On 03 Mar 2012, at 00:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Mar 2, 2:49 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

A sentence is not a program.

Okay, "WHILE  program > 0 DO program. Program = Program + 1. END

Does running that program (or one like it) create a 1p experience?

Very plausibly not. It lacks self-reference and universality.

Why isn't a WHILE loop self-referential?

It will depend on the procedure that you accept for the <test>, and <action> in "while <test> <action>". Self-reference does not need universality but sub-universality, and so will be quickly rich enough for self-reference to occur, but not universality. Unless the action is rich enough, again. But this is a distracting issue given that your point is that NO program ever can give a computation able to manifest consciousness.

We are relatively manifested by the function of our brain. "we" are
not function.

That seems to make 'functionalism' a misnomer.

Yes. For many reasons, including that function can be seen as extensional objects, defined by their inputs-outputs, or as intensional objects, by taking into account how they are computed with some details, or by taking into account modalities, resource, etc. Putnam's functionalism was fuzzy on the choice of level, leading him and its followers to some confusion.

In my early writing I define comp by "it exists a level such that functionalism is right at that level". That "existence" is not constructive (and thus the need of the act of faith), and that allow some clarification on what comp can mean.

If so, that objection
evaporates when we use a symmetrical form <> content model rather than
a cause >> effect model of brain-mind.

Form and content are not symmetrical.
The dependence of content to form requires at least universal machine.

What if content is not dependent on form and requires nothing except
being real?

Define "real".

I think that content and form are anomalous symmetries
inherent in all real things. It is only our perspective, as human
content, that makes us assume otherwise. Objectively, form and content
are different aspects of the same thing - one side a shape of matter
in space, the other a meaning through time.

Except that it is usually not symmetrical. Form are 3p describable and content are not. Also that contradicts what you say above, that content might be independent to form.
Then, even if that where true, why would that not apply to machine?

Your non attribution of consciousness to the machine might comes from
the fact that you believes that the machines is only handled by the 3p
Bp, but it happens that the machine, and its universal self-
transformation has self-referential correct fixed point, and who are
you to judge if she meant them or not? If you define consciousness by
the restriction of the Bp on the such true fixed point, the PA baby
machine will already not be "satisfied" if you call her a zombie.

Take for example how a computer writes compared to a person. If you
blow up a character from a digital font enough, you will see the
jagged bits. If you look at a person's hand writing you will see
dynamic expressiveness and character. No two words or letters that a
person writes will be exactly the same.

A computer of course, produces only identical characters, and its text
has no emotional connection to the author. There will never be a
computer who signs it's John Hancock any differently than any other
computer - unless programmed specifically to do so. All machines have
the same personality by default (which is no personality).

This is a good example of how we can project our own perceptions on an
inanimate, unconscious canvas and see our own reflection in it. These
letters only look like letters to us, but to a computer, they look
like nothing whatsoever.

You confuse the proposition "could a computer" think, with the question "could today's man-made computers think".

Reducing consciousness into mathematical terms

Which comp precisely does not. Comp might be said theologicalist, even if 99% mathematicalist.

can yield only a
mathematical sculpture that reminds us of consciousness. It is an
inside out approach, a reverse engineering of meaning by modeling
grammar and punctuation extensively. There is much more to awareness
than Bp & p.

You could refute plasma physics by saying that plasma have nothing to do with ink and papers, which typically appears in book on plasma physics.

Ironically this is, in the language of the Löbian machine, a confusion very similar to the confusion between Bp and Bp & p. But I think that you need to invest more time in the technics for appreciating this, to be honest.

you were able to make a living zygote large enough to walk into, it wouldn't be like that. Structures would emerge spontaneously out of
circulating fluid and molecules acting spontaneously and
simultaneously, not just in chain reaction.

It doesn't really make sense to me if comp were
true that there would be anything other than QM.


Why would there be any other 'levels'?

So you assume QM in your theory. I do not.

It doesn't have to be QM, it can be whatever you like - arithmetic
truth, Platonia, etc. Why have any other 'level'?

