Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a person. Zombies are not Turing emulable.
If we run the zombie argument backwards then, at what substitution level of zombiehood does a (completely possible) simulated person become an (non-Turing emulable) unconscious puppet? How bad of a simulation does it have to be before becoming an impossible zombie? This to me reveals an absurdity of arithmetic realism. Pinocchio the boy is possible to simulate mechanically, but Pinocchio the puppet is impossible. Doesn't that strike anyone else as an obvious deal breaker? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
