2012/2/28 Stephen P. King <[email protected]> > On 2/28/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 27 Feb 2012, at 20:02, Stephen P. King wrote: > > On 2/27/2012 12:26 PM, ronaldheld wrote: > > What observations or measurements can I perform that would falsify > COMP? > > Hi, > > Any measurement of a physical process that cannot be simulated by a > Turing Machine equivalent computation. > > > That would contradict digital physics. But digital physics is > self-contradictory (indeed it implies comp which implies the falsity of > digital physics). Roughly speaking: if "I" am a machine, then everything > else is not. > > > Dear Bruno, > > Let me see if my thoughts are correct as I can best write them. COMP > is the conjunction of "Yes Doctor", the Church Thesis and Arithmetic > Realism, correct? I am now not sure of the definition of "Digital physics" > given this thread so far... From what I can tell, Yes Doctor is built on > the idea of functional substitutability at some level or scale for physical > systems, such that a given algorithm will run on any functionally > equivalent physical system; it is basically a restatement of computational > universality. This idea shows us that our consciousness is not dependent on > a particular form of physical system if and only if our consciousness is > algorithmic or computable in the Turing sense. I am agnostic on this > because I do not see any evidence (pace Tegmark) that our brain's > implementation of consciousness does not involve quantum entanglement. > My answer to Ronald's question was based on what I thought I > understood of COMP, so it seems that I still do not understand COMP. Does > not COMP require that any observation of our physical world be faithfully > representable as a *finite* list of yes or no type questions and their > answers? >
Comp substitute "consciousness"... such as you could not feel any difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was substituted for a digital brain. Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is non-computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current state. > > > > IOW, any non-computational physical process. > > > Comp implies non-comp (non Turing emulable first plural person) physical > processes. Indeed the "comp primitive matter" is not Turing emulable, it is > an infinite sum on infinite computations. > > > But this definition (of "comp primitive matter") is fraught with the > measure problem! Does this exclude an infinite collection of possible > worlds to represent the physical systems that can implement that infinite > computations? I suppose that you could say that it does as the UD "will > generate all possible Turing machine states, infinitely often (why?), which > (by comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions corresponding to > (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in all possible (locally) > emulable environments or computational histories." > The usual idea that I am considering is that a physical system will > have to be potentially infinite to satisfy the requirements of a universal > Turing machine, as it has to have at least an infinite tape. You write: > > "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine > state] at space-time > (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time > (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of > computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which > is accepted as existing > independently of our selves with arithmetical realism)." > > This seems to bypass the requirement of the concrete implementation of > the UTM by appeal to the independent of the truth value of sigma_1 > sentences (or equivalent) such that you can then claim that: > > "not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine > psychology, but that ‘‘matter’’ has been ontologically reduced to > ‘‘mind’’ where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental > machine psychology." > > Therefore any considerations of, for example, thermodynamics is > irrelevant as such would be derivable from the "accidental correctness" of > Sigma_1 sentences. This is interesting on its own as it strongly resembles > the "occasionalism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occasionalism>" of > Malebranche and others that was proposed to explain psycho-psychical > parallelism between mental and physical events. Pratt's > residuation<http://books.google.com/books?id=2o9m_Z3nzYkC&pg=PA108&lpg=PA108&dq=vaughan+pratt+residuation&source=bl&ots=Za-09Qp9uM&sig=tpt00W53pzzRQyqjppg-OCO_75Q&hl=en&sa=X&ei=QOZMT9GUOZKztweczfU7&sqi=2&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=vaughan%20pratt%20residuation&f=false>solves > this problem without AR's idealism, among other things, by reducing > global computations to pairwise interactions between a potentially infinite > number of computations. This is a form of > accidentalism<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accidentalism>, > but is more subtle as the relationship between mental and physical > states/events does not need a causal explication. Additionally, Pratt's > residuation proposal (similar to > this<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Residuated_lattice>concept) generates only > consistent extensions of first person indeterminacy > modulo arbitrarily large memory resources. It is only when memory resources > are limited to being finite ("Forgetfulness" as what occurs in the Telephone > game <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_whispers>) that inconsistent > extensions might occur. > > My skepticism of your interpretation of COMP has always turned on the > allegation of eliminatism (in the sense of "that ‘‘matter’’ has been > ontologically reduced to ‘‘mind’’") that you seem to derive from the > independence of truth valuation, for example that because the primeness of > 17 is completely independent of our knowledge of 17ness or primeness > properties, that the truth value alone of "17 is prime" is sufficient to > determine the properties that the sentence "17 is prime" implies *to the > exclusion of all others*. I have looked at your Strobe > argument<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/lillethesis/these/node26.html#SECTION00724100000000000000>and > MGA but I still do not see how it is that the reduction follow. I have > not had the "aha" moment. :-( I am not convinced by Maudlin's > arguments<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Fabric-of-Reality/message/11020>. > How does the truth value determine the properties of a referent absent the > possibility of prior identification of the referent? How can the exactness > of the properties of an entity follow only from its potential existence as > an entity? It is how you answer these questions that I need to understand. > > > So to refute comp you need to find a non recoverable, by the first person > indeterminacy, physical processes. If there were evidences that the wave > function collapse, that might be considered as a refutation of comp. But > after a century of the collapse speculation, we can only say that this > evidences is meagre. > > > OK, so we have to show a counter-example to the recoverability of > physical process by first person indeterminancy (IPI)? Could you elaborate > a bit more on how IPI covers all possible physical processes without > assuming AR? I ask this because it seems to me that AR is what allows your > entire thesis to run. My problem with AR is that it prevents us from > finding any solutions to many problems including the concurrency > problem<http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa213029%28v=sql.80%29.aspx>as > it assumes property definiteness absent specifiably. You are tacitly > assuming that all possible computations can inspect each other > simultaneously and act upon each other without any occurrence of a conflict > or contradiction. This tells me that you do not understand the concurrency > problem! > This is an aspect of the problem of time that many thinkers have not > considered. This problem is seen in the statement: "Time exists because not > everything can occur all at once". Simultaneity is not a simple and > unproblematic concept in ontology. > > Onward! > > Stephen > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. 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