On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Comp substitute "consciousness"... such as you could not feel any
difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was
substituted for a digital brain.
OK, but could you elaborate on this statement? Is the
differentiation that one _might_ feel, given the wrong substitution
level, different from what _might_ occur if a "digital uploading"
procedure is conducted that fails to generate complete continuity? Those
"does not feel any difference" terms are a bit ambiguous and vague, IMHO.
Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a
program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain
with a digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because
comp implies that any piece of matter is non-computable... it is the
limit of the infinities of computation that goes through your
consciousness current state.
Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital
uploading argument if functional substitution cannot occur in a strictly
classical way, for example by strictly classical level measurement of
brain structure? Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement
will prevent any form of digital substitution. This might not be a bad
thing for Bruno's ontological argument - as it would show that 1p
indeterminacy is a function or endomorphism of entire "universes" in the
many-worlds sense - but would doom any change of immortality via digital
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