On Mar 2, 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 01 Mar 2012, at 22:32, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>>>>>>>> There is no such thing as evidence when it comes to
> >>>>>>>>> qualitative
> >>>>>>>>> phenomenology. You don't need evidence to infer that a clock
> >>>>>>>>> doesn't
> >>>>>>>>> know what time it is.
> >>>>>>>> A clock has no self-referential ability.
> >>>>>>> How do you know?
> >>>>>> By looking at the structure of the clock. It does not implement
> >>>>>> self-
> >>>>>> reference. It is a finite automaton, much lower in complexity
> >>>>>> than a
> >>>>>> universal machine.
> >>>>> Knowing what time it is doesn't require self reference.
> >>>> That's what I said, and it makes my point.
> >>> The difference between a clock knowing what time it is, Google
> >>> knowing
> >>> what you mean when you search for it, and an AI bot knowing how to
> >>> have a conversation with someone is a matter of degree. If comp
> >>> claims
> >>> that certain kinds of processes have 1p experiences associated with
> >>> them it has to explain why that should be the case.
> >> Because they have the ability to refer to themselves and understand
> >> the difference between 1p, 3p, the mind-body problem, etc.
> >> That some numbers have the ability to refer to themselves is proved
> >> in
> >> computer science textbook.
> >> A clock lacks it. A computer has it.
> > "This sentence" refers to 'itself' too. I see no reason why any number
> > or computer would have any more of a 1p experience than that.
> A sentence is not a program.

Okay, "WHILE  program > 0 DO program. Program = Program + 1. END

Does running that program (or one like it) create a 1p experience?

> >>>>> By comp it
> >>>>> should be generated by the 1p experience of the logic of the gears
> >>>>> of
> >>>>> the clock.
> >>>> ?
> >>> If the Chinese Room is intelligent, then why not gears?
> >> The chinese room is not intelligent.
> > I agree.
> >> The person which supervene on the
> >> some computation done by the chinese room might be intelligent.
> > Like a metaphysical 'person' that arises out of the computation ?
> It is more like "prime numbers" arising from + and *. Or like a chess
> player arising from some program, except that prime number and chess
> player have (today) no universal self-referential abilities.

That sounds like what I said.

> >>>>>>> By comp logic, the clock could just be part of a
> >>>>>>> universal timekeeping machine - just a baby of course, so we
> >>>>>>> can't
> >>>>>>> expect it to show any signs of being a universal machine yet,
> >>>>>>> but by
> >>>>>>> comp, we cannot assume that clocks can't know what time it is
> >>>>>>> just
> >>>>>>> because these primitive clocks don't know how to tell us that
> >>>>>>> they
> >>>>>>> know it yet.
> >>>>>> Then the universal timekeeping would be conscious, not the baby
> >>>>>> clock.
> >>>>>> Level confusion.
> >>>>> A Swiss watch has a fairly complicated movement. How many watches
> >>>>> does
> >>>>> it take before they collectively have a chance at knowing what
> >>>>> time it
> >>>>> is? If all self referential machines arise from finite automation
> >>>>> though (by UDA inevitability?), the designation of any Level at
> >>>>> all is
> >>>>> arbitrary. How does comp conceive of self referential machines
> >>>>> evolving in the first place?
> >>>> They exist arithmetically, in many relative way, that is to
> >>>> universal
> >>>> numbers. Relative "Evolution" exists in higher level description of
> >>>> those relation.
> >>>> Evolution of species, presuppose arithmetic and even comp,
> >>>> plausibly.
> >>>> Genetics is already digital relatively to QM.
> >>> My question though was how many watches does it take to make an
> >>> intelligent watch?
> >> Difficult question. One hundred might be enough, but a good engineers
> >> might be able to optimize it. I would not be so much astonished that
> >> one clock is enough, to implement a very simple (and inefficacious)
> >> universal system, but then you have to rearrange all the parts of
> >> that
> >> clock.
> > The misapprehensions of comp are even clearer to me imagining a
> > universal system in clockwork mechanisms. Electronic computers sort of
> > mesmerize us because electricity seems magical to us, but having a
> > warehouse full of brass gears manually clattering together and
> > assuming that there is a  conscious entity experiencing something
> > there is hard to seriously consider. It's like Leibniz' Windmill.
> Or like Ned block chinese people computer. This is not convincing.

