On 29 March 2012 20:47, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

> You don't know that.  It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
> experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does.  But if
> conscious experience is a process then it is certainly possible to create a
> process that is aware of being in both Washington and Moscow at the same
> time.  Think of a brain wired via RF links to eyeballs in M and W.   Or The
> Borg of Star Trek.  Of course that experience would be strange and we would
> tend to say, "Yes but it's still one consciousness."  So then the question
> becomes what do you mean by not experiencing duplication?  Is it a mere
> tautology based on how you define 'consciousness'?

Surely it's just a necessary prerequisite for accepting the
possibility of either MWI or comp?  IOW, if one rejects, on whatever
grounds, that a unique subjective perspective could be consistent with
the objective existence of multiple copies (as I think is the case
with Kent) then one is forced also to reject both MWI and comp.  Given
such a view, neither theory could be a viable explanation for one's
lived experience of observing "one universe at a time".

AFAICS, the more exotic examples you give above, e.g. a distributed
process, or a Borg-type group-mind, present no difficulties beyond
that for "ordinary" consciousness.  Again, either one accepts that
duplication of these states of affairs would be compatible, mutatis
mutandis, with the corresponding "single universe" perspective
(however exotic) or not.

Given the above, what makes it difficult to make sense of John's
objections to Bruno's argument is precisely that he accepts the
possibility of multiple copies in a comp or MWI scenario, whilst
ignoring the necessity of recovering a singular perspective.  But the
latter step is a prerequisite, in any scenario, for reproducing the
empirically uncertain state of affairs.  Without it, the "probability"
of every outcome - as John has continually reiterated - can only ever
be 100%!

"Selection", even if only implicit, is an ineliminable feature of any
theory seeking to explain the empirical facts.  Kent's proposal is a
process that eliminates all branches but one, albeit on a somewhat
different basis than Copenhagen.  Similarly, the heuristic I suggested
in an earlier post entails "selection", but in a non-destructive
manner.  BTW, I had long retained a dim recollection of a similar
selection metaphor involving "pigeon holes" from my youthful SF
reading, which I recently re-discovered to be Fred Hoyle's 1960's
novella "October the First is Too Late".  I also found that John
Gribbin refers to this very notion in his recent Multiverse book
(apparently he was a student of Hoyle's), relating it to the ideas of
Deutsch and Barbour.  This reinforced my suspicion that they do rely
implicitly on such a selection principle, though AFAICS neither of
them acknowledge it explicitly.

David

> On 3/29/2012 12:02 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 29 Mar 2012, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>> On 3/29/2012 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> And YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I will ask you to do the "hairsplitting" about that "YOU", that you are
>>>> using here, so as to convince me and others that it refutes indeed the
>>>> indeterminacy about the first person experience displayed in the WM
>>>> duplication thought experience (UDA step 3).
>>>>
>>>> Given that we both agree that we don't die in that experience, and given
>>>> that you are the one claiming that there is no indeterminate outcome, I 
>>>> will
>>>> ask to give us an algorithm predicting the result of the future
>>>> self-localization experience.
>>>
>>>
>>> The outcome is deterministic just like Everett's QM is deterministic.
>>>  And it has the same problems being given a probabilistic interpretation as
>>> EQM.  If you duplicated a coin in the transporter experiment the question,
>>> "Where will you expect to find the coin." has the same problems as "Where do
>>> you expect to find yourself".  The implication is that "self" is not a
>>> unique 'thing' (as for example a soul is assumed to be) but is process that
>>> can be realized in different media.
>>
>>
>> I agree. But the experience is lived as unique, so we can follow Plotinus
>> in using the term soul for the owner of the 1-view, that is, the knower.
>> From its pov, it is not duplicable, in the trivial sense that the
>> duplication is never part of his experience.
>
>
> You don't know that.  It's an assumption based on the idea that conscious
> experience is something a certain physical body, a brain, does.  But if
> conscious experience is a process then it is certainly possible to create a
> process that is aware of being in both Washington and Moscow at the same
> time.  Think of a brain wired via RF links to eyeballs in M and W.   Or The
> Borg of Star Trek.  Of course that experience would be strange and we would
> tend to say, "Yes but it's still one consciousness."  So then the question
> becomes what do you mean by not experiencing duplication?  Is it a mere
> tautology based on how you define 'consciousness'?
>
>
>> He would not know if we did not give him the protocol.
>> mathematically, this is related to the fact that no machine can know which
>> machine she is, already seen clearly by Post and (re)intuited by Benacerraf,
>> and "intuited" by the machine itself, accepting the Theaetetus' definition
>> of knowledge.
>>
>> I am not sure the problem of probability is identical in QM and COMP. In
>> QM, Everett showed that the P = A^2 principle does not depend on the choice
>> of the base,
>
>
> I don't think that's correct.  'A' is the amplitude of the projection on
> certain basis determined by what is measured.  Yes the Born rule can be
> applied whatever basis is chosen, but the projection produces different A's.
>
>
>> so that A can be considered as measuring the relative proportion of
>> possible accessible relative realities. This does not work with finite
>> multiverse, but it works with infinite multiverse,
>
>
> But infinite multiple worlds create a measure problem.  That's one of Adrian
> Kent's points.
>
>
>
>> and Gleason theorem justifies the unicity of the measure,
>
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by that?
>
>
>
>> for sufficiently complex physical reality (meaning the Hilbert space have
>> to be of dimension bigger than 2. So in my opinion, the Born rule is already
>> explained.
>>
>> With COMP, as I argue, we have to justify the wave itself (assuming QM is
>> correct) from the relative number relations and personal points of view (as
>> done in AUDA, for the logic of "measure one").
>
>
> Yes, that would be a signal accomplishment.
>
> Brent
>
>
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