On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 at 1:38 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:

> Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that
> zombies can't exist,


I think the two ideas "zombies are impossible" and computationalism are
independent.  Where you might say they are related is that a disbelief in
zombies yields a strong argument for computationalism.


> therefore anything that we cannot distinguish
> from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is
> impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a
> person. Zombies are not Turing emulable.
>

I think there is a subtle difference in meaning between "it is impossible
to create something that acts like a person which is not a person" and
saying "Zombies are not Turing emulable".  It is important to remember that
the non-possibility of zombies doesn't imply a particular person or thing
cannot be emulated, rather it means there is a particular consequence of
certain Turing emulations which is unavoidable, namely the
consciousness/mind/person.



>
> If we run the zombie argument backwards then, at what substitution
> level of zombiehood does a (completely possible) simulated person
> become an (non-Turing emulable) unconscious puppet? How bad of a
> simulation does it have to be before becoming an impossible zombie?
>
> This to me reveals an absurdity of arithmetic realism. Pinocchio the
> boy is possible to simulate mechanically, but Pinocchio the puppet is
> impossible. Doesn't that strike anyone else as an obvious deal breaker?
>


Not every Turing emulable process is necessarily conscious.

Jason

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