On 4/1/2012 1:28 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 April 2012 21:02, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>  wrote:

I'm all in favor of epistemology first.  But that means point-of-view comes
first, and only some things happen comes second.  The primitive,
micro-physical ensemble is an ontological assumption way down the line.
No argument from me on that!  But, in the light of "epistemology
first", can you make any sense of the notion of consciousness as an
epiphenomenon of its own constructions?

No sure. But if I do succeed in that, starting from being conscious of stuff, I can follow the chain back to consciousness. I don't need to forget where I came from.

Brent
Hence a Reality, yes. But not necessarily a physical reality. Here is the
logical dependence:
NUMBERS -> "MACHINE DREAMS" -> PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> PHYSICS -> NUMBERS.
      --- Bruno Marchal


David

On 4/1/2012 4:55 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 31 March 2012 01:09, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>    wrote:

That seems like conjuring a mystery out of nothing. Is your question why
is
my observational perspective associated with my brain?
It's only "a mystery out of nothing" if you have already accepted as
unproblematic the primitive existence of "my brain".  Even given the
assumption of a primitive micro-physicality, we lack any purely
PHYSICAL principle capable of making a fundamental ontological
distinction between the generalised ensemble in its entirety, and any
specifically-isolated "composite object". The ascription of composite
brain-hood to some domain of the micro-physical ensemble is an a
posteriori ascription from an already-established observational
perspective.  Hence to attribute said perspective to an epiphenomenon
of such an ascription amounts to putting the ontological cart before
the epistemological horse.

David

I'm all in favor of epistemology first.  But that means point-of-view comes
first, and only some things happen comes second.  The primitive,
micro-physical ensemble is an ontological assumption way down the line.

Brent


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