On 1 April 2012 21:02, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > I'm all in favor of epistemology first. But that means point-of-view comes > first, and only some things happen comes second. The primitive, > micro-physical ensemble is an ontological assumption way down the line.
No argument from me on that! But, in the light of "epistemology first", can you make any sense of the notion of consciousness as an epiphenomenon of its own constructions? David > On 4/1/2012 4:55 AM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> On 31 March 2012 01:09, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> That seems like conjuring a mystery out of nothing. Is your question why >>> is >>> my observational perspective associated with my brain? >> >> It's only "a mystery out of nothing" if you have already accepted as >> unproblematic the primitive existence of "my brain". Even given the >> assumption of a primitive micro-physicality, we lack any purely >> PHYSICAL principle capable of making a fundamental ontological >> distinction between the generalised ensemble in its entirety, and any >> specifically-isolated "composite object". The ascription of composite >> brain-hood to some domain of the micro-physical ensemble is an a >> posteriori ascription from an already-established observational >> perspective. Hence to attribute said perspective to an epiphenomenon >> of such an ascription amounts to putting the ontological cart before >> the epistemological horse. >> >> David > > > I'm all in favor of epistemology first. But that means point-of-view comes > first, and only some things happen comes second. The primitive, > micro-physical ensemble is an ontological assumption way down the line. > > Brent > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
