On 31 Mar 2012, at 01:23, David Nyman wrote:

On 30 March 2012 19:54, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

The problem with all this (as Kent makes explicit) is that there is
nothing in the mathematics of the "game physics" that corresponds to
this kind of momentary selection of subjective localisation.
Unfortunately, his own proposal doesn't really solve the underlying
problem, because although it can account, given the experimental
situation, for my seeing spin-up and not spin-down (because the other
doesn't objectively exist any longer) it cannot account for why the
experience is of David making this observation rather than Brent

It does if you think experience is an epiphenomena of physics. Brent and David are different physical systems and only one is looking at the system.

Sure, but even if one believes that to be the case, it is still taken
entirely for granted that there is some natural principle for the
selection of THIS physical system from the class of all such systems.
To appeal, a posteriori, to the fact that one's observational
perspective is apparently associated with this particular system and
not any other is merely to argue in a circle; since that is what we
are trying to explain we cannot adduce it as the explanation.

As I said before, the requirement for some principle of selection, in
this sense, is rarely made explicit, but nonetheless implicitly relied
on.  More often than not our particular localisation in space and time
has been consigned to the realm of "psychology" or "illusion", as in
Einstein's reputed remark, as though it were somehow possible to
disarm this inconvenient observational fact with scare quotes.  So
what intrigued me about Hoyle's idea (and according to Gribbin it was
rather more than a fictional conceit for him) was precisely that his
making it explicit exposed an "elephant in the room" that few others
were prepared to acknowledge.

Exactly. What comp shows is that each time a physicist use a physical law to make a physical prediction, he is using an identity principle, a selection principle, and an induction principle, which is incompatible with comp. He assumes his mind is attached to one brain and that there is no other equivalent brain existing in reality, to be able to transfer his 3p reasoning on its future 1-view. Comp makes the mind-body problem *more* difficult, by showing that those principles are not applicable.
Reality is more subtle than the physicist want us to believe.

Bruno






David

On 3/30/2012 4:38 AM, David Nyman wrote:

The problem with all this (as Kent makes explicit) is that there is
nothing in the mathematics of the "game physics" that corresponds to
this kind of momentary selection of subjective localisation.
Unfortunately, his own proposal doesn't really solve the underlying
problem, because although it can account, given the experimental
situation, for my seeing spin-up and not spin-down (because the other
doesn't objectively exist any longer) it cannot account for why the
experience is of David making this observation rather than Brent


It does if you think experience is an epiphenomena of physics. Brent and David are different physical systems and only one is looking at the system.

Brent


, or
indeed here rather than there, or now rather than then.  Subjective
localisation is simply assumed, or trivialised, as in Einstein's
remark “The distinction between past, present, and future is only a
stubbornly persistent illusion”.


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