Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that
zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish
from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is
impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a
person. Zombies are not Turing emulable.
If we run the zombie argument backwards then, at what substitution
level of zombiehood does a (completely possible) simulated person
become an (non-Turing emulable) unconscious puppet? How bad of a
simulation does it have to be before becoming an impossible zombie?
This to me reveals an absurdity of arithmetic realism. Pinocchio the
boy is possible to simulate mechanically, but Pinocchio the puppet is
impossible. Doesn't that strike anyone else as an obvious deal breaker?
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