On Oct 15, 10:59 am, John Mikes <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear Craig, > > where did you take it from that *"WILL"* does exist indeed?
Technically I think that will could be said to 'insist' rather than exist, and as such a subjective experiential phenomenon, it is nothing like a discrete object or mechanism. What insists is a point of view attached to the sense conditions of it's world which participates in focusing attention and taking action. > We experience a > *decision* - sometimes with the 'urge(?)' to fulfill > it, based on comparing partially conscious circumstances (anticipatory > included) and getting into some 'evaluation'(?) of what > seems to be advantageous and what not (strictly within our (conscious) image > of the present state we are in). Exactly. I think of this as a sensorimotive circuit. "It's cold, I should wear a jacket" -> puts on a jacket = circuit opens with the sense input "it's cold", motive circuit opens with "I should (close the circuit in such and such a way)" and the motive circuit is closed with the act of putting on the jacket, which kicks it back to the sense circuit..."now I'm too warm..." or closes the sense circuit "perfect - not cold anymore". All of this is prelinguistic though. This is going on in the womb, and it goes on in cells, molecules and atoms too, albeit in an ever more more mathematical and deterministic way (unless it's completely relativistic and it's just our frame of reference that makes it seem deterministic when we can't identify things subjectively - but that gets more into a Horton Hears A Who catastrophe) > A more stringent question is the equation (not mathematical, mind you) of > such idea with electromagnetism. > No matter how many neurons are involved in a cooperation, *NONE* of them is > assigned a *TOPICAL *(plus details) relation, > (like blue mAmps or green mAmps for bodily feelings, or emotional ones etc). > We experience those 'bland' PHYSICAL > data and *WE ASSIGN* topical meanings to them. As we see fit. At will <G>. > Now: *FIT* it is into the topical story (history?) we think within and so > the physical measurement gets translated into meaning > *by us* - i.e. by our present thinking. Which has no assignable connection > to the wider relations formatting it. At least we did > not know about such as of yesterday. Physics is a consequential extract and > cannot explain the original foundations. > Do you have a vocabulary between physical readings and topical meanings? I'm having a little trouble understanding but it sounds like we are talking nature nurture, Sapir Whorf kind of questions here. With subjective phenomena it's all very ambiguous. In language and semiotics there are so many theories about different kinds of representation (topical meanings?) which relate signifiers to referents. Onomatopoeia would be an example of a topical meaning which is compelled by sensory, gestural primitives rather than willful assignment. Other kinds of symbols suggest themselves out of second order logic and reasoning common to homo sapiens. We do willfully make up words and names also of course, which would be idiopathic unless we have some kind of etymology behind it. Notice that the most direct symbols are more universal and grounded in timeless experience, while the most topical are more proprietary and grounded in specific temporal experiences - ie adolescent neologism as ingroup pack bonding. Physics is a consequential extract to us, but I think the physics of body, or the experiences behind the physics, biochemistry, and physio-zoology that we embody personally do inhere unconsciously, defining our perceptions and experience. We cannot explain the foundations of physics, but those foundations are already explained through the very fabric of our ontology. Was that in the right neighborhood? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
