On Jan 14, 4:55 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 1/14/2012 11:38 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that
> > zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish
> > from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is
> > impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a
> > person. Zombies are not Turing emulable.
> No. It only follows that zombies are not Turing emulable unless people are 
> too. But why
> would you suppose people are not emulable?

No, I'm assuming for the sake of argument that people are Turing
emulable, but my point is that the proposition that zombies are
impossible means that no Turing simulation of consciousness is
possible that is not actually conscious. It means that I can't make a
Pinocchio program because the 'before' puppet and the 'after' boy must
be the same thing - a boy. There can be no sophisticated, interactive
puppets in computationalism.


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