On 26 Apr 2012, at 22:17, graytiger wrote:



On 14 mrt, 17:49, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:

'The concept of an afterlife is a perfectly reasonable thing to be
able
to imagine'

It is not. There is no strongly justified argument to suppose that
aynthing 'mind' like can stay in existence when the brain stops
functioning.

Only if you assume that brain "really" exists, and if you assume some identity thesis in cognitive science.
And this contradict the implicit use you made of mechanism.
See this list, or my URL showing that mechanism and wek materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or in physicalism) is logically incompatible with mechanism.

We have not yet solve the mind-body problem, so we have to say agnostic on such question.

Both with the computationalist theory (digital mechanism), and with its partial conformation by Everett QM, we are immortal.

'I'm talking about the existence of feeling as a phenomenon in the
universe. It makes no sense logically. '

But there are no evidence of a primary physical universe. Not one. There are only evidence for a physical reality, not for a primitively ontological physical reality. It is a metaphysical (theological) assumption, and it contradicts mechanism.

because people don't like the idea of dying. But that doesn't prove a
thing. So it is not really reasonable in the sense of being well
justified. People can have many needs that are answered by certain
beliefs, but that doesn't make these beliefs reasonable.

People don't like the idea of suffering, especially for a long time. If you read Sade, you can understand that the idea of mortality is also a form of wishful thinking.

Today, there are more evidence that the universe emerge from a number's dream matrix, say, than a reality per se.

To assert that we are mortal is not more rational than to assert we are immortal. It is theory dependent. And the evidences favor a little bit more the theories in which we are immortal (like comp, QM-without collapse) than the one in which we are mortal, (physicalism + little universe).

We can only search theories and test them. If not we do pseudo-religion.

Bruno











On Wed, Mar 14, 2012 at 9:00 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
http://pss.sagepub.com/content/22/5/613.abstract

Abstract

       The feeling of being in control of one’s own actions is a
strong subjective experience. However, discoveries in psychology and
neuroscience challenge the validity of this experience and suggest
that free will is just an illusion. This raises a question: What would happen if people started to disbelieve in free will? Previous research has shown that low control beliefs affect performance and motivation.
Recently, it has been shown that undermining free-will beliefs
influences social behavior. In the study reported here, we
investigated whether undermining beliefs in free will affects brain
correlates of voluntary motor preparation. Our results showed that the readiness potential was reduced in individuals induced to disbelieve
in free will. This effect was evident more than 1 s before
participants consciously decided to move, a finding that suggests that
the manipulation influenced intentional actions at preconscious
stages. Our findings indicate that abstract belief systems might have
a much more fundamental effect than previously thought.

Has anyone posted this yet? Hard to explain what brain correlates are
doing responding to an illusion...

You might be able to show that people who believe in an afterlife are more relaxed when faced with death. There are recognised neurological
correlates of relaxation. Would it thereby follow that there is in
fact an afterlife?

The concept of an afterlife is a perfectly reasonable thing to be able
to imagine, since we are born and have a life, it is not a problem to
imagine that we could continue to have a life even after this one
ends. This is not the case with free will. Hypnotizing a computer to
think it has 'free will' will not result in any changes in its
processing, since for a computer there is no possible difference
between voluntary action and automatic action. For us there is a
tremendously significant and obvious difference.

Craig

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