On 6/9/2012 2:44 AM, Pierz wrote:


On Saturday, June 9, 2012 12:27:43 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:

    On 6/8/2012 7:02 PM, Pierz wrote:
    I don't know, somehow this whole argument is not something I could take 
seriously enough to get worked up over - too many what ifs piled up on other 
what ifs. But I think I see a couple of flaws in this argument. Firstly, I am 
not sure about the equation of unconsciousness with death. Why should coma be 
any different from deep sleep - i.e. a state of minimal consciousness which one 
cannot remember in retrospect but which nevertheless is a legitimate 1p view? 
One does not miraculously avoid sleep each night (well, come to think of it, I 
do, but that's another story!). I think this is the point Bruno is making. But 
there's a deeper problem I think with the idea of avoiding the 'vicinity' of 
death. QI says you can never end up on a branch in which you are dead. That's 
clear enough - so long as you grant that death is 'no-point-of-view', i.e., 
there is no no afterlife. But *someone* ends up on all the branches, so long as 
there is a point of view associated wi
    th them. Even if there is a cul-de-sac branch in which the probability of 
death is 100%, some version of you goes down that track. So right up until the 
very brink of death, you should expect your experience to follow the 
probabilities given by normal physics and statistical expectations. You can't, 
by QI, 'foresee' that a branch is a cul-de-sac in advance and so trim it out of 
your possible futures. But because there is always a finite, if vanishingly 
small, probability of not dying, one might expect that one will always find 
oneself 'sliding along the edge of death' so to speak, always just barely 
avoiding oblivion. But this is reminiscent of Zeno's paradox. How can one's 
experience follow normal statistical rules right up until a certain limit, then 
diverge from them to an ever greater, more improbable extent? QI is another of 
the absurd paradoxes that arises when trying to reconcile objectivity and 
subjectivity. I think we'd be better adopting something analogous to Einst
    ein's assumption with regard to speed - namely that the laws of physics 
appear the same to us regardless of our velocity. By the same type of 
reasoning, we should assume that the laws of statistical probability (physics) 
will continue to apply at every point of our experience, even at liminal points 
like death. I personally favour the idea of primary consciousness, so I'm quite 
happy with the idea that 1p experience bridges death. If you don't swallow 
that, I suppose the onus is on you to explain away the paradox by some other 
means.


    Even if computation is fundamental and physics is derivative, that still 
leaves
    consciousness as derivative too and possibly derivative from physics.


I don't see how comp allows consciousness to be derived from physics, since comp assumes consciousness supervenes on computations that Bruno shows must be defined purely mathematically.

But do the computations on which consciousness supervenes necessarily entail a physics? I think they do. I don't think it's possible for a consciousness, at least a human-like consciousness, to exist without a stable environment for it to be aware of, i.e. a physical world.

Brent

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