Why not? Because our brain can be broken down into components also and
we assume that we are the function of our brain? If so, that objection
evaporates when we use a symmetrical form <> content model rather than
a cause >> effect model of brain-mind.

> It
> is just helpful to understand that consciousness relies on logical
> informational patterns that on matter. That problem is not a problem
> for comp, but for theories without notion of first person. It breaks
> down when you can apply a theory of knowledge, which is the case for
> machine, thanks to incompleteness. Consciousness is in the "true"
> fixed point of self-reference. It is not easy to explain this shortly
> and it relies on Gödel and Tarski works. There will be opportunities
> to come back on this.

All of that sounds still like the easy problem of consciousness.
Arithmetic can show *that* self reference exists but it does so by
drawing a circle around a hole where the self should be. It is a 3p
outside view looking in and finding only an abstract vector (pseudo
1p). This is indeed accurate from a 3p logical perspective, which is
why it is internally consistent and can be used to make sophisticated
puppets featuring trivial intelligence which can be elaborated to a
degree far exceeding human trivial intelligence, but still possessing
no feeling, understanding, or experience.

> > If
> > you were able to make a living zygote large enough to walk into, it
> > wouldn't be like that. Structures would emerge spontaneously out of
> > circulating fluid and molecules acting spontaneously and
> > simultaneously, not just in chain reaction.
> >>> It doesn't really make sense to me if comp were
> >>> true that there would be anything other than QM.
> >> ?
> > Why would there be any other 'levels'?
> So you assume QM in your theory. I do not.

It doesn't have to be QM, it can be whatever you like - arithmetic
truth, Platonia, etc. Why have any other 'level'?

> > No matter how complicated a
> > computer program is, it doesn't need to form some kind of non-
> > programmatic precipitate or accretion. What would be the point and how
> > would such a thing even be accomplished?
> ?

Deep Blue or Watson don't need to define some new 'level' of
interpretation which transcends programming or re-presents it in some

> >>> Why go through the
> >>> formality of genetics or cells? What would possibly be the point? If
> >>> silicon makes just as good of a person as do living mammal cells,
> >>> why
> >>> not just make people out of quantum to begin with?
> >> Nature does that, but it takes time. If you have a brain disease,
> >> your
> >> answer is like a doctor who would tell you, just wait life appears on
> >> some planet and with some luck it will do your brain.
> >> But my interest in comp is not in the practice, but in the conceptual
> >> revolution it brings.
> > I think that comp has conceptual validity, and actually could help us
> > understand consciousness in spite of it being exactly wrong about it.
> > Because of the disorientation problem, being wrong about it may in
> > fact be the only way to study it...as long as you know that it is only
> > showing you a shadow of mind, and not mind itself.
> We don't know that.

I know it as much as I know anything.

> >>>> A machine which can only add, cannot be universal.
> >>>> A machine which can only multiply cannot be universal.
> >>>> But a machine which can add and multiply is universal.
> >>> A calculator can add and multiply. Will it know what time it is if I
> >>> connect it to a clock?
> >> Too much ambiguity, but a priori: yes. Actually it does not need a
> >> clock. + and * can simulate the clock. Clock is a part of all
> >> computers, explicitly or implicitly.
> > This is a good way to show the difference between the a-signifying,
> > generic 'sense' of time that you're talking about, versus the
> > anthropocentric, signifying sense. All of those old VCRs flashing
> > 12:00 forever, even though there is a perfectly good clock on board
> > shows the extremely limited capacities of even a digital clock to tell
> > time. A microprocessor has only disconnected recursive enumeration.
> > There is no temporal context to it. If you set it to 7:00 or 13505:00
> > it makes no difference. Those symbols aren't grounded into anything at
> > all, they are digital units representing nothing at all. No qualia, no
> > 1p awareness.
> So you assume a continuous time?

I assume no time other than memory of experience in the perpetual now.
Knowing the time is a function of understanding. It only has relevance
in particular contexts, like 3D vision or olfactory sense.

> You would be an alien, you might say that human people have no qualia,
> given that they do not seems to be present in any cut section of a
> human body.

They would be right that I have no alien qualia. I don't say that the
components of a clock don't have qualia - I think that they must, but
I suspect its much less (say one quintillionth) as significant as
ours. Because the qualia is so primitive, there is no 1p coherence to
the 'clock' assembly as a whole. There is zero increase in 1p
significance over and above the value of the parts. That is not to say
there is no increase in significance to us by virtue of possessing and
using the clock, of course there is great utility, joy, comfort,
learning, knowing, etc.

