rely on our direct observation, which cannot be predicted by
>>>> any laws.
>>>> Science is just a tool of consciousness for it to learn to observe
>>>> clearly,
>>>> and see that there is an order in things. But just a tiny part of it
>>>> can be
>>>> made sense of by science.
>>>
>>> I think you restrict science too much. Like I think you restrict
>>> rationality.´
>> It all depends on what we mean with science, and rationality. The  
>> words have
>> no predefined meaning, we have to give them meaning itself.  
>> Personally, I am
>> willing to extend the meaning of science to the very act of observing
>> itself, making everything science.
> 
> That would lead to complete arbitrariness. That leads to suffering. 
You statement is complete arbitrariness. The only thing that leads to
suffering is lack of consciousness (though enough consciousness to be aware
of the fact that one's suffering).

 
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> That leads to the defense of the special interest against the common  
> interest.
Have I ever defended any special interest? If not, what are you talking
about? 


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> But rationality seems inherently pretty
>> limited to me.
> 
> You might have a limited view of rationality. Here Gödel's  
> incompleteness result illustrates that rationality can justifies the  
> existence of irrationality, but this does not mean we have to defend  
> its public use).
Gödel goes beyond rationality by using intuition. Rationality is only useful
with something beyond it, which makes it limited. Observing (consciousness),
on the other hand, is unlimited.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> Science is like describing the parts of the
>>>> mandelbrot, far enough from the border, that can be easily described
>>>> without
>>>> using any fractal (recursive) math.
>>>
>>> I see your point. But actually you are confusing science and
>>> scientists. The "Gödel's discovery" is the discovery that what we
>>> understand in the mathematical reality is about just a little scratch
>>> on the "real thing".
>> I would say the real thing is just not mathematical at all,
> 
> Which is already true for the "real epistemology" of the numbers.
I am talking of the ontology.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> The universe is just kind enough to make
>>>> a part of nature understandable through relatively easy rules, but
>>>> the vast
>>>> majority is beyond it.
>>>
>>> I can't hardly agree more. Today we know that this is the case even  
>>> in
>>> just arithmetic. We have understood why it has to be like that.
>>> Don't confuse the poor reductionist scientific approach of today,  
>>> with
>>> the theology of numbers of tomorrow.
>> Sadly I think it is just another kind of reductionism, reducing the  
>> ontology
>> to numbers.
> 
> The ontology does not matter, OR you are saying that comp is false,  
> and you are the one acting again freedom.
> (OR you believe there is a flaw in the reasoning).
If the ontology doesn't matter I take apples as the ontology and derive
everything from that. Yes, COMP is "false" because it is hardly meaningful
to postulate computations as the primitive thing. And I think that one can't
act against freedom, as freedom is all that is, but that depends on your
definition of freedom.
I am a very freedom oriented individual. Do whatever you do - it is your
freedom to do so, regardless of the consequences or opinions of others. Just
be aware that freedom can hurt a lot (but don't be intimidated by that, that
would just be another attempt to free yourself of freedom). Freedom that
needs to be protected by laws and morals is false freedom. True freedom is
already the case, and it includes the freedom to be utterly unconscious and
thus suffer your own unconsciousness and make others suffer. I am not saying
that this is "good". Freedom is beyond good and evil, and thus truly good in
an amoral sense.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> I just see no evidence at all that numbers are the basic
>> ontology, or that this is even meaningful.
> 
> Comp (by UDA).
Yes, that's why I am defending that COMP doesn't makes sense. If you don't
want to hear that, fine. You can be dogmatic about that if you want, but
then all further discussion is pointless.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Now, if you believe that you are different from all java programs,  
> then just say no to the doctor.
Of course I am doing this. But we are discussing right know whether COMP is
even meaningful, or rather the whole metaphysical construct that COMP
supposedly leads too. Of course one can say "yes", yet whatever you claim to
derive just doesn't follow. Saying "yes" is just a statement of trying
something, it doesn't have any necessarily metaphysical consequences
whatsoever, as no mere words or actions have.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> Sure, it is not stuffy, but hardly any intelligent materialst
>>>> thinks of material as "stuffy".
>>>> OK, subconsciously it appears they do (which
>>>> is my main point of disagreement with them, they regard matter as
>>>> "unintelligent", which seems to stem from the belief in "solid"
>>>> matter), but
>>>> intellectually they don't.
>>>
>>> But they think it as primitive. They take as dogma that it is outside
>>> there, and obeys laws, and then extrapolate from their seeings (like
>>> all animals does, because it works very well locally).
>> Yes, I don't agree with this either. But I also don't believe the  
>> dogma that
>> numbers is outside there, and obeys laws, etc...
> 
> It is not a dogma. (but it is used to make sense on expression like  
> "programs", "machines", numbers", "finite", which we already used.
OK, but then why do you believe it without evidence?


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Comp is not a dogma. It is a testable theory, which really means only  
> a refutable theory, as understood by Popper.
What could refute it? You need to have precise predictions, otherwise it is
just useless. I can make a theory that says that the earth is round and you
can refute it if you show the opposite, and as long as this is not the case
whatever the theory says is plausible. This is not how science works.
Of course you can say COMP is refutable by something which is utterly
implausible in the first place, but then I wonder why you even bother with
it. And of course in this case COMP is not being made plausible by being
refutable.

benjayk
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