On 2/28/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

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On 27 Feb 2012, at 20:02, Stephen P. King wrote:On 2/27/2012 12:26 PM, ronaldheld wrote:What observations or measurements can I perform that would falsify COMP?Hi,Any measurement of a physical process that cannot be simulated bya Turing Machine equivalent computation.That would contradict digital physics. But digital physics isself-contradictory (indeed it implies comp which implies the falsityof digital physics). Roughly speaking: if "I" am a machine, theneverything else is not.

Dear Bruno,

`Let me see if my thoughts are correct as I can best write them.`

`COMP is the conjunction of "Yes Doctor", the Church Thesis and`

`Arithmetic Realism, correct? I am now not sure of the definition of`

`"Digital physics" given this thread so far... From what I can tell, Yes`

`Doctor is built on the idea of functional substitutability at some level`

`or scale for physical systems, such that a given algorithm will run on`

`any functionally equivalent physical system; it is basically a`

`restatement of computational universality. This idea shows us that our`

`consciousness is not dependent on a particular form of physical system`

`if and only if our consciousness is algorithmic or computable in the`

`Turing sense. I am agnostic on this because I do not see any evidence`

`(pace Tegmark) that our brain's implementation of consciousness does not`

`involve quantum entanglement.`

`My answer to Ronald's question was based on what I thought I`

`understood of COMP, so it seems that I still do not understand COMP.`

`Does not COMP require that any observation of our physical world be`

`faithfully representable as a _finite_ list of yes or no type questions`

`and their answers?`

IOW, any non-computational physical process.Comp implies non-comp (non Turing emulable first plural person)physical processes. Indeed the "comp primitive matter" is not Turingemulable, it is an infinite sum on infinite computations.

`But this definition (of "comp primitive matter") is fraught with`

`the measure problem! Does this exclude an infinite collection of`

`possible worlds to represent the physical systems that can implement`

`that infinite computations? I suppose that you could say that it does as`

`the UD "will generate all possible Turing machine states, infinitely`

`often (why?), which (by comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions`

`corresponding to (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in all`

`possible (locally) emulable environments or computational histories."`

`The usual idea that I am considering is that a physical system will`

`have to be potentially infinite to satisfy the requirements of a`

`universal Turing machine, as it has to have at least an infinite tape.`

`You write:`

`"Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine`

`state] at space-time`

`(x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time`

`(x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of`

`computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which`

`is accepted as existing`

independently of our selves with arithmetical realism)."

`This seems to bypass the requirement of the concrete implementation`

`of the UTM by appeal to the independent of the truth value of sigma_1`

`sentences (or equivalent) such that you can then claim that:`

`"not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine`

`psychology, but that ''matter'' has been ontologically reduced to`

`''mind'' where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental`

`machine psychology."`

`Therefore any considerations of, for example, thermodynamics is`

`irrelevant as such would be derivable from the "accidental correctness"`

`of Sigma_1 sentences. This is interesting on its own as it strongly`

`resembles the "occasionalism`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occasionalism>" of Malebranche and others`

`that was proposed to explain psycho-psychical parallelism between mental`

`and physical events. Pratt's residuation`

`<http://books.google.com/books?id=2o9m_Z3nzYkC&pg=PA108&lpg=PA108&dq=vaughan+pratt+residuation&source=bl&ots=Za-09Qp9uM&sig=tpt00W53pzzRQyqjppg-OCO_75Q&hl=en&sa=X&ei=QOZMT9GUOZKztweczfU7&sqi=2&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=vaughan%20pratt%20residuation&f=false>`

`solves this problem without AR's idealism, among other things, by`

`reducing global computations to pairwise interactions between a`

`potentially infinite number of computations. This is a form of`

`accidentalism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accidentalism>, but is more`

`subtle as the relationship between mental and physical states/events`

`does not need a causal explication. Additionally, Pratt's residuation`

`proposal (similar to this`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Residuated_lattice> concept) generates`

`only consistent extensions of first person indeterminacy modulo`

`arbitrarily large memory resources. It is only when memory resources are`

`limited to being finite ("Forgetfulness" as what occurs in the Telephone`

`game <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_whispers>) that inconsistent`

`extensions might occur.`

`My skepticism of your interpretation of COMP has always turned on`

`the allegation of eliminatism (in the sense of "that ''matter'' has been`

`ontologically reduced to ''mind''") that you seem to derive from the`

`independence of truth valuation, for example that because the primeness`

`of 17 is completely independent of our knowledge of 17ness or primeness`

`properties, that the truth value alone of "17 is prime" is sufficient to`

`determine the properties that the sentence "17 is prime" implies _to the`

`exclusion of all others_. I have looked at your Strobe argument`

`<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/lillethesis/these/node26.html#SECTION00724100000000000000>`

`and MGA but I still do not see how it is that the reduction follow. I`

`have not had the "aha" moment. :-( I am not convinced by Maudlin's`

`arguments`

`<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Fabric-of-Reality/message/11020>. How`

`does the truth value determine the properties of a referent absent the`

`possibility of prior identification of the referent? How can the`

`exactness of the properties of an entity follow only from its potential`

`existence as an entity? It is how you answer these questions that I need`

`to understand.`

So to refute comp you need to find a non recoverable, by the firstperson indeterminacy, physical processes. If there were evidences thatthe wave function collapse, that might be considered as a refutationof comp. But after a century of the collapse speculation, we can onlysay that this evidences is meagre.

`OK, so we have to show a counter-example to the recoverability of`

`physical process by first person indeterminancy (IPI)? Could you`

`elaborate a bit more on how IPI covers all possible physical processes`

`without assuming AR? I ask this because it seems to me that AR is what`

`allows your entire thesis to run. My problem with AR is that it prevents`

`us from finding any solutions to many problems including the concurrency`

`problem`

`<http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa213029%28v=sql.80%29.aspx> as`

`it assumes property definiteness absent specifiably. You are tacitly`

`assuming that all possible computations can inspect each other`

`simultaneously and act upon each other without any occurrence of a`

`conflict or contradiction. This tells me that you do not understand the`

`concurrency problem!`

`This is an aspect of the problem of time that many thinkers have`

`not considered. This problem is seen in the statement: "Time exists`

`because not everything can occur all at once". Simultaneity is not a`

`simple and unproblematic concept in ontology.`

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