On Fri, Jan 20, 2012 at 2:49 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> > On 20 Jan 2012, at 07:17, Joseph Knight wrote: > > > > On Wed, Jan 18, 2012 at 1:33 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> Stephen, Ronald, >> >> The paper is very interesting, on physics, but succumbs directly from the >> argument that any digital physics is bound to be unsuccessful on the >> mind-body problem by being still physicalist. The body problem is a problem >> of computer science, that is arithmetic, once we bet that observer are >> Turing emulable, as they should if the physics is digital. >> >> If the universe is a computation, then comp is true. But comp implies >> that the universe cannot be a computation (by UDA). > > > Could you explain this a little bit? I didn't get that from my reading of > the UDA > > > I suppose you grasped well the sixth first steps. > > Consider yourself in front of a running UD, and the "protocol" is that it > will never stop. Suppose you drop a pen. To predict what you will feel is > determined by *all* computations in the UD's work going through your > states. So to predict exactly what you will feel, you cannot use one > computation, but an infinity of them. This is a priori non computable. > Even if it is computable (like if ONE computation multiplies so much that > it get a measure near one), we know that there are other computations, so, > this can only be 1 - epsilon, and the exact decimal will still need an > infinite computation, even if much shorter computation provides excellent > approximations. But in principle, your exact future, even the "physical" > first person sharable, is not given by one computation, but, below your > substitution level, all of them. You can't compute that. And he phyical > laws are just describing your normal histories, and the nomality can only > come on the "winning computations" in the limit. Phycics might remain > arithmetical, but certainly well above Sigma_1 (the computable). > Tell me if this helps. > Yes - thanks! > > Bruno > > > > > > > >> So the universe is a computation implies that the universe is not a >> computation. So the universe is not a computation, whatever it can be. This >> defeat Finkelstein, Schmidhuber, Fredkin, and all attempts to conceive the >> physical universe as a computation, or output of a computation. > > >> This does not mean that the paper does not have interesting ideas on the >> unification of known forces in physics, and that "quantum graphity" might >> be a good idea, but if correct, such idea have to be recovered from the >> (more ambitious) attempt to get a unification of both qualia and quanta >> (consciousness and matter). The authors have still not integrate the >> mind-body problem. We are still much in advance on this list :) >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> On 18 Jan 2012, at 14:53, ronaldheld wrote: >> >> I found this at arXiv:1201.3398v1 [gr-qc] 17 Jan 2012. Any comments? >>> I have just started to read it., >>> Ronald >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to >>> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> >>> . >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>> . >>> >>> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> >> > > > -- > Joseph Knight > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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