On 2/28/2012 1:40 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Stephen did wrote that, not me... ;)
2012/2/28 meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
On 2/28/2012 7:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Dear Bruno,
Let me see if my thoughts are correct as I can best write
them. COMP is the conjunction of "Yes Doctor", the Church Thesis
and Arithmetic Realism, correct? I am now not sure of the
definition of "Digital physics" given this thread so far... From
what I can tell, Yes Doctor is built on the idea of functional
substitutability at some level or scale for physical systems,
such that a given algorithm will run on any functionally
equivalent physical system; it is basically a restatement of
computational universality. This idea shows us that our
consciousness is not dependent on a particular form of physical
system if and only if our consciousness is algorithmic or
computable in the Turing sense. I am agnostic on this because I
do not see any evidence (pace Tegmark) that our brain's
implementation of consciousness does not involve quantum
entanglement.
This is ambiguous. Tegmark showed that quantum decoherence of ion
locations in neural processes is much faster than neural
signaling, therefore brain processing is almost all classical. It
is classical *because* there is quantum entanglement between the
ions and the environment. It is quantum entanglement with an
environment (something with many degrees of freedom) that produces
decoherence and classical behavior. If you substitute for some
neurons a silicon chip that is designed to be functionally
identical, that "functionally identical" means it acts as a
classical device to implement a certain computational algorithm.
Of course it will be quantum entangled with its environment
because that's what makes it classical.
Maybe you meant you that you think brain processes may involve
quantum coherent superpositions - but that's what Tegmark refuted.
Brent
Hi Quentin,
Thank you for that. ;-)
Onward!
Stephen
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