On Jan 14, 4:55 pm, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 1/14/2012 11:38 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that > > zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish > > from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is > > impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a > > person. Zombies are not Turing emulable. > > No. It only follows that zombies are not Turing emulable unless people are > too. But why > would you suppose people are not emulable?
No, I'm assuming for the sake of argument that people are Turing emulable, but my point is that the proposition that zombies are impossible means that no Turing simulation of consciousness is possible that is not actually conscious. It means that I can't make a Pinocchio program because the 'before' puppet and the 'after' boy must be the same thing - a boy. There can be no sophisticated, interactive puppets in computationalism. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