Nice. Let us chose first order arithmetical truth. The formula that we
can write with "=", the logical symbols (with "A" for "for all", "E""
for "it exists", and x, y, z, ..., as variables), and the symbol "0",
"+", "*" and "s".

Do you agree with the intended meaning of the axioms I use:

Ax ~(0 = s(x)) (For all number x the successor of x is different from
AxAy ~(x = y) -> ~(s(x) = s(y))    (different numbers have different

Ax x + 0 = x
AxAy  x + s(y) = s(x + y)   ( meaning x + (y +1) = (x + y) +1) = laws
of addition

Ax   x *0 = 0
AxAy x*s(y) = x*y + x    laws of multiplication

This defines a UD.

And in that theory, we can prove the existence of  (tiedously) a
machine which "believes" the axiom above together with the infinity of
axioms (for all formula F translatable in the machine's language):

(F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x))) -> AxF(x)

This defines the machines I will interview "in" the theory above.

Then the levels will grow, including many cycles, (strange) loops,
self-reference, and relatively true self-reference, and "absolute"
fixed points, ... well a whole "theology", I think.

Thanks for writing it out that way. It helps, although I'm still not
able to get enough out of it to say for sure that I get it. The thing
is though, you can still have loops within loops and theology without
having any other level than the native arithmetic level. I still don't
see why or how any other levels with other characteristics would or
could arise.

Because you can define the working of the theory above *in* the language of the theory above. This is long and tedious to show, and akin to programming in very low level language (which is the price of its metamathematical simplicity).

But that's standard, and appears the first time in Gödel 1931. From Gödel 1931 to Solovay 1976 there has been tremendous progresses, and comp makes it exploitable, notably to study what ideally correct machine can prove and not prove about themselves, and what she can guess when looking inward.

UDA shows physics is there, and the work of Solovay makes it almost easy to derive the propositional level of physics from machine's introspection. making comp already testable, and up to now, comp is saved by the quantum aspect of physics.

No matter how complicated a
computer program is, it doesn't need to form some kind of non-
programmatic precipitate or accretion. What would be the point and
would such a thing even be accomplished?


Deep Blue or Watson don't need to define some new 'level' of
interpretation which transcends programming or re-presents it in some

Because deep blue is programmed to play some toy game. Not the
struggle of life game, in which you need self-referential control
structure, short and long term memories, universality, Löbianity, etc.

I think even if it were programmed to play the struggle of life game
it will still only ever be a toy struggle. That's why I say it has to
be made of something which knows what it means to want to survive and
remain living as itself...cells.

But you don't explain how cells do that. If you tell me "Not like the machine", you seems to possess an infinite knowledge about cells and about machine which I don't have.

I know it as much as I know anything.

- either you have the magical ability to distinguish humans from
zombies, or
- you must explain what in the brain is not Turing emulable, and how
it interacts with the behavior.

At this point, it's easy to distinguish humans from puppets.

Zombie (p-zombies) acts like humans.

The look
weird. They sound weird. It's not a problem. Even if we were not able
to tell the difference with our own senses, by the time anything
remotely convincing in the way of androids come out, there will
probably be detection technologies available at the same time. Even if
a puppet fools us, it probably won't fool another device designed to
detect an android signature.

This is surrealistic! You are telling me that a machine, and thus a zombie, for you, will be able to detect a conscious human from a zombie!!

The brain would be Turing emulable if there weren't a living person in
it. A dead brain is Turing emulable. What is not emulable is
accumulated 1p experience of the person who lives their life through
the brain.

This is ambiguous, and makes sense for the machine, both with 1p defined by personal memory in teleportation protocol, and by Bp & p.

Because the machine as a whole isn't an entity, it's an assembly of
different parts. It only seems like an 'it' to us. You can tell the
difference too because once you turn the seed on, you can't stop it
without killing it. There's no pause. Machines can be stopped and re-
started generally.

You confuse natural machines evolving since a long time, with man-made machine following a different type evolution.
You keep making an invalid argument again and again.

