On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 at 1:38 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>wrote:
> Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that > zombies can't exist, I think the two ideas "zombies are impossible" and computationalism are independent. Where you might say they are related is that a disbelief in zombies yields a strong argument for computationalism. > therefore anything that we cannot distinguish > from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is > impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a > person. Zombies are not Turing emulable. > I think there is a subtle difference in meaning between "it is impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a person" and saying "Zombies are not Turing emulable". It is important to remember that the non-possibility of zombies doesn't imply a particular person or thing cannot be emulated, rather it means there is a particular consequence of certain Turing emulations which is unavoidable, namely the consciousness/mind/person. > > If we run the zombie argument backwards then, at what substitution > level of zombiehood does a (completely possible) simulated person > become an (non-Turing emulable) unconscious puppet? How bad of a > simulation does it have to be before becoming an impossible zombie? > > This to me reveals an absurdity of arithmetic realism. Pinocchio the > boy is possible to simulate mechanically, but Pinocchio the puppet is > impossible. Doesn't that strike anyone else as an obvious deal breaker? > Not every Turing emulable process is necessarily conscious. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
