On 2/28/2012 1:40 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Stephen did wrote that, not me... ;)

2012/2/28 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>

    On 2/28/2012 7:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
    Dear Bruno,

        Let me see if my thoughts are correct as I can best write
    them. COMP is the conjunction of "Yes Doctor", the Church Thesis
    and Arithmetic Realism, correct? I am now not sure of the
    definition of "Digital physics" given this thread so far... From
    what I can tell, Yes Doctor is built on the idea of functional
    substitutability at some level or scale for physical systems,
    such that a given algorithm will run on any functionally
    equivalent physical system; it is basically a restatement of
    computational universality. This idea shows us that our
    consciousness is not dependent on a particular form of physical
    system if and only if our consciousness is algorithmic or
    computable in the Turing sense. I am agnostic on this because I
    do not see any evidence (pace Tegmark) that our brain's
    implementation of consciousness does not involve quantum
entanglement.

    This is ambiguous.  Tegmark showed that quantum decoherence of ion
    locations in neural processes is much faster than neural
    signaling, therefore brain processing is almost all classical.  It
    is classical *because* there is quantum entanglement between the
    ions and the environment.  It is quantum entanglement with an
    environment (something with many degrees of freedom) that produces
    decoherence and classical behavior.  If you substitute for some
    neurons a silicon chip that is designed to be functionally
    identical, that "functionally identical" means it acts as a
classical device to implement a certain computational algorithm. Of course it will be quantum entangled with its environment
    because that's what makes it classical.

    Maybe you meant you that you think brain processes may involve
    quantum coherent superpositions - but that's what Tegmark refuted.

    Brent

Hi Quentin,

    Thank you for that. ;-)

Onward!

Stephen

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to