> >>>> The machine is a whole, its function belongs to none of its parts.
> >>>> When the components are unrelated, the machine does not work. The
> >>>> machine works well when its components are well assembled, be it
> >>>> artificially, naturally, virtually or arithmetically (that does not
> >>>> matter, and can't matter).
> >>> The machine isn't a whole though. Any number of parts can be
> >>> replaced
> >>> without irreversibly killing the machine.
> >> Like us. There is no one construct in the human body which lasts for
> >> more than seven years.
> > Not like us. If any major organ replacement fails for any reason, we
> > will die. A machine could sit in a machine shop for 100 years and be
> > perfectly viable if it gets fixed at that time.
> Some seed can live thousand of years.

A thousand years means nothing to a seed. It doesn't begin living
until it germinates, that becomes year zero for it.

>You should not compare the crude
> man made machine with natural nanotechnology having a very long
> history. No one doubt that life is a very sophisticated technology.
> Some frog can freeze completely, and after 4 month of seemingly death,
> come back to their activities.

As far as I know, all living organisms arise from a single dividing
cell and no machines are built that way. This may be a much bigger
deal than it sounds if consciousness 'insists' through memory rather
than appears instantaneously as a function of objects in space. If we
started building machines this way, as nanotech seeds, I think we
would gain 1p sentience, but lose control of it.

> >> Brains have much shorter material identity. Only bones change more
> >> slowly, but are still replaced quasi completely in seven years,
> >> according to biologists.
> > True, but they are replaced with tissues which are appropriately aged,
> > not stem cells. The biographical narrative of the organism as a whole
> > is maintained.
> Even if that is correct for current machines, comp is considering all
> machines.

That's the theory.

> >>>> All know theories in biology are known to be reducible to QM, which
> >>>> is
> >>>> Turing emulable. So your theory/opinion is that all known theories
> >>>> are
> >>>> false.
> >>> They aren't false, they are only catastrophically incomplete.
> >>> Neither
> >>> biology nor QM has any opinion on a purpose for awareness or living
> >>> organisms to exist.
> >> That does not entail that QM structures or biological structure
> >> cannot
> >> be aware, or bear local notion of persons.
> > If we were not ourselves aware, would anything that QM or biology
> > entails leas us to suspect that a such thing as awareness could be
> > possible?
> Yes. Their ability to support universality and self-reference.

Why should universality and self-reference indicate awareness of any
kind. I have motion sensors on my garage lights. I could make them
universal by plugging them into a TV set instead of lights. They are
self referential because whenever I go in the garage at night, they
turn on to greet me and to make their presence known.

> > Turning emulation counts on computation being sufficient to
> > support life and awareness, but it's an arbitrary wish.
> All theories collect evidences. Comp has many positive evidences. Non-
> comp has only the absence of solution to a problem kind of evidence.

Non-comp has sense. It doesn't need evidence because the thought of
needing evidence is already non-comp symbol grounding. A machine will
solve problems using whatever parameters or data it is given. It has
no capacity to doubt them unless programmed to act as if it were
doubting them. Machines never want or need evidence. They extrapolate
recursively, forever.

> But non-comp faces the same difficulties, except that it hides them
> more easily, in special vague infinities.

It doesn't hide anything, any more than the our sense of humor hides.
It is theory which needs to justify it's relevance in terms of sense,
not the other way around.

> > We aren't
> > seeing anything especially hopeful to back it up.
> Study a book in computer science. Look at molecular biology, or
> quantum mechanics.

Nice theory but no payoff in terms of breakthroughs in consciousness.

> >>>> You have to lower the comp level in the infinitely low, and
> >>>> introduce special infinities, not 1p machine recoverable to make
> >>>> comp
> >>>> false.
> >>> No, you can just reject the entire presumption that computation by
> >>> itself has causal efficacy.
> >> But it has causal efficacy, even with zombie, which can decide and
> >> act
> >> on the environment like us.
> > Only because there is a material body which can input and output to a
> > material environment.
> Immaterial body can input and output to an immaterial environment.

Only in theory. I don't think it is the case in reality.

> > A program, without a physical substrate, has no
> > causal efficacy (if it could, we wouldn't need computers).
> Yes, but the point is that a physical substrate is a relative notion,
> for relative (indexical) use.

