On 20 Jan 2012, at 07:17, Joseph Knight wrote:

On Wed, Jan 18, 2012 at 1:33 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:Stephen, Ronald,The paper is very interesting, on physics, but succumbs directlyfrom the argument that any digital physics is bound to beunsuccessful on the mind-body problem by being still physicalist.The body problem is a problem of computer science, that isarithmetic, once we bet that observer are Turing emulable, as theyshould if the physics is digital.If the universe is a computation, then comp is true. But compimplies that the universe cannot be a computation (by UDA).Could you explain this a little bit? I didn't get that from myreading of the UDA

I suppose you grasped well the sixth first steps.

`Consider yourself in front of a running UD, and the "protocol" is that`

`it will never stop. Suppose you drop a pen. To predict what you will`

`feel is determined by *all* computations in the UD's work going`

`through your states. So to predict exactly what you will feel, you`

`cannot use one computation, but an infinity of them. This is a priori`

`non computable.`

`Even if it is computable (like if ONE computation multiplies so much`

`that it get a measure near one), we know that there are other`

`computations, so, this can only be 1 - epsilon, and the exact decimal`

`will still need an infinite computation, even if much shorter`

`computation provides excellent approximations. But in principle, your`

`exact future, even the "physical" first person sharable, is not given`

`by one computation, but, below your substitution level, all of them.`

`You can't compute that. And he phyical laws are just describing your`

`normal histories, and the nomality can only come on the "winning`

`computations" in the limit. Phycics might remain arithmetical, but`

`certainly well above Sigma_1 (the computable).`

Tell me if this helps. Bruno

So the universe is a computation implies that the universe is not acomputation. So the universe is not a computation, whatever it canbe. This defeat Finkelstein, Schmidhuber, Fredkin, and all attemptsto conceive the physical universe as a computation, or output of acomputation.This does not mean that the paper does not have interesting ideas onthe unification of known forces in physics, and that "quantumgraphity" might be a good idea, but if correct, such idea have to berecovered from the (more ambitious) attempt to get a unification ofboth qualia and quanta (consciousness and matter). The authors havestill not integrate the mind-body problem. We are still much inadvance on this list :)Bruno On 18 Jan 2012, at 14:53, ronaldheld wrote: I found this at arXiv:1201.3398v1 [gr-qc] 17 Jan 2012. Any comments? I have just started to read it., Ronald --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.-- Joseph Knight --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.