2012/2/28 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
> On 2/28/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 27 Feb 2012, at 20:02, Stephen P. King wrote:
> On 2/27/2012 12:26 PM, ronaldheld wrote:
> What observations or measurements can I perform that would falsify
> Any measurement of a physical process that cannot be simulated by a
> Turing Machine equivalent computation.
> That would contradict digital physics. But digital physics is
> self-contradictory (indeed it implies comp which implies the falsity of
> digital physics). Roughly speaking: if "I" am a machine, then everything
> else is not.
> Dear Bruno,
> Let me see if my thoughts are correct as I can best write them. COMP
> is the conjunction of "Yes Doctor", the Church Thesis and Arithmetic
> Realism, correct? I am now not sure of the definition of "Digital physics"
> given this thread so far... From what I can tell, Yes Doctor is built on
> the idea of functional substitutability at some level or scale for physical
> systems, such that a given algorithm will run on any functionally
> equivalent physical system; it is basically a restatement of computational
> universality. This idea shows us that our consciousness is not dependent on
> a particular form of physical system if and only if our consciousness is
> algorithmic or computable in the Turing sense. I am agnostic on this
> because I do not see any evidence (pace Tegmark) that our brain's
> implementation of consciousness does not involve quantum entanglement.
> My answer to Ronald's question was based on what I thought I
> understood of COMP, so it seems that I still do not understand COMP. Does
> not COMP require that any observation of our physical world be faithfully
> representable as a *finite* list of yes or no type questions and their
Comp substitute "consciousness"... such as you could not feel any
difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was
substituted for a digital brain.
Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a
program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a
digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies
that any piece of matter is non-computable... it is the limit of the
infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current
> IOW, any non-computational physical process.
> Comp implies non-comp (non Turing emulable first plural person) physical
> processes. Indeed the "comp primitive matter" is not Turing emulable, it is
> an infinite sum on infinite computations.
> But this definition (of "comp primitive matter") is fraught with the
> measure problem! Does this exclude an infinite collection of possible
> worlds to represent the physical systems that can implement that infinite
> computations? I suppose that you could say that it does as the UD "will
> generate all possible Turing machine states, infinitely often (why?), which
> (by comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions corresponding to
> (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in all possible (locally)
> emulable environments or computational histories."
> The usual idea that I am considering is that a physical system will
> have to be potentially infinite to satisfy the requirements of a universal
> Turing machine, as it has to have at least an infinite tape. You write:
> "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine
> state] at space-time
> (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time
> (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of
> computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which
> is accepted as existing
> independently of our selves with arithmetical realism)."
> This seems to bypass the requirement of the concrete implementation of
> the UTM by appeal to the independent of the truth value of sigma_1
> sentences (or equivalent) such that you can then claim that:
> "not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine
> psychology, but that ‘‘matter’’ has been ontologically reduced to
> ‘‘mind’’ where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental
> machine psychology."
> Therefore any considerations of, for example, thermodynamics is
> irrelevant as such would be derivable from the "accidental correctness" of
> Sigma_1 sentences. This is interesting on its own as it strongly resembles
> the "occasionalism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occasionalism>" of
> Malebranche and others that was proposed to explain psycho-psychical
> parallelism between mental and physical events. Pratt's
> this problem without AR's idealism, among other things, by reducing
> global computations to pairwise interactions between a potentially infinite
> number of computations. This is a form of
> but is more subtle as the relationship between mental and physical
> states/events does not need a causal explication. Additionally, Pratt's
> residuation proposal (similar to
> this<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Residuated_lattice>concept) generates only
> consistent extensions of first person indeterminacy
> modulo arbitrarily large memory resources. It is only when memory resources
> are limited to being finite ("Forgetfulness" as what occurs in the Telephone
> game <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_whispers>) that inconsistent
> extensions might occur.
> My skepticism of your interpretation of COMP has always turned on the
> allegation of eliminatism (in the sense of "that ‘‘matter’’ has been
> ontologically reduced to ‘‘mind’’") that you seem to derive from the
> independence of truth valuation, for example that because the primeness of
> 17 is completely independent of our knowledge of 17ness or primeness
> properties, that the truth value alone of "17 is prime" is sufficient to
> determine the properties that the sentence "17 is prime" implies *to the
> exclusion of all others*. I have looked at your Strobe
> MGA but I still do not see how it is that the reduction follow. I have
> not had the "aha" moment. :-( I am not convinced by Maudlin's
> How does the truth value determine the properties of a referent absent the
> possibility of prior identification of the referent? How can the exactness
> of the properties of an entity follow only from its potential existence as
> an entity? It is how you answer these questions that I need to understand.
> So to refute comp you need to find a non recoverable, by the first person
> indeterminacy, physical processes. If there were evidences that the wave
> function collapse, that might be considered as a refutation of comp. But
> after a century of the collapse speculation, we can only say that this
> evidences is meagre.
> OK, so we have to show a counter-example to the recoverability of
> physical process by first person indeterminancy (IPI)? Could you elaborate
> a bit more on how IPI covers all possible physical processes without
> assuming AR? I ask this because it seems to me that AR is what allows your
> entire thesis to run. My problem with AR is that it prevents us from
> finding any solutions to many problems including the concurrency
> it assumes property definiteness absent specifiably. You are tacitly
> assuming that all possible computations can inspect each other
> simultaneously and act upon each other without any occurrence of a conflict
> or contradiction. This tells me that you do not understand the concurrency
> This is an aspect of the problem of time that many thinkers have not
> considered. This problem is seen in the statement: "Time exists because not
> everything can occur all at once". Simultaneity is not a simple and
> unproblematic concept in ontology.
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