We don't know that. Its qualia of physicality to us is certainly a
relative notion, but with sense, it would be the case that the
relative notion is the actual concrete presentation of realism for us.
Its specular reflection - seeing 'through' the proximal surface to the
distal image. Sense means it is both relative and absolute.

> >>> Computation to me is clearly an
> >>> epiphenomenon of experienced events, not the other way around.
> >> Computation are well defined object in arithmetic. You cannot
> >> redefine
> >> standard notion to suit your point. Or you can conclude whatever you
> >> want at the start.
> > Arithmetic is an experience too.
> You confuse arithmetic and the experience of arithmetic.

No, it's just that I think all arithmetic is an experience of
something - whether it's a brain, a cell, or a semiconductor. Not
empty space.

> >>>>>>> This is
> >>>>>>> another variation on the Chinese Room. The pig can walk around
> >>>>>>> at
> >>>>>>> 30,000 feet and we can ask it questions about the view from up
> >>>>>>> there,
> >>>>>>> but the pig has not, in fact learned to fly or become a bird.
> >>>>>>> Neither
> >>>>>>> has the plane, for that matter.
> >>>>>> Your analogy is confusing. I would say that the pig in the plane
> >>>>>> does
> >>>>>> fly, but this is out of the topic.
> >>>>> It could be said that the pig is flying, but not that he has
> >>>>> *learned
> >>>>> to fly* (and especially not learned to fly like a bird - which
> >>>>> would
> >>>>> be the direct analogy for a computer simulating human
> >>>>> consciousness).
> >>>> That why the flying analogy does not work. Consciousness concerns
> >>>> something unprovable for everone concerned, except oneself.
> >>> No analogy can work any better because nothing else in the
> >>> universe is
> >>> unprovable for everyone except oneself except consciousness.
> >> ?
> > Nothing but consciousness is subjective. Nothing else besides
> > consciousness is unprovable to others but unnecessary to prove to
> > oneself.
> Good. that's a point for the machine's consciousness theory, which
> relate consciousness and consistency. indeed only consistency and all
> G* minus G propositions appears to the machine as unprovable to
> others, but easily inferable to oneself.

Consistency is only a comment on an aspect of consciousness though,
just as a shadow of a tree has a basic tree shape. It doesn't define
the tree, it's a silhouette.

> >>>> May I ask you a question? Is a human with an artificial heart
> >>>> still a
> >>>> human?
> >>> Of course. A person with a wooden leg is still human as well. A
> >>> person
> >>> with a wooden head is not a person though.
> >> OK. So the problem is circumscribe to the brain. Someone can have an
> >> artificial body, but not an artificial brain.
> >> Could someone survive with an artificial cerebral stem?
> > It depends how good the artificial brain stem was. The more of the
> > brain you try to replace, the more intolerant it will be, probably
> > exponentially so.
> So, here you seem to agree that it is just a matter of complexity.

Not at all. If you are watering plants with vinegar, it is not the
complexity which makes it a poor substitute for water. Complexity is
important, but it's a red herring as far as a living organism having
parts replaced. It's more about organic authenticity and similarity on
all levels.

> But
> we abstract from this in the conceptual theory. Such a complexity is
> irrelevant. We are not addressing any practical issue here.
> > Just as having four prosthetic limbs would be more
> > of a burden than just one, the more the ratio of living brain to
> > prosthetic brain tilts toward the prosthetic, the less person there is
> > left. It's not strictly linear, as neuroplasticity would allow the
> > person to scale down to what is left of the natural brain (as in cases
> > where people have an entire hemisphere removed), and even if the
> > prosthetics were good it is not clear that it would feel the same for
> > the person.
> Theoretically, this will be true only if your lower the level in the
> infinitely down.

Or if there is no level at all. At what level can water be substituted
with something that is not wet?

> > If the person survived with an artificial brain stem, they
> > may never again feel that they were 'really' in their body again. If
> > the cortex were replaced, they may regress to infancy and never be
> > able to learn to use the new brain.
> Why? You need infinities to asses such truth conceptually.

Because you are replacing part of a tree that knows it's a tree. It
remembers and has expectations. If someone suddenly replaced your home
with a structure that looked the same on the outside but was
cinderblocks and asphalt on the inside, you wouldn't be able to go on
living as usual.


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