Thank you for your answers. I will make one comment now. I plan to read
Schneider on molecular machines (thanks for the link) and then I may
make more comments.
On 31.07.2012 11:08 Alberto G. Corona said the following:
Evgenii, great questions
2012/7/30 Evgenii Rudnyi<use...@rudnyi.ru>
On 30.07.2012 11:19 Alberto G. Corona said the following:
The activity of the brain is the mind and the mind is a separate
world that includes all that can be perceived. What is outside of the
mind may just plain mathematics. What we call phisical world is in
reality set of phenomenons perceived by the mind. Observations happen
in the mind. We can repeat and verify experiments because we live in
the same mathematical reality outside of the mind, and because our
minds have similar architecture and experience, so we have the same
language, interests, experimental machines, procedures, so, as Eric
Voegelin said, we live in a shared social mind.
I am not sure if I understand. How do you connect these two assumptions:
"What we call phisical world is in reality set of phenomenons perceived by
"because we live in the same mathematical reality outside of the mind"
Do you mean that the world outside of the mind is congruent with the
perceived world by the mind?
Yes. This is not magical, but a product of natural selection. Our mental
world is made to support life, and life is the art of maintaining and
reproducing our bodies, that live outside of the mind. A computer can
simulate anythnig we want, but our brains are dedicated computers devoted
full time to carefully examine the external reality that appear to our
perception as phenomenons or else, we would not survive. Some irrealities
can be accepted when they are in a trade-off with other more valuable
knowledge, or the perception is too expensive. We do not see individual
dangerous bacterias for example, but we avoid them by smell and taste and
some visual clues, well before we noticed its existence.
So when we have in front of our eyes an arrangement of atoms that has
direct or indirect meaning for our purposes, we identifty and classify it
according with his "use": men, women, disgusting, pleasing, horses,
experiments, countries..but also atoms, electrons and so on. And we proceed
acordingly. None of these things exist outside of the mind, but what we are
sure of is that outside there is something that make all of us perceive the
same things and it respond with certain laws that we have discovered that
are mathematical. So both are congruent because the mind evolved to be
congruent, but not only congruent, but congruent in certain defined ways.
There is a branch called evolutionary epistemology that study the
epistemological consequences of the evolved nature of our mind.
The world in the brain that is congruent with the world outside of the
brain brings us a paradox, as described by Max Velmans:
“Lehar (2003), however, points out that if the phenomenal world is
inside the brain, the real skull must be outside the phenomenal world
(the former and the latter are logically equivalent). Let me be clear:
if one accepts that
a) The phenomenal world appears to have spatial extension to the
perceived horizon and dome of the sky.
b) The phenomenal world is really inside the brain.
It follows that
c) The real skull (as opposed to the phenomenal skull) is beyond the
perceived horizon and dome of the sky.“
Some problem here is that science that we know has started with
observations and we make these observations in the three dimensional
world that we observe outside of our body/brain. Now if we say that
actually what we consciously observe is in the brain, then we should
reconsider as well what observation is.
Hence my interest to skeptic arguments. For example, see famous ‘Proof
of an External World’ by Moore
"How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain
gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as I make a
certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’ (‘Proof of an
External World’ 166)."
"I knew that there was one hand in the place indicated by combining a
certain gesture with my first utterance of ‘here’ and that there was
another in the different place indicated by combining a certain gesture
with my second utterance of ‘here’. How absurd it would be to suggest
that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was
not the case! You might as well suggest that I do not know that I am now
standing up and talking — that perhaps after all I'm not, and that it's
not quite certain that I am! (‘Proof of an External World’ 166)"
With the picture as described by you, this does not work any more.
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