2012/2/28 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>

>  On 2/28/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 27 Feb 2012, at 20:02, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
> On 2/27/2012 12:26 PM, ronaldheld wrote:
>
> What observations or measurements can I perform that would falsify
> COMP?
>
>  Hi,
>
>    Any measurement of a physical process that cannot be simulated by a
> Turing Machine equivalent computation.
>
>
> That would contradict digital physics. But digital physics is
> self-contradictory (indeed it implies comp which implies the falsity of
> digital physics). Roughly speaking: if "I" am a machine, then everything
> else is not.
>
>
> Dear Bruno,
>
>     Let me see if my thoughts are correct as I can best write them. COMP
> is the conjunction of "Yes Doctor", the Church Thesis and Arithmetic
> Realism, correct? I am now not sure of the definition of "Digital physics"
> given this thread so far... From what I can tell, Yes Doctor is built on
> the idea of functional substitutability at some level or scale for physical
> systems, such that a given algorithm will run on any functionally
> equivalent physical system; it is basically a restatement of computational
> universality. This idea shows us that our consciousness is not dependent on
> a particular form of physical system if and only if our consciousness is
> algorithmic or computable in the Turing sense. I am agnostic on this
> because I do not see any evidence (pace Tegmark) that our brain's
> implementation of consciousness does not involve quantum entanglement.
>     My answer to Ronald's question was based on what I thought I
> understood of COMP, so it seems that I still do not understand COMP. Does
> not COMP require that any observation of our physical world be faithfully
> representable as a *finite* list of yes or no type questions and their
> answers?
>

Comp substitute "consciousness"... such as you could not feel any
difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was
substituted for a digital brain.

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a
program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a
digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies
that any piece of matter is non-computable... it is the limit of the
infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current
state.


>
>
>
> IOW, any non-computational physical process.
>
>
> Comp implies non-comp (non Turing emulable first plural person) physical
> processes. Indeed the "comp primitive matter" is not Turing emulable, it is
> an infinite sum on infinite computations.
>
>
>     But this definition (of "comp primitive matter") is fraught with the
> measure problem! Does this exclude an infinite collection of possible
> worlds to represent the physical systems that can implement that infinite
> computations? I suppose that you could say that it does as the UD "will
> generate all possible Turing machine states, infinitely often (why?), which
> (by comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions corresponding to
> (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in all possible (locally)
> emulable environments or computational histories."
>     The usual idea that I am considering is that a physical system will
> have to be potentially infinite to satisfy the requirements of a universal
> Turing machine, as it has to have at least an infinite tape. You write:
>
> "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine
> state] at space-time
> (x,t), we are obliged  to associate  [the pain  I  feel at  space-time
> (x,t)]  to a  type or a  sheaf of
> computations  (existing  forever  in  the arithmetical  Platonia  which
> is  accepted  as  existing
> independently of  our  selves  with  arithmetical  realism)."
>
>     This seems to bypass the requirement of the concrete implementation of
> the UTM by appeal to the independent of the truth value of sigma_1
> sentences (or equivalent) such that you can then claim that:
>
> "not only physics has been  epistemologically  reduced to machine
> psychology, but that ‘‘matter’’ has been ontologically  reduced  to
> ‘‘mind’’ where mind  is defined  as  the  object  study of fundamental
> machine psychology."
>
>     Therefore any considerations of, for example, thermodynamics is
> irrelevant as such would be derivable from the "accidental correctness" of
> Sigma_1 sentences.  This is interesting on its own as it strongly resembles
> the "occasionalism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occasionalism>" of
> Malebranche and others that was proposed to explain psycho-psychical
> parallelism between mental and physical events. Pratt's 
> residuation<http://books.google.com/books?id=2o9m_Z3nzYkC&pg=PA108&lpg=PA108&dq=vaughan+pratt+residuation&source=bl&ots=Za-09Qp9uM&sig=tpt00W53pzzRQyqjppg-OCO_75Q&hl=en&sa=X&ei=QOZMT9GUOZKztweczfU7&sqi=2&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=vaughan%20pratt%20residuation&f=false>solves
>  this problem without AR's idealism, among other things, by reducing
> global computations to pairwise interactions between a potentially infinite
> number of computations. This is a form of 
> accidentalism<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accidentalism>,
> but is more subtle as the relationship between mental and physical
> states/events does not need a causal explication. Additionally, Pratt's
> residuation proposal  (similar to 
> this<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Residuated_lattice>concept) generates only 
> consistent extensions of first person indeterminacy
> modulo arbitrarily large memory resources. It is only when memory resources
> are limited to being finite ("Forgetfulness" as what occurs in the Telephone
> game <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_whispers>) that inconsistent
> extensions might occur.
>
>     My skepticism of your interpretation of COMP has always turned on the
> allegation of eliminatism (in the sense of "that ‘‘matter’’ has been
> ontologically  reduced  to ‘‘mind’’")  that you seem to derive from the
> independence of truth valuation, for example that because the primeness of
> 17 is completely independent of our knowledge of 17ness or primeness
> properties, that the truth value alone of "17 is prime" is sufficient to
> determine the properties that the sentence "17 is prime" implies *to the
> exclusion of all others*. I have looked at your Strobe 
> argument<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/lillethesis/these/node26.html#SECTION00724100000000000000>and
>  MGA but I still do not see how it is that the reduction follow. I have
> not had the "aha" moment. :-( I am not convinced by Maudlin's 
> arguments<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Fabric-of-Reality/message/11020>.
> How does the truth value determine the properties of a referent absent the
> possibility of prior identification of the referent? How can the exactness
> of the properties of an entity follow only from its potential existence as
> an entity? It is how you answer these questions that I need to understand.
>
>
> So to refute comp you need to find a non recoverable, by the first person
> indeterminacy, physical processes. If there were evidences that the wave
> function collapse, that might be considered as a refutation of comp. But
> after a century of the collapse speculation, we can only say that this
> evidences is meagre.
>
>
>     OK, so we have to show a counter-example to the recoverability of
> physical process by first person indeterminancy (IPI)? Could you elaborate
> a bit more on how IPI covers all possible physical processes without
> assuming AR? I ask this because it seems to me that AR is what allows your
> entire thesis to run. My problem with AR is that it prevents us from
> finding any solutions to many problems including the concurrency 
> problem<http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa213029%28v=sql.80%29.aspx>as
>  it assumes property definiteness absent specifiably. You are tacitly
> assuming that all possible computations can inspect each other
> simultaneously and act upon each other without any occurrence of a conflict
> or contradiction. This tells me that you do not understand the concurrency
> problem!
>     This is an aspect of the problem of time that many thinkers have not
> considered. This problem is seen in the statement: "Time exists because not
> everything can occur all at once". Simultaneity is not a simple and
> unproblematic concept in ontology.
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
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