Hi Stephen,
On 8/6/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
[SPK] Which is the definition I use. Any one that actually
thinks that God is a person, could be a person, or is the
complement (anti) of such, has truly not thought through the
implications of such.
[BM
For me, and comp, it is an open problem.
[SPK]
? Why? It's not complicated! A person must be, at least,
nameable. A person has always has a name.
[BM]
Why?
Because names are necessary for persistent distinguishability.
OK. You are using "name" in the logician sense of "definite
description". With comp we always have a 3-name, but the first person
have no name.
Let us try an informal proof by contradiction. Consider the case
where it is *not* necessary for a person to have a name. What means
would then exist for one entity to be distinguished from another?
By the entity itself: no problem (and so this is not a problem for the
personal evaluation of the measure). By some other entity?
We might consider the location of an entity as a proxy for the
purposes of identification, but this will not work because entities
can change location and a list of all of the past locations of an
entity would constitute a name and such is not allowed in our
consideration here.
Sure.
What about the 1p content of an entity, i.e. the private name that
an entity has for itself with in its self-referential beliefs?
It has no such name. "Bp & p", for example, cannot be described in
arithmetic, despite being defined in arithmetical terms. It is like
arithmetical truth, we can't define it in arithmetic language.
Since it is not communicable - as this would make the 1p aspect a
non-first person concern and thus make it vanish - it cannot be a
name. Names are 3p, they are public invariants that form from a
consensus of many entities coming to an agreement, and thus cannot
be determined strictly by 1p content. You might also note that the
anti-foundation axiom is "every graph has a unique decoration". The
decoration is the name! It is the name that allow for non-ambiguous
identification.
A number's name is its meaning invariant symbol representation
class... Consider what would happen to COMP if entities had no
names! Do I need to go any further for you to see the absurdity of
persons (or semi-autonomous entities) not having names?
Say that it is X. There is something that is not that person and
that something must therefore have a different name: not-X. What
is God's name? ... It cannot be named because there is nothing
that it is not! Therefore God cannot be a person. Transcendence
eliminates nameability. The Abrahamist think that Satan is the
anti-God, but that would be a denial of God's transcendence. There
are reasons why Abrahamists do not tolerate logic, this is one of
them.
With comp if God exists it has no name, but I don't see why it
would make it a non person. God is unique, it does not need a name.
God is unique because there is no complement nor alternative to
it. Ambiguously stated: God is the totality of what is necessarily
possible.
That is not bad in a first approximation. With comp, you can make it
precise through the set of Gödel numbers of the true arithmetical
sentences. Obviously this is not a computable set, and it is not
nameable by the machine (with comp), making set theory somehow too
rich for comp. Of course, arithmetic contains or emulates a lot of
entities believing in set theory, but we should not reify those
beliefs in the ontology. It is better to keep them only in the machine
epistemology.
On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Is the translation or encoding a unique mapping? How many possible
ways are available to encode B?
There is an infinity of way to encode "B". Some can be just
intensionally equivalent (different codes but same logic), or
extensionally equivalent but not intensionally equivalent, like Bp
and Bp & Dt. They prove the same arithmetical proposition, but
obeys different logic.
OK, do you not see that the infinity of ways that "B" can be
encoded makes the name of "B" ambiguous?
I don't see that at all.
The name of "B" is at most 1p; a private name and thus subject to
Wittgenstein's criticism.
All the names of "B" are third person notion, even if "B" itself
cannot recognize its body or code. It is only "self-ambiguous", which
is partially relevant for the measure problem. This is why I use modal
logic to handle that situation, besides the fact that incompleteness
leaves no real choice in the matter.
The experiences are strictly 1p even if they are the
intersection of an infinity of computations, but this is what makes
then have a zero measure!
Ah?
A finite and semi-closed consensus of 1p's allows for the
construction of diaries and thus for the meaningfulness of "shared"
experiences. But this is exactly what a non-primitive material world
is in my thinking and nothing more. A material world is merely a
synchronized collection of interfaces (aka synchronized or 'aligned'
bisimulations) between the experiences of the computations. I use
the concept of simulations (as discussed by David Deutsch in his
book "The Fabric of Reality") to quantify the experiences of
computations. You use the modal logical equivalent. I think that we
are only having a semantical disagreement here.
?
The problem that I see in COMP is that if we make numbers (or any
other named yet irreducible entity) as an ontological primitive
makes the measure problem unsolvable because it is not possible to
uniquely name relational schemata of numbers. The anti-foundation
axiom of Azcel - every graph has a unique decoration - is not
possible in your scheme because of the ambiguity of naming that
Godel numbering causes. One always has to jump to a meta-theory to
uniquely name the entities within a given theory (defined as in
Godel's scheme) such that there is a bivalent truth value for the
names. Interestingly, this action looks almost exactly like what
happens in a forcing! So my claim is, now, that at best your step 8
is true in a forced extension.
1004.
On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
[SPK] At what level (relative) is the material hypostases?
[BM]
This is ambiguous. The material hypostases (Bp & Dt) defines the
(high) level where machines (the person incarnated by the machine)
can make the observations.
But it is preferable to extracts all those answer by yourself, for
all what I say here needs to be extracted to get the UDA step by
step.
Dear Bruno,
OK, we seem to be in agreement on this. At the "high level" there
is a meaningful notion of observations (and naming as I have
discussed in previous posts) but never at the primitive level.
OK.
My point is that this meaningfulness vanished anywhere outside of
this high level.
I agree.
We cannot pull back the meaning of a term when and if we pull back
the term to the primitive level, because doing so, as you discuss in
step 8,
?
severs the connection that carries the relations that define the
unique name that occurs at the high level. This is the problem of
epiphenomena of immaterialism.
?
On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
We cannot use the Godel numbering because they are not unique,
?
If the names (description) were unique, there would be no first
person indeterminacy. A enumerable infinity , non mechanically
enumerable though, of explicit description of Stephen King exists
in arithmetic, if comp is true.
Dear Bruno,
But it does not exist uniquely as a singleton in arithmetic
OK.
and that is the problem.
The interesting problem, yes. That is the point.
It does exist as the equivalence relation on a infinite class of
computations, but these equivalence classes do not have a power-set
of which they are a uniquely defined.
?
Names are only meaningful when and if they are 3p.
Sure.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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