On 6/22/2012 2:55 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/22/2012 11:42 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
You don't need 1p-indeterminacy for this. The independance requires
only that if a brain support consciousness in a particular
computation not using neuron 323, and if physical supervenience is
true, then consciousness can be said to be supported by the same
brain, doing the same computation with the neuron 323 being
eliminated. Do you agree with this?
That doesn't follow. You are treating consciousness as though it were
a single thing to be either 'supported' or 'not supported'.
Eliminating 323 would only show that those particular conscious
thoughts did not depend on 323, not that 'consciousness' is
independent of 323. Some other conscious thoughts may be impossible
after eliminating 323.
Do you experience consciousness as a fragmented set of events? I do
not... It is a "sinlge thing" in the sense that it is an integral whole
and not a fragmented group of bits. I do think that we are more in
agreement than not...
"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon
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