You should not compare the crude
man made machine with natural nanotechnology having a very long
history. No one doubt that life is a very sophisticated technology.
Some frog can freeze completely, and after 4 month of seemingly
come back to their activities.

As far as I know, all living organisms arise from a single dividing
cell and no machines are built that way.

Is a ribosome alive?

Not by itself. It's part of the context of a cell, which is alive by

OK, but then the point you made about the reassembled clock is no more valid.

This may be a much bigger
deal than it sounds if consciousness 'insists' through memory rather
than appears instantaneously as a function of objects in space.

Memory is a key, sure. But it is an information pattern, usually
interpreted by some information handling.

We don't know that. What you are talking about may only be recall. Our
experience as humans may be defined by an ability to temporarily
forget that we are the entire universe through all time.

Open question in the comp theory. Perhaps yes, no, and it depends on how any of the terms above are reinterpreted in machine's theology.

I will not blame you to reintroduce the ghost in the machine. crudely
said, computer science justifies the existence of the ghost (software)
in the machine (hardware).

I steer away from ghosts though because it makes a pseudosubstance of
something which I understand to be the actual opposite of a substance.
We can talk about ghosts figuratively, sure, or souls or whatever, but
that reifies existence at the expense of essence - which is a
perfectly rational thing to do unless you are trying to talk about
consciousness itself. If you privilege existence when you talk about
consciousness, you immediately get lost into a 3p model of
consciousness. Software is precisely that 3p model of (some aspects
of) consciousness. It has the same ghostly qualities if you force it
into an existential context, but it's a different animal. The
insubstantial of concepts alone doesn't make them sentient, nor does
their ability to overlap function with sentience.

I was not talking about the "point of view" of the "ghost", but of the "ghost". Don't confuse the softaware and its relative interpretation by some universal software or hardware.

It is here that you should study the math. Ideally self-referentially
correct machines cannot miss the doubt. They becomes quickly modest,
and know that whatever they learn, their ignorance will only get
bigger. Forever.

Then they have no doubt of their ignorance instead.

Amazingly, you are wrong on that too. They can doubt even their ignorance. the only thing they cannot doubt is that they doubt.

In conscience and mecanisme I refine Thomas Slezak interpretation of Descartes' cogito (which is in G), in the logic Z, and this makes it possible to prove that Malcolm's argument against the existence of dreams is equivalent with his argument against conscious machine.

You are right, but only from the first person point of view. It is a
key point for the knower, perhaps the human right brain, and part of
the limbic system. But doing science, the theory should no more refer
to the sense of the one who does the theory, only to the sense "object
of theory", if not you do pseudo-religion-science. You can do that.
There is a public for that, but it is no more like searching the
truth, but asserting personal opinions (in the best case, because
usually the pseudo-things is just a selling strategy).

I would agree except in this special case of studying consciousness
itself. Everything goes out the window when we look at the qualitative
side of the universe. We have to come to it on its terms. The object
of the theory is not an object, it is a subject.

So meditation, dreams, and things like that might be very useful for the study of consciousness, but you can only start with sharable personal opinion, and those are called hypotheses, whatever the matter subject is (1p, or 3p or anything).

If not, you are saying something like "I know (am conscious that) comp is false", which is strictly equivalent with "believe me, God told me!".

Only in theory. I don't think it is the case in reality.

It is a consequence of the theory that this is the case in reality. We
start from the innocuous local relative "yes doctor", and then the
reasoning shows that we are already in an arithmetical matrix, and we
can explain why, from inside, it looks like an analytical, physical,
gigantic history.

It's still de-presentational. There is no actual there there. No
'show', only an idea that something shaped like a theater can
accommodate a stage and props. Comp seems to say "Since stage+props =
show, then we have explained show business in terms of the traffic
patterns of lifting trunks and the angles of Klieg lights".

Yes. It is weird. But this is only the 3p view, and you forget the meta-explanation of the 1p-view, and why its relation with 3p is different than a mere attribution of some 1p to some 3p.



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