On 08 Jun 2012, at 19:30, Johnathan Corgan wrote:

On Fri, Jun 8, 2012 at 12:45 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence of)
first person view?

I think this is actually the point--calculations of expected future
experiences based on now being in the neighborhood of D (which result
in "torment") should instead be calculated based on now being in the
neighborhood of the transition from C->U, as D and U are
indistinguishable.  Calculating expectation on this basis results in
much better anticipated outcomes, according to the paper.

OK, that makes sense (in comp). I will look at the paper, when I found the time ... (exam period!).

Given that very minimal change in the brain seems to be able to send someone
in the "amnesic arithmetical heaven", as illustrated by some drugs

The changes you note may be minimal in the macro sense (small delta
concentrations of receptor ligands in the synaptic cleft), but result
in profoundly different trajectories of firing patterns at the
systemic level.

That might be a reason to expect such deep jump in the very actual conscious experience, when near death. Such experiences occur also at sleep where we can easily jump from normal mundane state of consciousness to quite "altered one", and this seems most plausible for possible consistent continuations in extreme situation. That might have evolutionary advantage also, like the ability to continue some fight after big injuries, and there are evidences for this. The brain is more than a neural net, it is a sophisticated chemical drug factory.



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