On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:22, Roger wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
Personally I go with Roger Penrose and his conjecture that, as
I personally understand it, conscious experience is noncomputable.
Penrose is right, but with a wrong argument. The fact that
consciousness is not computable, nor even definable, is a consequence
of mechanism. It does not refute mechanism, it confirms it.
Which is not to say that IMHO experience can be understood through
Leibniz's metaphysics of substances (using category theory).
IMHO, that's the only way.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
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