On 31 Jul 2012, at 17:36, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:

## Advertising

Citeren Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:On 30 Jul 2012, at 19:57, meekerdb wrote:On 7/30/2012 2:19 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:The Boltzman brains , according with what i have read, arecompletely different beasts. Boltzman pressuposes, that , sinceno random arrangement of matter is statistically impossible,and Boltzman demonstrated it in certain conditions (ergodicconditions) , with enough time, some arrangements of matterwould simulate minds, or even worlds and civilizations. But15.000 Million years, that is the age of the universe is notenough.Boltzman was considering the question of how the universe came tobe in its state of low entropy. I could be due to a randomfluctuation. And it was more probable that the randomfluctuation simply produced the universe as we see than afluctuation that produced a big bang universe which then evolvedinto what we see.Actually I doubt this, like the probability that life appears onearth and leads to us, is plausibly bigger than the probabilitythat "I" appears here just now, in my exact current state.And extending this line of thought further, a fluctuation thatmerely created a brain along with the illusion of this universewas still more probable (i.e. less improbable).If that were true, that could be used to put more doubt on theexistence of the 1-person indeterminacy measure, I think.In the UD, or arithmetic, this reflects the competition betweenlittle numbers (simple explanation) and big numbers(algorithmically complex explanation). But the indeterminacy bearson all numbers, so the little one have to multiply much more thanthe complex one, in some ways. Linearity at the physical bottommight be explained by that phenomenon, qualitatively.Sean Carroll has a good discussion of this and why this argumentdoes not hold for a multiverse, in his book "From Infinity to Here".Looks interesting. I guess this can be very easily extended to the"many dreams" occurring in arithmetic.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/The problem is to explain also why the entropy of the early universewas so low. If you just accept that this is the case and also don'tbother about the very distant future, there is no problem. But ifyou assume that time goes on from the infinite distant past and/orto the infinite distant future, you have a problem, because smallerlocal low entropy states are then more likely than the wholeobservable universe being in some low entropy state.And Sean Carroll's argument amounts to simply hiding the problem inan ever expanding state space, it's not that he has shown that in amultiverse the problem doesn't occur.

`But with comp I don't see how we could avoid the ever expanding state`

`space. That is what a UD is, notably, and its existence is a`

`consequence of simple laws (+ and *).`

`Should not a quantum multiverse also contains some quantum universal`

`dovetailer and avoids the problem in the Sean Carroll way? (as far as`

`I can imagine it)`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.