On 22 Jun 2012, at 20:42, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 6/22/2012 4:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Jun 2012, at 21:32, Stephen P. King wrote:

What does first person indeterminacy show other than the independence of the process that generates the 1p from any particular case of physical system?

You don't need 1p-indeterminacy for this. The independance requires only that if a brain support consciousness in a particular computation not using neuron 323, and if physical supervenience is true, then consciousness can be said to be supported by the same brain, doing the same computation with the neuron 323 being eliminated. Do you agree with this?



It is a known fact that the brain is a "connection" machine. We do not fully understand how it works and many people are only assuming (based on a cartoon of a proof by Tegmark) that it is just a classical machine.

I do not, and often insist that classicality is not part of comp. All quantum computers are Turing emulable, and thus are arithmetically emulated. The additive-multiplicative structure of arithmetic implements (in the original math sense, not in Deutsch revised sense) all quantum computations.



If there is any dependence on quantum entanglement at all involved in the "generation" of the physical correlate of consciousness then the elimination of neural 323 will make a difference.

In that case the 323 register has a role in the computation, and it means only we have not chosen the right substitution level.



We simply are entertaining conjectures at this point with COMP.

Comp is the "conjectural postulate" (theory). The rest is logic.



I cannot comprehend how you minimize the role of the physical in computations to the point of irrelevance and ignore the consequences of this.

I don't minimize it, I nullify its role in consciousness, as a consequence of comp. But I show the price, which is a discovery by itself: the physical laws originates from a pure arithmetical statistics.



I see your result as an important part of the overall advancement of our understanding of consciousness, but I simply do not see the idea that Integers and arithmetic (assuming a particular set of axioms) is primitive ontologically.

So, comp has to be false for you. But that is just your opinion. You don't provide an argument why comp should be false, or if you prefer, why we need primitive matter.




I suspect that we will merely have to agree to disagree on this.

An unicellular is simultaneously a digestive system, a muscle, a liver, a kidney and without doubt a neuron. It does not need an axon because the brain of the unicellular has only one neuron. I am very open with the idea that a unicellular is already conscious. I am agnostic on Hammerov, but it is a red herring (as Hammerov confirmed to me in private) as a tool against comp. Penrose disagrees with Hammerof and me on this, as Penrose want us being not Turing emulable at all. Penrose is genuinely non-computationalist. Not Hammerof. Hammerof just assumes that the comp level is very low.

Now, even if each individual neuron is a microtubular conscious quantum machine, this does not entail that our own level is that low. But again, even if that is that case, and we are quantum computer, this changes nothing in the reasoning. The UD does simulate all quantum computers. Not in real time relatively to us, but the physics comes from the 1-indeterminacy, which is delay-invariant, so it does not matter, from our internal points of view that the emulation of the quantum behavior is super-exponentially slowed down.

Now, if we extract exactly QM from comp (and the current evidences are that that is the case), then we have reason to believe that we are classical machine defined by the Heisenberg uncertainty level. The quantum would be the digital as seen from the first person pov. If our level is lower than the quantum level, comp remains exact, but the comp matter will no more be described entirely by QM: the theory will be incomplete (which I doubt).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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